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The first stories I ever heard were the ones my mother brought with her out of 
Ethiopia, where she grew up. This project germinated as I asked her to tell them to me 
over and over again. I am indebted to my grandfather, who always tried to understand 
Ethiopia on its own terms, my grandmother the book lover, who insisted on finishing 
high school, and Kofi Obeng, who first told me Ananse tales long ago. I have carried 
them with me. My father nurtured my curiosity, and the fact that he gave me the animated 
Gulliver’s Travels on VHS around the age of 8 is no doubt to blame for my 
preoccupation with eighteenth-century exploration narratives. I learn astonishing things 
every day from my spouse, Sean, who has helped me find the key not once but many 
times.   
I have been overwhelmed by the intellectual generosity of Laura Engel, Kristina 
Bross, Christopher Lukasik, and Geraldine Friedman—mentors and committee members 
who encouraged and inspired me. I didn’t know when I checked a new book about 
Ethiopia and Samuel Johnson out from the library that the author had long connections 
with both my committee chair and my mother, but I have benefited enormously from 
Wendy Laura Belcher’s support, whether it was fate that induced her to board this ship or 
not. I have been grateful for Manushag Powell, who captained it, every leg of the journey: 
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This dissertation argues that African worlds and worldviews left an indelible mark on 
British Enlightenment texts, whether their authors encountered the continent first or 
secondhand. As eighteenth-century thinkers began experimenting with empirical and 
categorical strategies for making sense of the globe, Africa was an important testing 
ground for these burgeoning epistemological methodologies. Travelers and writers tried 
to reconcile observer-based methods of knowledge production with the continent’s 
reputedly impenetrable landscapes, unfamiliar cultures, and strange animals. Such 
inquiries engendered broader philosophical debates about the natures of nature, the body, 
and the self. Yet, I contend Africa was not a passive participant in this process. Not only 
did African environments undermine European attempts to reduce the continent to 
empirical data; as such epistemological methods failed, writers filled in their texts with 
African knowledge and narratives. As a result, African representational practices, 
economics, technologies, medical advances, and even thoughts on the body and soul 






This dissertation argues that Africa influenced early eighteenth-century British 
literature and shaped Enlightenment notions about the self and world. I examine how 
both travel writers and authors of imaginative works incorporated African history, 
knowledge, and narratives into their texts. Scholars have often suggested that the Africa 
of eighteenth-century European literature is either an imaginative space with no tangible 
connection to authentic African worlds or an inert geography of difference onto which 
writers projected fantasies of colonial domination. Chinua Achebe famously wrote in 
1977 that in European texts, “Africa is to Europe as the picture is to Dorian Gray—a 
carrier onto whom the master unloads his physical and moral deformities so that he may 
go forward, erect and immaculate” (251). Achebe suggests, and many literary critics have 
agreed, that there is no space for any kind of “real” understanding of Africa in these 
representations—the power-knowledge field simply does not allow for it. Instead, Africa 
is produced as a fantasy space that Europeans first possess imaginatively, through 
storytelling, and then literally through colonization. As various cultural critics have 
argued, these representational practices go hand-in-hand with the development of 
Enlightenment literature and knowledge-making methodologies in the eighteenth 
century—the time when Europeans allegedly first began objectifying the world through 





By addressing how the production of European knowledge has been both 
historically situated and politicized, these methods have highlighted deeply entrenched 
power imbalances in order to bring visibility to still marginalized cultural groups in both 
former colonies and in the African diaspora. Yet, scholars across several disciplines have 
also considered the limitations of these kinds of methodological and theoretical 
frameworks for how we understand the nature of contact between Europe and non-
European places. Historian John Thornton’s 1992 Africa and Africans in the Making of 
the Atlantic World establishes that, particularly during the early Enlightenment, African 
leaders still wielded an enormous amount of both territorial and economic control in their 
dealings with Europeans. The anthropologist Julian Fabian reminds us that “There is 
overwhelming indirect evidence that European travelers seldom met their [African] hosts 
in a state we would expect of scientific explorers: clear-minded and self-controlled. More 
often than not, they…were ‘out of their minds’ with extreme fatigue, fear, delusions of 
grandeur, and feelings ranging from anger to contempt” (3). This figure often surfaces in 
eighteenth-century texts, standing in stark opposition to, for example, Mary Louise 
Pratt’s “seeing man,” who coolly and collectedly casts his gaze over foreign landscapes, 
ordering their spaces in accordance with Enlightenment principles of rationality.2  
The idea that Africa functioned as blank, exploitable space in the European 
imagination is indebted to Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism, but the literary critic 
Srinivas Aravamudan has suggested the terms of “Enlightenment Orientalism” need to be 
redefined, as most of the eighteenth century predates the corporate colonial structures on 
which Said’s theory depends. He observes, “Not just bent on the domination of the other 





Orientalism the self was under critique as much as any ‘other’” (3). Cognizant of the 
extent that outstanding models of postcolonial scholarship still put the colonizer at the 
center of literary analysis, Wendy Laura Belcher has argued for a model that “enables us 
to recognize how Europe’s others were not merely an ingredient of European 
representations, not merely the exploited subjects of the European gaze, but also the 
producers of discourse that has co-constituted European representations” (1). It is a 
mistake, Belcher argues, to assume that Africa can only be represented through its 
measurable particularities (229); rather, she suggests, African discourse has the capacity 
to “possess” Europeans who encounter it, through travel or text, becoming a part of 
European knowledge and worldviews (3). 
Critical frameworks that endow European writers with the ability to discursively 
transform Africa into blank space tend to treat the authorial subject as an impenetrable 
self, fully in control of his or her representational practices. But in doing so, they gloss 
over the fact that narrating or authorial subjects’ limitations are as much a part of any text 
as their intentions, and they bracket the ways that African people, places, objects, and 
animals influenced European texts and minds. This project traces how African worlds 
and worldviews left an indelible mark on eighteenth-century British literature, whether its 
authors encountered the continent first or secondhand. I analyze a range of widely read 
eighteenth-century texts, including the fiction of Aphra Behn, Daniel Defoe, and Samuel 
Johnson; the satire of the Scriblerians (Alexander Pope, Jonathan Swift, John Gay, and 
John Arbuthnot); the eyewitness accounts of popular travel writers such as Willem 
Bosman and James Bruce; geographical dictionaries and scientific tracts; and sketches, 





on these works makes them visible in an intellectual tradition that has tended to obscure 
them. It also allows us to re-envision the Enlightenment less as the brainchild of 
European Cartesian subjects than a phenomenon that was globally, multiculturally 
produced. 
I argue that as eighteenth-century thinkers began experimenting with empirical 
and categorical strategies for making sense of the globe, Africa was an important testing 
ground for these burgeoning epistemological methodologies. Travelers and writers tried 
to reconcile observer-based methods of knowledge production with the continent’s 
reputedly impenetrable landscapes, unfamiliar cultures, and strange animals. Such 
inquiries engendered broader philosophical debates about the natures of nature, the body, 
and the self. Furthermore, Africa was not a passive participant in this process. Not only 
did African environments undermine European attempts to reduce the continent to 
empirical data; as such epistemological methods failed, writers filled in their texts with 
African knowledge and narratives. As a result, African representational practices, 
economics, technologies, medical advances, and even thoughts on the body and soul 
became an inextricable part of British Enlightenment discourse. 
I am not arguing that eighteenth-century British texts act as unclouded window 
into Africa—as Kwasi Wiredu and V.Y. Mudimbe have argued, it would be a mistake to 
assume that Western epistemological structures can serve as accurate mirrors for African 
systems of thought.4 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to examine how African worlds and 
worldviews became part of the foundations of British Enlightenment through the very 
exploration narratives and imaginative fictions that also exerted fantasies of European 





knowledge is locally produced and encourages scholarship to look beyond Europe as the 
epicenter of modernity. Furthermore, taking seriously the role that Africa played in 
shaping these foundations of modern European knowledge and culture puts us a step 
closer to taking seriously the role that Africa plays on the world stage today.  
 
The Local Foundations of Global Knowledge  
By “global knowledge,” I mean both knowledge of the globe and how knowledge 
was abstracted in the eighteenth century from particular or experiential evidence 
according to the epistemological methods of the early Enlightenment.5 The global, as a 
metaphor for a universal or a synthesized whole, was intimately tied to the global as a 
geographical concept. As David Livingstone argues, “to try and figure out how local 
experience is transformed into shared generalization is… to ask fundamentally 
geographical questions” (xi). Furthermore, the geographer John Agnew suggests, “An 
account of the modern geopolitical imagination—the predominant ways world politics 
has been represented, talked about and acted on geographically by both major actors and 
commentators over the past two hundred years—must start with the origins and 
development of the capacity to see the world as a whole” (11). Agnew is one of many 
scholars who understand the ability to see the world-as-picture (to borrow and literalize a 
term from Heidegger) as a defining factor of modernity (17).6 This “perspectival basis” is, 
according to Agnew, the foundation for “the scientific model of knowing” (18) because it 
enables the illusion of both objectivity and the synthesis of particular, empirical 
experiences into abstract concepts that have long been considered foundational to 





historical phenomenon. Representation was, Heidegger argues, the key way modern 
thinkers brought the rest of the world in “relation to oneself” (132). The cultural power of 
the globalized world-as-picture is that it not only makes the world calculable, it makes 
the world transferable—it can be circulated, conjectured over, and projected upon. 
But in the practice of geographical inquiry, particular and experiential evidence 
was not always easily assimilated into the global. 7 In fact, Livingstone questions whether 
scientific knowledge, once produced locally, can ever really be universal or if it always 
carries with it the vestiges of its origins. “Spaces both enable and constrain discourse,” he 
writes, stimulating how we see and describe our worlds (7).8 Travel writing is of course 
the most immediately obvious genre that broadcasts these tensions: the way travelers’ 
particular experiences often conflicted with accepted truths led to their dual reputations as 
both knowledge producers and untrustworthy raconteurs. But imaginative literature 
played a crucial role in validating and challenging early Enlightenment epistemological 
methodologies as well. Rather than “a site of philosophical argumentation itself,” John 
Bender observes that the novel, for instance, is “a genre that inquires into knowledge and 
knowing” (6). Writers including Aphra Behn, Daniel Defoe, the Scriberians, and Samuel 
Johnson took up the topic of early globalism and how contact with non-European 
geographies challenged cultural understandings of knowledge and truth. Although they 
came from different social and political backgrounds, and their critiques are each 
different, all of these authors turned to Africa as their testing ground. I argue these 
fictionalized narratives of Africa, rather than functioning as purely imaginative depictions, 
map complex relationships among geography, knowledge, and history that illustrate 





modernity. Such an investigation complicates the world-as-picture as the foundation of 
Enlightenment epistemologies, enabling us to see that the discursive reification of the 
division between self and world is not as pervasive or as persuasive in eighteenth-century 
texts as it may first appear. 
If the early Enlightenment world was ideally understood as a coherent image or 
picture that the observer can construct in relation to his own detached subject position, 
Africa was its event horizon—its interior was neither accessed nor charted by Europeans 
until well into the nineteenth century. Confident British gazers who may write about what 
they see from the safety of James Island suddenly become much less visible themselves 
the farther they move inland, into territory that is not only unmapped but controlled by 
Africans who are oblivious to or unconvinced by the discourse of British exceptionalism. 
Instead, they begin to incorporate the stories of others into their own, the often 
incalculable experience of confronting the unknown inflects their narratives, their 
accounts are wrought by place. In the moments when British exceptionalism either fails 
or is intentionally set aside as authors question the viability of certain representational 
methodologies, the ways that the British thinking subject was constituted through contact 
with African people, places, animals, and art becomes apparent.  
 
What was Africa to Eighteenth-Century Britons? 
The most obvious and well-studied connection between Britain and Africa in the 
eighteenth century is the transatlantic slave trade. As plantation agriculture increased in 
the West Indies, so too did the demand for laborers, particularly ones who were used to 





belong.9 Britain’s involvement in the slave trade increased dramatically in 1713 when 
Britain gained the Asiento from Spain as part of the Treaty of Utrecht that ended the War 
of Spanish Succession, giving Britain exclusive rights to provide the Spanish colonies 
with slaves.10 Yet, the transatlantic slave trade was not Britain’s only interest in Africa 
during this time, commercial or otherwise. For one, much of the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century literature about Africa is preoccupied with trade in other commodities. 
The anonymous author of The Golden Coast, or a Description of Guinney (1660) calls 
America a land of “Rarities,” and Asia a land of “Pleasure,” but Africa a land of 
“Treasures” (2), and as the title of the text suggests, one of the most coveted of these 
treasures was gold. As I discuss further in Chapter 2, travelers to Africa desired to locate 
the source of its gold mines, but during this time Europe’s relationship to the continent 
was mercantile rather than colonial, and African potentates had no compunctions about 
denying European factors access to their lands.11 The Dutch factor Willem Bosman wrote 
in his 1703 travel account, translated into English in 1705,  
There is no small number of Men in Europe who believe that the Gold Mines are 
in our Power; that we, like the Spaniards in the West Indies, have no more to do 
but to work them by our slaves. Though you perfectly know we have no manner 
of access to these Treasures, nor do I believe that any of our People have ever 
seen one of them: Which you will easily credit, when you are informed that the 
Negroes esteem them Sacred and consequently take all possible care to keep us 
from them. (80) 
The goldfields and mines of Guinea were managed by Mande and Akan groups, and 





merchants.12 Africa’s coastal societies were cosmopolitan and economically complex, 
and British writers knew that.   
In fact, as I detail in Chapter 1, the successes of the trans-Sahara trade was one 
factor that piqued Britain’s interest in Africa, as stories circulated in Europe about Arabs 
who had grown rich from African gold, ivory, slaves, beeswax, and civet. Richard Jobson, 
who traveled along the Gambia in the early seventeenth century, relates a story in his 
Golden Trade (1623) that showcases both British interest in the trans-Sahara trade and 
the circuitous interconnections among African, Arab, and European worlds in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Looking for a direct link to the inland goldfields 
that he has heard about from “good grounded conferances with…principle Merchants of 
Barbary” (4), Jobson seeks out a Mandinka guide he calls Bucker Sano, who he has heard 
will take Europeans up the Gambia, observing that “those promising rivers” are the most 
likely way of accessing “this golden trade, by the South parts” (5). At their first meeting, 
Jobson notices that the blade of Bucker Sano’s sword and that a pair of bracelets his wife 
is wearing appear to be “brought in their beginnings, either from London, or some other 
part of this our native Country” (92). When Jobson asks Bucker Sano how he came by 
the items, he responds, “there were people used to come amongst them, whom they called 
Arabecks, who brought them these, and diverse other commodities…Tawny Moores 
[who] came in great companies together and with many Cammels” (92). The sword and 
the bracelets—British in origin but ending up in West Africa through Eastern channels—
are an apt synecdoche for the complex role Africa and Africans played in mediating and 





were much more attuned to these complex routes of contact and exchange than is often 
assumed—a fact that is reflected in early Enlightenment texts about Africa.  
This is because Europeans were not only interested in Africa for its material 
goods. As Pratt illustrates, the eighteenth century was characterized “by an orientation 
toward interior exploration and the construction of global-scale meaning through the 
descriptive apparatuses of natural history” (15). Travel writing, and the imaginative 
fictions that both borrowed from and commented on geographical texts, “produce[d] the 
world” for a British readership (4). However, the production of Africa proved both 
illuminating and vexing for naturalists and geographers. The Golden Coast, for example, 
opens with a tree diagram—a much-used means of categorizing knowledge in 
Enlightenment travel narratives—that breaks the world down into two parts: the unknown, 
and the known (2). The “unknown” category includes Africa as well as America and “the 
Southern Continent” (Willem Janzoon had brought reports of Australia back to Europe 
around 1600). The “known” category, is further broken down into two additional 
categories, what was known “Anciently,” which includes Europe, Asia, and Africa, and 
what has been known “Lately” which includes America. Africa’s double place in the 
diagram illustrates its complicated position in the production of knowledge about the 
globe. The knowledge that Europeans have about it is ancient, but not conclusive, it is 
familiar but foreign, and so in the cultural imagination it was paradoxically portrayed as 
both known and unknown—a geographical puzzle to be solved. As George Abbot 
concludes in his 1664 Briefe description of the whole world, of the Old World continents, 
Africa remains the most elusive: “So exact a description is therefore not to be looked for, 





to gather detailed information about the continent, about its geographical features, its 
inhabitants both human and nonhuman, its resources, its climate, and so on. 
 Representing Africa was a constant exercise in moving from this abundance of 
local, particular evidence to global observations and claims. The result, as Roxann 
Wheeler notes, was not simply a homogenized space of otherness. Rather, “many writers 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed [Africa] contained the most 
diversity of any quarter of the world” (94), and they devised various strategies for 
indexing that diversity.13 Geographies, for example, always broke the continent down 
into distinct regions, although with few exceptions these regions and their boundaries 
vary from text to text. John Ogilby’s Africa (1670) divides the continent into Egypt, 
Barbary, Negroland, Nether Ethiopia, Upper Ethiopia or Abyssinia, and the African 
Islands. The third edition of The Compleat Geographer (1709), printed by John and 
Awnsham Churchill with engravings by the famous geographer and cartographer Herman 
Moll, divides the continent into more regions including Barbary, Egypt, Biledulgerid, 
Saara, Negroland, Guinea, Nubia, Abyssynia, Zanguebar, the Kongo, Monomotapa and 
the land of the Cafres, and contains sections on the oceanic islands and on Malta.  
As travelers attempted to understand the differences and relationships between 
Africa’s diverse cultural groups, these tidy divisions blurred again. Though it may seem 
that, for example, that Islamic Barbary, Christian Abyssinia, and pagan Guinea are 
distinct, ongoing territory wars as well as institutions like the trans-Sahara trade and the 
inter-African slave trade meant that the both the cultural and the political borders across 
Africa were often in flux. The Compleat Geographer reminds readers that along with 





sixteenth century by Jesuit missionaries, and in Morocco there are white inhabitants who 
“boast that they are descended from Christians” (169). Despite Abyssinia’s reputation in 
Europe as a Christian nation—possibly even the kingdom of Prester John—the 1711 New 
Collections of Voyages and Travels points out that there are Jews and Muslims that live 
there as well (31). The Compleat Geographer laments that the once great Egypt has been 
taken over by Islam (165), but Charles Jacques Poncet, a French physician who traveled 
to Ethiopia in 1699 to treat Iyasu I for a skin condition, wrote about the longstanding 
institutional relationship between the Ethiopian Orthodox Täwaḥəәdo Church and the 
Coptic Church of Alexandria (56).14 In his 1735 travel narrative, Francis Moore gives an 
account of the inhabitants along the Gambia River, which include Wolof who enslave the 
Muslim Fula (69), Mandinka who practice Islam (26), and Mandinka who participate in 
traditional West African religious ceremonies and masquerades (116).15  
Africa was a melting pot not only between cultures and religions, but between 
texts and discourses as well. As John Thornton points out, early modern inhabitants of the 
Kingdom of Kongo did not simply adopt Portuguese Catholicism but blended it with and 
translated it through their preexisting belief systems (“Development” 157-58). The Bible, 
for instance, was called nkanda ukisi or a “charm in the form of a book,” incorporating 
the pre-Christian belief in charms, or nkisi, directly into the new religion. When Emperor 
Iyasu received paintings of saints from Poncet as a gift, he requested that the names of 
the saints be written underneath the images in Ge’ez. “Upon this Occasion,” Poncet 
writes, “[Iyasu] told me we were of the same Religion, and only differed in certain Rites” 
(86). Both Jobson and Moore provide descriptions of gris gris, strips of paper from the 





sometimes with plants or animal parts, intended to protect the wearer from harm (39-40). 
The Arabic script and the pagan artifact designed to send a message to the spirits that 
bridge the divine and corporeal worlds function as one in spite of the alleged divisions 
between sub-Saharan and Arabic North Africa. Thus, it is clear that despite early 
geographers’ affection for the tree diagram, eighteenth-century British writers and 
readers had to continually confront the limitations of such schematics for reflecting the 
complexity of the world’s second largest continent, where categorical boundaries seemed 
to collapse. Africa resisted both synthesis and homogenization.  
Africa as a place of such mixture or hybridity fed into European perceptions of 
the continent that dated back to the classical texts of Aristotle and Herodotus. In his 
natural history, Pliny the Elder makes note of “the common Greek Proverb that Africa is 
continually bringing forth something new,” and as I detail in Chapter 3, some variation of 
this proverb appears in nearly every travel text about Africa published in the eighteenth 
century. More commonly recited today as “something new is always coming out of 
Africa,” it is from this proverb that we get the modern day phrase “Out of Africa,” 
immortalized by Karen von Blixen-Finecke’s memoir of living in Kenya in the early 
twentieth century and the 1985 film based on the book starring Robert Redford and Meryl 
Streep. The phrase is used now in a positive if somewhat over-romanticized sense to 
signify both Africa’s status as the cradle of life and the potential of its postcolonial 
nations to become contributors to the so-called first world. It is, for example, the official 
motto of South Africa’s natural history museum, included in Latin on the museum’s coat 





that in Africa, the animals crossbreed, producing offspring that continually upset the rules 
of nature. 
These kinds of associations have spawned many negative stereotypes about Africa 
as a fabulous, monstrous space that pervaded European texts through the nineteenth 
century, and I consider the context and implications of the proverb as it pertains to these 
issues further in Chapter 3. However, mixture was not always considered a negative thing 
by eighteenth-century thinkers and writers. Wolfram Schmidgen argues that “Early 
eighteenth-century culture prized the mixture of different kinds: linguistic, literary, 
religious, racial, and political,” and that in science and politics, such mixture was 
identified as a “modernizing force” (xi-xii).16 Both Dror Wahrman and Aravamudan 
suggest it is not until the end of the eighteenth century that Britons adopted a culture of 
severe xenophobia (219; Enlightenment 4). Rather, Aravamudan remarks that pre-
nineteenth-century engagement with non-European cultures and places oscillated 
between xenophobia and xenophilia, resulting in a “hybrid mode that refutes nascent 
ideologies of autochthony and parthenogenesis” (10). The fact that Africa was a space of 
mixture in the eighteenth century, of surprising animals, peoples, and ideas that 
continually challenged what Britons thought they knew, meant that it was also an 
important testing ground for the knowledge-making methodologies of the British 
Enlightenment—a term that I am using to demarcate the epistemological shifts in how 






Worlds and Worldviews in the Age of Enlightenment 
Although the idea of the Enlightenment lost much of its humanist traction in the 
twentieth century,17 the intellectual practices of the eighteenth century still underpin the 
production of modern knowledge.18 As Withers puts it, “The Enlightenment, scrutinized 
in all sorts of ways, may be politically dead—but it won’t lie down intellectually” (5). It 
remains a cultural phenomenon worth investigating. However, acknowledging 
Enlightenment’s academic value means continuing to dispel the myth that it was largely a 
product of white European men who “dared to know,” as Kant would have it. If the study 
of Enlightenment requires, as Foucault once suggested, “a historical investigation into the 
events that have led us to constitute ourselves, and to recognizes ourselves as subjects of 
what we are doing, thinking, saying” (“What” 46), it is important to look beyond both 
Europe and beyond the European subject as modernity’s impassable agents.  
Reimagining Enlightenment as “global encounters locally articulated” (Withers 
14) and as a phenomenon in which objects of study have the agency to influence 
observers enables us to see how African worlds and Africans’ worldviews were not 
merely tangential to British literature and thought in the eighteenth century.19 I take 
Africa as my case study for this not because it was the only non-European geography that 
was writing back into European texts, but because it was uniquely vexing to European 
thinkers and writers and because it is woefully understudied in the field.20 Although we 
now resoundingly reject Hegel’s nineteenth-century argument that effectively excluded 
the continent from discussions of the development of modernity, it is worthwhile to ask 





Britain’s contact with and representations of Africa and its inhabitants in the 
eighteenth century are not reducible to either the slave trade or to a proto-colonial 
episteme. British texts about Africa were self-consciously shaped for political or 
institutional ends, but they also reflect the incalculable experience of confronting 
unknown geographies, Europeans’ dependence on African knowledge to navigate and 
survive in the torrid zone, and encounters with African self-representation. These latter 
factors are not subsumed by institutionalized representations of the continent but coexist 
alongside them in the texts that provided the structures and data of early Enlightenment 
geographical knowledge: travel narratives, surveys, and even fictional genres like novels 
and romances. As different as they may have been in other ways, Behn, Defoe, Pope, 
Swift, Gay, Arbuthnot, and Johnson were all preoccupied with questions about what it 
means to know the world, and they explored the limitations of empiricism for producing 
this global knowledge. Despite the fact that both firsthand and imaginative accounts 
about Africa relied on the tropes of the eyewitness account—their visual language 
suggesting “the hegemony of a particular means of seeing and framing nature” (Broglio 
16)—these authors were aware of the fact that travelers’ relationships with the places 
they encountered were mediated through more senses than sight, and that sight itself is 
not reducible to “the most sensible and least sensate sense” (Broglio 19). Their 
imaginative accounts of Africa posit the contact zone as a simultaneously material and 
conceptual space, comprised of both experience and discourse, European and African.    
If we reimagine the contact zone this way, it thus becomes possible to account for 
the bodily and psychological vulnerability of the travelers who wrote about the continent 





such representations translated African knowledge into European discourse. I suggest that 
these influences are encoded in many eighteenth-century texts about Africa, whether they 
are fictional and romantic, like Oroonoko or Rasselas, or eyewitness accounts, like John 
Atkins’s or William Smith’s. As Broglio points out, contact zones are not in and of 
themselves reducible to the hegemonic strategies that may be used to represent them; 
rather, “Contact zones take up the movement of bodies within the landscape and the 
passage of thought prior to symbolic abstraction as well as later capturing and ordering 
nature within representational systems” (21). It is therefore possible that these 
representational systems transmit more of that contact than even the writers themselves 
intend or realize.21 Furthermore, as Catherine Molineux argues, our definition of these 
contact zones can extend beyond the physical geography of the African coast to the 
media through which a British public would have encountered the continent, inflected 
though they are by imagination and fantasy (Faces 6). Thus, we need to consider the 
extent that such texts were “globally produced,” as Belcher puts it (Abyssinia’s 1), rather 
than purely reflective of European hegemonic worldviews. 
Henri Lefebvre’s work is useful for theorizing how the material and the 
conceptual work together to produce defined and understandable spaces. Ontologically, 
the theory jettisons a subject/object binary in favor of a model that illustrates 
interconnectivity among body, mind, and world. In his response to the tendency of some 
postmodern theories to fetishize space as a subject-producing, logico-epsitemological 
phenomenon, Lefebvre argues against the notion that “mental space” can and should be 
detached from “physical and social spheres,” especially when such theories give no clear 





perceived space—that is, materially quantifiable space (32)—and conceived space—that 
is, space as a symbolic code grounded in imperatives of order and production (33)—are 
taken together, what surfaces is not a materialism-idealism or subject-object binary but a 
trialectics among historicality, spatiality, and sociality that radically opens up how we 
think of both being-in-the-world and knowledge of the world.22 As he suggests, it is 
important to tease out the links between the material world and the conceptual world 
“even if the links between these concepts and the physical realities to which they 
correspond are not always clearly established” (12). Doing so results in a model of space 
that his student Edward Soja has termed “Thirdspace”—the lived space that breaks the 
binary relationship between the perceived space of the material world and the conceived 
space of epistemology, space that is both real and imagined (10). Furthermore, as Robert 
Tally, Jr., argues, narrative is how we map these “real-and-imaginary” spaces (6), making 
narratives vital objects of study for understanding how the real and imaginary work 
together to form the lived. 
Seeing these relationships, though, requires letting go of presumptions about the 
sovereignty of identity and the self that informs many critical theories about how non-
European places are represented in eighteenth-century literature. As Bernard Westphal 
argues, “Most issues of spatial analysis in the field of literature focus on the individual’s 
point of view, which, depending on the genre, is the author’s or a fictional character’s 
point of view” (111). He calls this kind of analysis “ego-centered analysis,” which, in 
essence, takes the Cartesian viewing subject as an allegory for a text’s structure. 
Conversely, when one shifts the analytical focus from the authorial or narrating subject to 





(113). My methodology assumes that instead of a sovereign self fully in control of the 
representations he or she produces, the viewing or authorial subject can be acted upon by 
the environments or geographies he or she attempts to represent, understanding that 
“environments” or “geographies” are not simply containers for people and objects but are 
comprehensive, self-organizing systems that have some measure of impact on those who 
enter into them.23 In other words, these writers can be “out of their minds” as Fabian puts 
it (3) or “discursively possessed” as Belcher puts it (Abyssinia’s 9), encountering people, 
places, ideas, and experiences that rupture rather than reinforce narratives of European 
sovereignty. In this way, representations are produced at least in part by environments 
themselves, even if they are still inflected by cultural biases and the trappings of 
fictionality. In fact, in such texts, “The fictional place takes part in a variable relationship 
with the real. Its geography assumes a mixed status” (Westphal 99). Such an inquiry does 
not ignore questions of identity but comes around to them through a broader definition of 
what constituted reality for subjects of the British Enlightenment.  
Furthermore, African subjects are fundamental to my understanding of African 
worlds or African geographies. Geography, after all, is a product of culture. 
Environments, as J.J. Gibson argues, are mediums for perception, not objects to be 
rationalized (16), which means that geographical investigation is a matter of 
interpretation. When geography is understood as the coming together of space, history, 
and being-in-the-world rather than the product of Cartesian subjects encountering 
objectified landscapes, it allows us to see how the interpretations of space I consider 
depended on African agency, even though these same texts might simultaneously oppress 





political motivations or intentions of their authors, African discourse and subjectivity are 
inerasable from eighteenth-century texts about Africa.  
 
Chapter Overview 
My first three chapters reconsider several canonical representations of Africa 
often read as imaginative European fantasies about the continent. I suggest that although 
these representations are not mimetic one-to-one correlations with empirical reality, they 
nevertheless depend on African history and environments, as well as indigenous 
epistemologies and technologies, to tell their stories. Chapter 1, for example, argues that 
the trans-Saharan trade is a vital context for Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko (1688). Examining 
how Behn mimics early Enlightenment geographical texts that blend empirical detail with 
narrative speculation, I suggest Oroonoko juxtaposes burgeoning Atlantic worldviews 
against Africa’s Old World trade relationships in order to interrogate late seventeenth-
century institutionalized methods for producing geographical knowledge. In Chapter 2, I 
contend that Europeans’ inability to penetrate Africa’s interior fostered a dependence on 
African knowledge and technologies that shaped eyewitness and fictional accounts of the 
continent. Daniel Defoe’s Captain Singleton (1720) and William Smith’s A New Voyage 
to Guinea (1745) initially appear to be texts that celebrate the triumph of European 
technologies and epistemologies over savage African landscapes and peoples. Yet both 
illustrate the extent that early Enlightenment geographical discourse and cartography 
depended on African representations of the interior, such as Mandinka stories about the 
inland goldfields. In Chapter 3, I examine how the Scriblerians repurposed the cultural 





methodologies that sought a god’s-eye view of the world through specimen collecting 
and taxonomies. In doing so, they established a model in which Africans were aligned 
culturally and conceptually with animal worlds but that was not yet synonymous with the 
biological arguments for racial difference that would begin to appear at the end of the 
century. 
My last two chapters demonstrate how abstract and imaginative concepts from 
African philosophy and art infiltrate European texts. While these worlds and worldviews 
are highly mediated through accounts that are rarely anthropologically accurate, they are 
still a recoverable part of British literary history. Chapter 4 argues that literary scholars 
can analyze Akan, Yoruba, and Edo art, artifacts, and performative rituals as African 
texts that articulate West African ideas about the metaphysical relationship between self 
and world and between matter and the divine. These metaphysical ideas animate the 
accounts of eighteenth-century travelers who encountered such African representations, 
including Willem Bosman’s New Voyage to Guinea (1703/05) and John Atkins’s Voyage 
to Guinea, Brasil, and the West Indies (1735). African women are often underrepresented 
in eighteenth century literature, but my final chapter argues that both Samuel Johnson’s 
Rasselas (1759) and James Bruce’s Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile (1790) 
prove significant exceptions to that rule as they adopt and adapt the traditions and 
discourses of intelligent and politically savvy Ethiopian women into their own texts. My 
conclusion looks forward to how Britain’s geopolitical relationship with Africa changed 
at the end of the century but proposes that Africa’s influence on European discourse did 







1 For example, Homi Bhabha calls this the “reality effect,” the “structured gaze of power 
whose objective is authority, whose ‘subjects’ are historical” (155). William Spanos 
understands this as the foundations of what he calls the “imperial metanarrative,” arguing 
that the imperial gaze “sees the being into which it inquires as a totalizing spatial image, 
a ‘field’ or ‘region’ or ‘domain’ to be comprehended, mastered and exploited” (191). Ron 
Broglio argues that when the objective eye is turned on nature, “Sight is considered the 
most valuable and most refined sense—the most sensible and least sensate sense. As 
such, it serves abstract, objective, and rational knowledge. The dominance of vision, and 
more specifically geometrical linear perspective, prevents other forms of knowledge 
about nature from surfacing” (19). Although no one critic alone espouses so simplistic a 
conclusion, the theoretical narrative that has been constructed over the past twenty-five 
years or so is that this myth of objectivity—formulated by and circulated to the public 
through the eyewitness account—creates a visual regime that exerts a coercive power 
over European Enlightenment epistemologies, enabling and justifying the enormities of 
colonization and the production of a particular kind of phenomenological subject. 
2 In Imperial Eyes, the “seeing man” is Pratt’s “admittedly unfriendly label for the white 
male subject of European landscape discourse – he whose imperial eyes passively look 
out and possess” (9). Although in many ways I take Pratt’s intersection between visuality, 
the scientific revolution, and travel writing as the point of departure for my project, I am 
indebted to much of the terminology and basic frameworks that she establishes in 






writing to eighteenth-century Britain, both in terms of these texts’ ability to establish 
ideological norms and to move outside of or subvert them.	  	   
3 Roxann Wheeler estimates, “Between 1700 and 1750, about four times as many books 
were published on Africa as were published during the seventeenth century” (94). 
4 Wiredu calls this phenomenon “African thought framed in foreign categories” (xiv). 
Mudimbe calls it a “silent dependence on a Western episteme” (x). 
5 The writings of Sir Francis Bacon are often identified as the genesis of this paradigm 
shift. His Novum Organum espouses the value of breaking nature “into parts,” producing 
knowledge by starting from experiment and observation and building abstract principles 
out of one’s observations (140). See, for example, Livingstone 100 and Carey 40.  
6 Heidegger uses “world picture” (Weldbild) to describe what happens when the world is 
not pictured but  “conceived and grasped as a picture” (129), a fundamental fact of the 
modern age whereby man becomes the subject who “makes depend upon himself the way 
in which he must take his stand in relation to whatever is objective” (132).   
7 Michael McKeon observes that Enlightenment economies of knowledge entail “on the 
one hand, generality, totality, abstract universality, objectification; on the other hand, 
particularity, individuation, concrete multiplicity, mobility” (xviii). 
8 Similarly, Withers argues that “location makes a difference to the production of 
knowledge and to the contexts of its reception and justification” (97). 
9 The analogical reasoning of climate theory was one of the justifications for relying so 
heavily on African laborers in the Caribbean. See Robert Markley 189-90.  






11 John Thornton explains that because Europeans could not conquer the mainland of 
Africa in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, “they had to abandon the time-
honored tradition of trading and raiding and substitute a relationship based more or less 
completely on peacefully regulated trade” (Africa 38).  
12 The four major goldfields were Bambuhu, Bure, Lobi, and the Akan fields Ghana and 
the Ivory Coast.   
13 Similarly, George Boulukos observes that “commercial travelers’ 
accounts…emphasize the differences between African groups and make efforts to 
identify the best ways to locate potential partners and exploit pre-existing economic 
structures” (53).  
14 Poncet’s narrative was translated into English in 1709.  
15 Moore gives one of the earliest European accounts of a West African masquerade, one 
that he calls “Mumbo Jumbo,” in which a figure “dressed in a long Coat made of the 
Bark of Trees, with a Tuft of fine Straw on the Top of it” about nine feet tall calls the 
villagers around it to sing and dance (117). 
16 Schmidgen includes John Toland, John Locke, Jonathan Swift, Francis Atterbury, Lord 
Bolingbroke, Robert Walpole, Joseph Addison, Francis Hutcheson, Bernard Mandeville, 
Alexander Pope, and Daniel Defoe among the defenders of such mixture. See 14.  
17 The most foundational text that sought to expose Enlightenment’s dark side is 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which, drawing from Kant, they 
argue that “the true nature of schematism which externally coordinates the universal and 






be in the interest of industrial society. Being is apprehended in terms of manipulation and 
administration” (64). Although there has been a great deal of pushback against 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s definition, the insidiousness of universalized knowledge 
continues to cast a long shadow over eighteenth-century studies, what Wolfram 
Schmidgen calls the scholarly fascination with “a relentlessly cunning modernity” (149).  
18 Of course, not all mid-to-late twentieth-century treatments of the Enlightenment 
theorize it as a technological engine of destruction. Spurred on by various reclamation 
projects of the eighties and nineties, many scholars qualified the Enlightenment as 
something that was multifaceted, multivalent, and contested. See Dorinda Outram’s The 
Enlightenment. As a result, scholarly texts have been published on topics that erstwhile 
would have seemed contradictory: women and the Enlightenment, the religious 
Enlightenment, the postcolonial Enlightenment. See, for example, Eve Tavor Bannet’s 
Domestic Revolutions: Enlightenment Feminisms and the Novel, David Sorkin’s The 
Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna, and 
Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa’s The Postcolonial Enlightenment: Eighteenth-century 
Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory. 
19 Schmidgen suggests that Enlightenment studies can still “tell a positive story” (148), 
but that it is important to “rethink the relationship between investigator and object, to 
revise our configuration of critical identity and agency” (157). 
20 There has, however, been much valuable work that has been done on the impact of the 
African diaspora on the ideas and culture of the eighteenth-century Anglo-American 






foundational example of this, emphasizing as he does the fluidity and exchange between 
the culture of the African diaspora and British and American modernity. Other examples 
of texts that examine the importance of African traditions to Anglo-American thought in 
transatlantic contexts include Susan Scott Parrish’s American Curiosity, particularly 
chapter 7; Judith A. Carney’s Black Rice, which recounts the influence of African 
agricultural knowledge on the Carolina rice economy; Mechal Sobel’s The World they 
Made Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-Century Virginia; and James 
Sweet’s Domingo Alvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic 
World. However, as Sweet points out, in the turn towards early modern and eighteenth-
century Atlantic studies in the humanities, Africa itself remains a dramatically 
understudied quadrant compared to Europe and the Americas (4). The study of Africa’s 
geopolitical importance to the early Atlantic world is often limited to the slave trade or to 
the influence of North Africa as an extension of the Arab world.   
21 As W.J.T. Mitchell argues, “A medium, in short, is not just a set of materials, an 
apparatus, or a code that ‘mediates’ between individuals. It is a complex social institution 
that contains individuals within it, and is constituted by a history of practices, rituals, and 
habits, skills and techniques, as well as by a set of material objects and spaces” (213). 
22 As Edward Soja explains in his interpretation of Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, 
mistaking perceptual and conceptual space as the totality of spatial “reality” results in 
“the double illusion of objectivism and subjectivism that weakens [one’s] insights into 
the workings of power” (69). As a result, power is often “simplified into hegemonic and 






ideas and subjectivities are shaped. Although “power—and the specifically cultural 
politics that arise from its workings—is contextualized and made concrete, like all social 
relations, in the (social) production of (social) space,” Soja agrees with Foucault that 
“these links between space, knowledge, power, and cultural politics must be seen as both 
oppressive and enabling, filled not only with authoritarian perils but also with 
possibilities for community, resistance, and emancipatory change” (87).  
23 On a more disciplinary level, such a method also eschews making what Andrew 
Gordon and Bernhard Klein call the “mistake of assuming, against the historical 





CHAPTER 1: TRANSATLANTIC/TRANS-SAHARA: AFRICAN WORLDS AND 
DUELING WORLDVIEWS IN APHRA BEHN’S OROONOKO
Since the incorporation of Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko (1688) into the canon of 
eighteenth-century scholarship in the late twentieth century, a substantial body of 
criticism has developed on the nature of the novel’s relationship to its non-European 
settings. The text contains references to all four of the continents recognized in the 
seventeenth century, showcases the circulation of goods and people among them, and 
self-consciously comments on its own representational methodologies as it mimics 
several knowledge-producing genres of its cultural moment, such as the taxonomical list 
and the eyewitness account. Moira Ferguson argued in 1992 that Oroonoko in fact 
“generated a paradigm for British colonialist discourse” (339). At the very least, its 
incorporation into the canon certainly coincided with a trend in eighteenth-century 
scholarship of reading it this way. Over the past three decades, critical opinion has varied 
on the nature of the novel’s relationship to the non-European spaces it purports to 
represent, ranging from praise for its antislavery sentiments to condemnation for its 
alleged pro-colonial discourse to arguments “that such readings are anachronistic” (Harol 
453), but they all seem to agree that the novella is important for understanding how 
Britain imagined the rest of the world in the late seventeenth century. As Srivinvas 
Aravamudan observes in the first chapter of Tropicopolitans, “A book on colonialism and 





critical attention has bordered on the obsessional” (29). In its examination of Behn’s 
representation of Africa, this chapter, in a sense, continues this obsessional trend, but 
through a specific caveat. While I understand Behn’s text as an important portrayal of 
Africa at the end of the seventeenth century, I situate it as one representation among 
many that was circulating at that time—including classical sources, eyewitness accounts, 
and both European and Arabic geographies—not the paradigmatic image of Africa in the 
British imagination at large.  
Behn’s efforts to represent the colonial situation in Surinam are often considered 
persuasive to the extent that scholars believe Behn actually traveled there when she was 
in service to Charles II during the Second Dutch War—a prime example of how the 
authority of the eyewitness that Behn’s narrator so coyly adopts is still privileged as an 
epistemological strategy today. However, since it is unlikely that Behn would have 
traveled extensively in Africa herself (although it is possible that a ship traveling between 
Europe and the Caribbean would have stopped at least on the western African islands), 
critics often treat Behn’s portrayal of that continent as a Eurocentric fantasy: a 
combination of romantic tropes, descriptions of the exoticized other, and allegory for 
Britain’s own late seventeenth-century political situation.1 The result of this, several 
scholars have suggested, is an “Africanism” akin to Said’s “Orientalism,”—a discourse 
of power that has little to do with its supposed geographical referent and much to do with 
Britain’s desire to construct a national identity through an imaginative fascination with 
the cultural other.2 These readings depend on the notion that Africa’s geography played a 
catachrestic role in the production of British nationalism and the British Enlightenment, 





transforming geographical space into ideological narratives. They also suggest that a 
representation that does not obviously reflect an epistemology of perceived space—
“realistic” due to its one-to-one correlation with a material geography—must be given 
entirely over to an epistemology of conceived space, one where space “is entirely 
ideational, made up of projections into the empirical world from conceived or imagined 
geographies” (Soja 79).  
Yet, critics have suggested that other aspects of Oroonoko self-consciously 
articulate critical questions about the relationship between representation and reality. 
Corrinne Harol, for example, argues that Behn’s “anti-mimetic representation of 
chronology and geography” needs to be taken seriously as a narrative method (460)—a 
kind of “Baroque realism,” that “pits the self’s capacity to objectify the world…against 
the baroque allegorical commitment” (460). Vernon Guy Dickson argues for the 
importance of “contextualiz[ing] Behn’s exploration of truth with respect to the period’s 
changing notions of truth’s relation to and representation of fact and fiction” (573). 
Catherine Molineux argues that the novella is fundamentally “an investigation of 
representation—of how ideas about the world are embodied and then disrupted” (“False 
Gifts” 470). She, Sills, and Robert Markley, among others, suggest that Behn is 
intentionally interrogating late seventeenth-century institutionalized methods for 
producing knowledge about the globe. As other critics like Karen Bloom Gevirtz and 
Judy Hayden have shown, Behn would have been knowledgeable enough about these 
contemporary scientific debates to do so. Sills and Markley specifically highlight her 
investment in contemporary geographical issues, and Laura Runge observes that the 





investigation into the novel’s treatment of Africa based on these observations reveals that 
Behn likely had a more nuanced understanding of the problems that plagued early 
Enlightenment geographical representation than she is traditionally given credit for. 
I argue that Africa’s shifting geopolitical relationships in the increasingly 
globalized world of the late seventeenth century were a vital part of Behn’s interrogation 
of institutionalized methods for producing knowledge about the globe. While the 
observer-narrator of Oroonoko is a knowledge-producing figure in the New World 
context of Surinam, her representations of Africa depend on Oroonoko as a secondary 
narrator in her text, highlighting the extent to which knowledge about Africa came not 
from European eyewitnesses but from non-European testimony and mediated narrative 
accounts of the land. By decentering the eyewitness from its representation of Africa, the 
text reminds us that West Africa’s Old World context was one to which European 
interlocutors were only auxiliary. European impressions of Africa were informed much 
more directly through accounts of the trans-Sahara trade, which supplied African slaves, 
ivory, gold, cotton, indigo, perfumes, and other goods to Asia and to Europe through Italy 
in exchange for salt, textiles, china, metals, and cowrie shells. This complex African 
world animates Behn’s text, even if its narrative is, as Adam Sills suggests, not reducible 
to maps of perceived space that critics so often use to assess the text’s commitment to 
“realism” (319).4 
I am not suggesting that Behn’s representation of Africa is what we would 
consider anthropologically or geographically correct. In Oroonoko, Africa is appropriated 
for Behn’s political and institutional critiques, but I nevertheless contest the notion that 





detached from the continent’s historical realities. Africa’s intercontinental trade is an 
influential context for the novella that should not be disregarded with the justification that 
Behn would have had no means of thinking about the continent in a complex way. Behn’s 
awareness of trans-Saharan routes and the narratives that followed them out of Africa is 
likely given their prevalence in medieval and Renaissance accounts. Her text maps the 
way that even in the turn to empirical strategies of representation, these Old World 
geographical stories, and their often non-European tellers, continued to influence 
European worldviews.  
 
Geographical Representation in the Early Enlightenment 
The triangle trade is such a powerful touchstone in eighteenth-century studies that 
Africa is often mentioned in the context of Caribbean plantation slavery more frequently 
than it is addressed as an independent geography. In addition to their well-studied 
economic relationship, West Africa and the Caribbean have an important epistemological 
relationship in much early Enlightenment literature, Oroonoko included. As regions of 
the torrid zone, there was a presumed geosymmetry between the two places, to use 
Markley’s term, because it was believed that “similar climatological conditions obtain 
across the same latitudes and therefore the relationships between humankind and its 
environments apply across similarly situated regions, countries, and continents” (189-90). 
This analogous affiliation was cited as a reason for why Africans were more suited to 
labor in the West Indian plantation than Europeans, but it also meant that the Caribbean 
was used in geographical writings to explicate knowledge about Africa and vice versa. 





West Indies (1684), one proposed source text for Behn, argues that Europeans can learn 
to survive in both the West Indies and Guinea by observing how the natives of such hot 
climates eat and care for themselves (52-55).  
According to Markley, Behn was not only attuned to this discourse, in Oroonoko 
she “tests the limits of these mutually constitutive analogies” (190). I argue that one of 
these limits that Behn’s narrative highlights is that although Africa and the Caribbean 
were increasingly interlinked with the growth of the transatlantic slave trade, distinct 
discourses were necessary to represent the two geographical spaces, in part because, 
similar climates aside, Africa had a dramatically different place in world history than the 
Caribbean did. Thus, we should not assume that the only way that either Behn or her 
readers imagined Africa was in an Atlantic context of exportation and exploitation no 
matter how dominant that context might initially appear in the text. As Sills points out, 
Behn was writing during a time when geographical organizing principles such as “the 
Atlantic” were not a given (319).  
In fact, two early world maps illustrate two different worldviews that were in play 
during Behn’s day. The first, Martin Waldseemuller’s 1507 map of the world, relegates 
America to the far left and puts Africa and the classical world in the center, emphasizing 
geopolitical and trade relationships in which goods moved from the interior of Africa and 
Asia north and west into Europe through Italy. Almost 100 years later, Willem Janszoon 
Blaeu’s 1606 map of the world was so committed to putting the Atlantic Ocean in the 
center that Africa is moved far over to the right side, and Asia is divided in two. Yet, this 
Atlantic worldview did not so much supplant as become layered on top of the classical 





ways of thinking about geographical space influenced not just representational practices 
but also the methodologies used to gather geographical information.   
On the one hand, at the end of the seventeenth century methods of geographical 
inquiry were shifting, like so much of natural philosophy, from emblematic readings and 
Aristotelian reasoning to empirical observation and the systematization of data collection 
(Ogborn and Withers 14). The Royal Society, committed to Francis Bacon’s idea that 
empiricism was the bedrock on which scientific certainty could be built, identified 
travelers as invaluable agents for gathering this data (Carey 40), but also recognized that 
the observers would need to be “properly trained eyewitnesses” in order for their data to 
be reliable (Livingstone 148).5 One strategy for regulating travelers’ empirical methods 
was the publication of instruction books like Robert Boyle’s General Heads for the 
Natural History of a Country Great or Small Drawn out for the Use of Travellers and 
Navigators, written in 1666, which breaks “the things to be observed” into four 
categories—the heavens, including things like latitude; the air, including observations of 
the weather; the water, including the natures of rivers and the patterns of tides; and the 
earth, including not only the minerals and landscapes of the earth but its inhabitants and 
their behaviors.6 He details a list of questions that travelers should answer, ideally 
through their own empirical observations rather than through secondhand accounts. The 
effect of Boyle’s General Heads—and similar texts like John Woodward’s Brief 
Instructions for Making Observations in All Parts of the World, published a few decades 
later—on the way that travelers described their voyages ostensibly marked a shift in the 





between the marvelous and the empirical were virtually non-existent, to the handmaiden 
of natural history.7  
On the other hand, since the world was still largely inaccessible even to the 
intrepid European explorer, and many places like Africa posed challenges to empirical 
strategies (as I discuss more extensively in the next chapter), such texts were still notably 
dependent on the very sources, methodologies, and worldviews they were trying to move 
away from. Take, for example, the Golden Coast or a Description of Guinney (1665), 
another proposed source text for Oroonoko.8 The title page makes the Golden Coast 
appear like an early example of the institutionalized ideal of an empirical account, 
breaking down the topics covered into Guinea’s “Air and situation,” “Commodities 
imported thither and exported thence,” its “People, Religion, War and Peace,” and “Their 
way of Traffick, their Laws and Customs,” etc.9 However, the text is essentially a reprint 
of four early modern travelers’ tales that first appeared in Richard Hakluyt’s Principal 
Navigations (1589-1600). Its prefatory overview of the continent draws heavily from Leo 
Africanus’s Description of Africa (4-6), and it quotes a stanza from Richard Zouch’s The 
Dove: Or, Passages of Cosmography (1615) as an authoritative description of “The Land 
of Negroes,” “Wherein the Black Prince keeps his Residence, / Attended with his Jeaty-
coloured train” (3). The Golden Coast is an early example of a common trend in 
Enlightenment geographical texts—preexisting accounts were often given different 
prefatory material and commentary and marketed as wholly new when in fact they were 
largely patchworks of everything from first-hand accounts to poetry.10 Thus, although 
there was ostensibly a break with classical, medieval, and early modern representational 





that had come before, like those of Pliny, Leo Africanus, and the Portuguese Jesuits who 
were some of the first European explorers in Africa. These old ways of looking at the 
world were kept alive through constant remediation even as epistemological 
methodologies were ostensibly changing.  
Furthermore, in spite of the best efforts of the Royal Society to train the ideal 
eyewitness, “much geographical information was produced by persons whose credibility 
could not always be sanctioned, depended upon the testimony of native ‘others,’ and was 
consumed by metropolitan audiences distant from the sites of knowledge making and the 
producers of it” (Ogborn and Withers 20). In the case of geographies like Africa’s that 
were literally and epistemologically impenetrable for the European viewing subject, the 
second-hand narrative testimony of non-European others comprised the majority of 
Europe’s knowledge about the majority of the continent. This fact is often pointed out by 
travelers like Bosman, who makes it clear, “all that I impart to you concerning the In-land 
Negroes, is not the result of my own Observation… but is only collected from the 
Relation of the Negroes that come from thence: but they are such People, that in this and 
other things, I dare assure myself of the Truth of what they say” (208).  
Such African contributions to European knowledge about the globe were often 
obscured by the ways that, as I address in the introduction, the production of “knowledge” 
itself was dependent on “dividing” knowledge “from the process by which it is known” 
(McKeon xix). As David Livingstone puts it, “Ironically, to acquire knowledge that was 
true everywhere, the seer had to go somewhere to find wisdom that bore the marks of 
nowhere” (21). Through this epistemological alchemy, the non-European sources of 





still haunts the margins of Enlightenment texts, and their ultimate indivisibility serves as 
a reminder, inconvenient to early Royal Society methods, that global knowledge is 
always locally produced. When a picture of geographical space is universalized through 
“translation” and “displacement” (Withers 11), it always carries with it at least some 
marks of this local production.  
This is as possible for a fictional account of geographical space as it is for a travel 
narrative, enabling us to see how early modern African worlds had a hand in producing 
even Behn’s text. After all, these limitations on the production of Enlightenment 
geographical knowledge reveal not that geographical practices during this time were 
unscientific or that the Royal Society’s strategies were destined for failure, but rather that 
geographical facts are always presented through the trappings of fiction—through an 
adherence to certain conventions of representation, the crafting of character through 
narrative, and the intertextual presence of stories from others (Ogborn and Withers 22-
23).11 Eyewitnesses never function on their own in these texts but sit amid a combination 
of narrative techniques and other witnesses, which often results in competing visions of 
geographical space within the same text rather than a definitive, unified picture. In other 
words, the production of geography—literally “earth writing”—is as much a product of 
storytelling as it is of the observation of material and historical landscapes and peoples, a 
fact that Behn’s novella dramatizes in its opening pages.   
From its first scene, Oroonoko lays bare the fact that geographical representation 
was comprised from an unsettled combination of methods and genres, establishing 
several of the tensions implicit in the knowledge produced by travelers. The narrator 





what you will find set down” (9), evoking the rhetoric of empiricism that marked late 
seventeenth-century travel narratives as credible.12 Although she tells us this will be an 
account of an African slave, she opens the story in Surinam, describing the animals and 
inhabitants of the area, giving a brief account of their customs and governing systems. In 
order for a particular writing style to gain scientific credibility in the late seventeenth 
century, it ostensibly needed to be “naked,” as Robert Boyle put it—untouched by 
stylistic flourishes and romanticized language (qtd. in Shapin 495). When she writes 
about Surinam, Behn’s narration evokes this “discourse of fact” (Hayden 126).13   
For example, when the narrator is describing the area’s wildlife, she details “a sort 
of monkey, as big as a rat or weasel, but of a marvelous and delicate shape” that “has a 
face and hands like a human creature” and a cat that is “a little beast in the form and 
fashion of a lion, as big as a kitten, but so exactly made in all parts like that noble beast, 
that it is it in miniature” (10). This emphasis on categories of measurement—the size and 
shape of these specimens—is evocative of the Royal Society’s early projects of taxonomy 
and speciation, as is the comparison and differentiation across species that the narrator 
uses.14 The narrator overtly evokes the Royal Society and its epistemological agendas 
when she observes “prodigious snakes, of which there are some three-score yards in 
length, as is the skin of one that may be seen at his Majesty’s Antiquaries” (10), which 
was the Royal Society’s repository, lauded by fellows like Thomas Sprat and John 
Wilkins as the space where “Ranks of all the Species of Nature” could be determined 
through observation and comparison (Sprat 251).  
As critics have noted, by identifying herself as the “eye-witness” to such things, 





within the text. Kelley Wezner, for example, claims that this “gaze is central to the text, 
as Behn’s narrator accentuates the role of the gaze by relying on eyewitness testimony to 
establish the veracity of her narrative” (14). Yet, although Wezner reads this rhetorical 
move as an earnest one, the very next line gives us license to read it ironically: 
immediately after Behn labels her text as an “eye-witness” account, she complicates this 
designation by telling the reader, “what I could not be witness of I received from the 
mouth of the chief actor in this history, the hero himself, who gave us the whole 
transactions of his youth” (9). By positioning Oroonoko as the “secondary author” of the 
text (Dickson 585), Behn illustrates the extent that travel writers were reliant on the 
“testimony of . . . ‘others’” that Ogborn and Withers identify as problematic to 
geographic credibility, and her change in style from apparent realism to romance when 
she moves into Oroonoko’s portion of the text corresponds with this move from 
eyewitness accounting to what is essentially non-empirical storytelling.15 In doing so, the 
narrator mimics eyewitness accounts like Richard Jobson’s 1623 Golden Trade, in which 
he proclaims that “what doeth insewe of this discourse; is written from mee either as an 
eyewitness, or what I have received from the Country people, and none but such, as were 
of esteem, and as my confidence assures, would deliver no false thing” (8). But by 
establishing this discordance between representational methods in her text, Behn does not 
harness the generic power of the eyewitness account to give her narrator credibility but 
rather unsettles the eyewitness account by dramatizing the central question in early 
Enlightenment geographical production: whether empirical data can be reconciled with 





These representational tensions resurface throughout the novella, and as I detail in 
the next section, it is not a coincidence that Africa is the backdrop for Behn’s suspicion 
of the eyewitness account as an epistemological strategy. Africa was a space that not only 
bridged the New and Old Worlds, it was one in which the European eyewitness was 
continually displaced, necessitating a dependence on both African narratives about the 
continent and on accounts that decenter Europeans and their trade needs. This 
representational matrix enables us to see how African worlds persist at the roots of even 
fictional European texts, as Behn’s novella enacts the very dependence on non-European 
visions of Africa that the narrator embraces by bringing on Oroonoko as the secondary 
narrator of her story.  
 
Africa in the Geographical Imagination 
The New World is initially associated in Oroonoko with both economic and 
epistemological optimism, in part because Europeans are presented as fully in control of 
both Surinam’s profit- and knowledge-producing systems. As Susan Scott Parrish argues, 
the New World was crucial to the development of European empiricism. Its very sense of 
newness made its unknown aspects exciting, inspiring curiosity in both its creole 
inhabitants and the London metropole in the late seventeenth century (25-27). The 
narrator of Oroonoko laments the fact that the late king of England allowed the Dutch to 
gain political control of Surinam, speculating that it “may contain more noble earth than 
all the universe besides; for, they say, it reaches from east to west, one way as far as 
China, and another to Peru” (51). This description not only codes the New World’s 





geographically imagines the New World’s proximity to China is a metaphorical 
evocation of Blaeu’s map, in which Asia appears on both the western and the eastern 
halves, putting America and European trans-Atlantic trade concerns front and center. 
But Behn’s narrator eschews the language of the eyewitness account for the 
African portion of her tale, relying instead on conventions of romance to replicate the fact 
that it is Oroonoko and not the narrator who is the source of this representation. In 
leaving much implied and much up to the imagination, these conventions keep the reader 
one step removed from the action of the scene, drawing attention to the narrative 
apparatus as a mediatory device and to the discursive rather than empirical quality of the 
details. For example, when the narrator recounts Oroonoko’s interactions with the fair 
Imoinda, she avoids using the concrete language from the opening pages, stating instead 
about Oroonoko’s visit to the otan, “I believe he omitted saying nothing to this young 
maid that might persuade her to suffer him to seize her own, and take the rights of love; 
and I believe she was not long resisting those arms where she longed to be….” (29; 
emphasis added). The narrator gives a tacit explanation of this shift in tone from the 
confident eyewitness to the romantic narrator: “the satisfaction of these two young lovers” 
is “not to be imagined,” and “It is impossible to express the transports [Oroonoko] 
suffered” (29). The narrator claims to employ such tactics for propriety’s sake, but the 
contrast between this language and the language used to describe the New World 
emphasizes the incompatibility between empirical methods for gathering geographical 
knowledge and representing Africa’s enigmatic interior, which often depended on 
speculation rather than observed facts. Africa, which has yet to be penetrated by 





talked about through narrative constructs that suggest and imply, not through the “naked” 
language of empiricism.  
The narrator links, and comments on, such epistemological and erotic themes 
early on in the novella when she points out that the literal nakedness of the inhabitants of 
Surinam is an impediment to both “curiosity” and to lustful desire. As she describes,  
[I]f one lives forever among them, there is not to be seen an indecent action or 
glance; and being continually used to see one another so unadorned, so like our 
parents before the Fall, it seems as if they had no wishes, there being nothing to 
heighten curiosity, but all you can see, you see at once, and every moment see; 
and where there is no novelty, there can be no curiosity. (11)   
Nakedness may be equated with transparency here, but it is also equated with 
prelapsarian naiveté. Not only can there be no knowledge production if there is no 
curiosity, the text suggests that to follow Boyle’s advice and present the world as if the 
surface tells the whole story is to miss the role that narrative subtext plays in dictating 
experience, particularly of worlds that are not accessible to the naked eye. Though on the 
surface Behn is praising the natives’ simplicity and restraint, when contrasted with 
Oroonoko and Imoinda’s passionate affair, such descriptions reinforce the gap between 
empirical ideals and the issues of translation and displacement that otherwise shaped 
geographical representation. The extent that such representations were in fact dependent 
on the trappings of fiction is echoed in the way the generic conventions of romance 
simultaneously reveal and conceal the narrative scene between the lovers.    
Behn’s turn to strategies that simultaneously illuminate and occlude not only 





that Africa occupied a similarly enigmatic position in the British cultural imagination in 
the late seventeenth century. Its proximity to Europe and its associations with the Old 
World meant that goods and people had been moving between Africa and Europe for 
hundreds of years, and that Africa had a significant presence in both theological and 
classical works. Yet, for all that, the continent remained largely closed to Europeans well 
into the nineteenth century. Geographical writers were troubled by its epistemological 
elusiveness even as they emphasized the treasures to be found there. For example, John 
Pory wrote in the introduction to his 1600 translation of Leo Africanus’s History and 
Description of Africa that Africa “is one of the three general parts of the world knowen 
unto our ancestors; which in very deed was not thoroughly by them discovered,” in a 
large part because “the Inlands coulde not be travailed in regard of huge deserts full of 
dangerous sands, which being driven with the winde, put travailers in extreme hazard of 
their lives” (12). Similarly George Abbot writes in his introduction to the Africa portion 
of his 1664 Briefe Description of the Whole World that the “greatest part” of Africa, 
“although it hath been guessed at by Writers in former times,” remains unknown. 
According to Abbot, like Pory, the intense heat and the expansive wilderness of the 
continent have prevented European travel in the interior.  
In truth, though, groups of people had managed to traverse this hazardous desert 
full of sand and heat for hundreds of years. The foundation of Europe’s knowledge about 
the interior of Africa was not European exploration but narrative histories that came 
largely through Arab North Africa. Berber and Jewish merchants carried information 
across the trans-Saharan trade routes alongside the ivory, slaves, and gold they obtained 





intimately linked to the circulation and production of goods in this context. As Ghislaine 
Lydon argues, the Sahara was “a contact zone where teams of camels transported ideas, 
cultural practices, people, and commodities” (4-5), connecting the great Mali and 
Songhai Empires in West Africa with North and East Africa, Asia, and Europe through 
Italy. Although most of the routes’ golden age was between the eleventh and fifteenth 
centuries, they “sustained the efforts of Europeans to divert the desert trade until the 
twentieth century” (106).  
Laura Runge usefully suggests that Oroonoko is a “product, and part of the 
process, of exchange that characterizes the Atlantic Enlightenment” and thus “records—
or imagines—a specific transactional place in history” (20). She outlines how the novel 
then functions as a “complex vehicle for the importation of ideas from the Atlantic” (21). 
However, representations of Africa that emphasized trans-Saharan relationships, rather 
than or in addition to transatlantic ones, were still prominent in Behn’s day, inviting 
consideration into how Oroonoko might be a complex vehicle for the importation of ideas 
from Africa as well. As I mentioned in the introduction, part of the purpose of Jobson’s 
1620 voyage up the Gambia, and George Thompson’s before him, was to find a way for 
Britain to tap directly into the trans-Sahara trade. Jobson attempted to persuade the 
Mandinka merchants who brokered trade on the westernmost points of the trans-Saharan 
routes to take him to where the Arabic camel caravans traded for gold with the interior 
natives (92-93). When his attempts failed, he instead pressed his guides for information 
about the location of interior trade towns, in particular, Tombutto, the early modern name 
for Timbuktu (102), hoping that there would be some way for Britain to reach “the 





“great desertes of sand” (4-5). As I detail in the next chapter, the aim of traders like 
Jobson and Thompson was to eventually skirt the Mandinka middlemen and gain direct 
access to African gold. But the location of these mines and trade points remained elusive 
due to the Mandinka’s unwillingness to disclose too much information about the 
continent’s interior. 
 Any pre-knowledge Jobson had of Tombutto and its alleged wealth likely came 
from the most widely read and trusted of sources on the trans-Sahara trade: Leo 
Africanus’s Description of Africa, which was translated into English by John Pory in 
1600. As a Moor writing in Italian in the sixteenth century about many places he had not 
personally traveled to, Leo Africanus was in some ways the antithesis to the geographical 
authority idealized by the Royal Society. Yet, his text nevertheless remained an important 
authoritative source about Africa, particularly its interior, until well into the eighteenth 
century because it gives one of the first glimpses into what the Arabs in North Africa 
called Bilad al-Sudan, “the land of the blacks.” In fact, writing in 1738, Francis Moore 
would defend both Leo Africanus and Muhammad al-Idrisi (the “Nubian Geographer” 
[vii]) on the very grounds that they were allegedly Africans themselves, and thus “have 
given a better Account of the Inland Parts of Africa than any other” (viii).16 Whether we 
now understand either writer as strictly “African,” Moore’s comment highlights the 
extent that the production of modern geographical knowledge was dependent on the 
authority of non-European sources and emphasizes the continued importance of narrative 
evidence for forming a complete picture of the world well into the age of the eyewitness 
account. Allegedly traveling himself as far as Timbuktu, Leo Africanus wrote about 





“Genni” [Guinea], where the inhabitants sell “their cotton” “unto the merchants of 
Barbarie, for cloth of Europe, for brazen vessels, for armour, and other such commodities” 
(286). His descriptions, gathered from merchants who traversed these trails, take the 
reader from the west coast through Mali, “where the inhabitants are rich, and have plenty 
of wares” (287), to Timbuktu where “the rich king…hath many plates and scepters of 
gold…and he keeps a magnificent and well furnished court” (288), back into the major 
Arab-occupied lands of Nubia and Egypt. 
This structure as well as the details of these descriptions both recount and emulate 
the trade caravans that connected West Africa to Asia and Europe, driven forward by the 
exchange of goods: cloth, horses, dishes, and “manuscripts or written books out of 
Barbarie, which are sold for more money than any other merchandize” (288) traded for 
“slaves and gold” (271). Other widely read writers in the seventeenth century mimicked 
these narrative patterns. As a segue into his own section on “the land of the blacks,” 
Samuel Purchas (1613) writes about the desert separating the “Numidians” from the 
“Negros” where there is no water, “And yet through these waylesse ways, doth 
covetousnesse carry both the Arabians and their roavings and Merchants with their 
Caravans to the Negros for wealth: wither, I thinke, at least you expect the coming of this 
our Caravan also” (537). By using the trans-Sahara trade as a textual metaphor for the 
reader’s own literary journey through geographical space—the “caravan” of the narrative 
taking the reader into sub-Saharan Africa—Purchas constructs the continent not in terms 
of its New World Atlantic connections, which were burgeoning at the time, but in terms 
of long-standing Old World trade relationships, recorded in Leo Africanus’s narrative, 





narrative, the production of geographical knowledge about the interior is linked to these 
trade routes. But in this worldview, as in the trade caravans, Europe plays only an 
auxiliary role, receiving goods from and transmitting goods into Africa through African, 
Arabic, and Jewish merchants, who also traded slaves, gold, and ivory to Asia.     
Although trans-Atlantic trade dominates much of Oroonoko, Behn evokes this 
alternate geographical configuration of Africa throughout her narrative in several ways. 
When she first introduces Coramantien, she refers to it as “a country of blacks so called” 
(13), and the way she draws attention to the discursive nature of the signifier “black” has 
led many critics to consider how Europeans established blackness as a category of racial 
difference during this time.17 However, it more likely that “so called” modifies not 
“blacks” in particular but “country of blacks,” which changes the discursive unit under 
consideration from a description of the Negrified body to a description of the 
geographical space of Sub-Saharan Africa. If we weigh this subtle shift in emphasis, then 
it is equally important to recognize that it was North African geographers and merchants 
and not Europeans who popularized referring to the lands beyond the Sahara as Bilad al-
Sudan, “the land of the blacks” (Lydon 88), as Ogilby mentions in his influential 1670 
Africa when describing the part of the continent “call’d Negro-Land, or, The Countrey of 
the Blacks” (315). These divisions were recorded by Leo Africanus and Muhammad al-
Idrisi and maintained by most European geographies throughout the eighteenth century, 
which depended on such texts by Arabic geographers, however mediated, for accounts of 
the interior.18 In the context of the trans-Saharan trade, the moniker Bilad al-Sudan is a 
mark of difference but also connection. As Purchas indicates, Berber traders were eager 





that the Sahara itself initially appears to be a “waylesse” division between the two, Lydon 
points out that the Sahara “was never a barrier but always a bridge to intercontinental 
exchange” (105). Inserted into a comment about how European traders have found 
Coramantien “one of those places in which they found the most advantageous trading for 
these slaves” (13), Behn’s evocation of Arabic geographical categories emphasizes that 
intercontinental trade from within Africa predated the Atlantic slave trade by several 
hundred years. The passive voice of this paragraph and the fact that the European traders 
“found” Coramantien advantageous for the trade in slaves, as if stumbling on a vibrant 
market already in place, marks a tonal shift in the novella, where the previously very 
present eyewitness-narrator suddenly disappears, reminding the reader that she has no 
empirical authority in this section of the narrative but is rather beholden to the testimony 
of the African other. The European subject is thus tangential in this paragraph to both the 
narrative economy and the market economy.    
The existence of this pre-Atlantic market is reinforced by Behn’s descriptions of 
Oroonoko and his king as traders of slaves, a fact that Aravamudan has identified as one 
of the text’s parodic ironies and that Adam Beach argues is evidence for reading 
Oroonoko as an Atlantic creole—the children of usually Portuguese traders and their 
African wives and mistresses who became powerful brokers in Atlantic trade (226).19 At 
one point we are told that Oroonoko gives Imoinda a courtship gift of “a hundred and 
fifty slaves in fetters” (16), which emphasizes the fact that Africa already had well-
established internal trade routes and practices at this time.20 That Oroonoko took these 
slaves in battle as “the trophies of…victory” indicates the extent that dominance over 





of each potentate’s standing army (Reid 58).21 When the slave-owning Imoinda is then 
turned slave herself, the king gives the command that she and Onahal “should be both 
sold off as slaves to another country, either Christian, or heathen, it was no matter where” 
(31). In this moment, the New and the Old Worlds are brought in juxtaposition with each 
other, with Africa caught in the middle between two geographical models. Although 
Imoinda is destined by genre to be reunited with Oroonoko in New World servitude, the 
king’s order indicates that she could have had a different fate—rather than an Atlantic 
crossing in a ship, she could have crossed the Sahara in a caravan and ultimately ended 
up in a different “Christian” land than the West Indies, such as Italy, or in a “heathen” 
land either somewhere else in Africa or in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, Barbary slavery 
would be the most common choice according to the conventions of romance that Behn so 
clearly depends on here.  
The trans-Sahara trade was not, however limited to the slave market. It is central 
to Behn’s descriptions of the luxurious court at Coramantien. The king’s otan is filled 
with carpets and cushions. Oroonoko’s battle tent is a “rich pavilion” softened by a 
“carpet” (32) and “couch” (34). Oroonoko’s clothing is equally extravagant. In battle “his 
people had purposely put on him all things that might make him shine with most splendor, 
to strike a reverend awe into the beholders” (35), and when he is taken as a slave, he is 
wearing “a rich habit…so different from the rest” (43). It is indicated through Onahal’s 
pearl earrings that the women in the novella are also well adorned (27), and the palace’s 
many apartments are lavishly furnished and surrounded by groves of citrus trees. If such 
descriptions contrast sharply with the narrator’s empirical descriptions of Surinam, I 





are not any less specific than her details of Surinam, but when her naked descriptions of 
Surinam are contrasted with the sumptuousness and the luxury of the court at 
Coramantien, one is deemed empirical while the other is written off as Orientalized 
fancy.22 I will return to the geographical and epistemological effect of Behn’s contrasting 
narrative modes, but it is important here to recognize the plausibility of Behn’s details, 
not because they generate a realistic portrait of what Coramantien would have looked 
like—as in an anthropologically correct geographical representation of a specifically 
located West African city—but because they capture something important about the 
material culture of African worlds in the late seventeenth century and the power of those 
worlds to impact European narratives.   
All of the luxury goods that Behn either lists outright or suggests would have been 
available in West Africa at that time. As evidenced by Leo Africanus’s descriptions, 
exotic cloth was coveted by West African kingdoms, and according to Lydon, “Textiles 
of bewildering varieties and origins circulated along transcontinental trade routes. Al-
Bakri mentioned red and blue cloaks as well as silk, cotton, and brocades worn by the 
inhabitants of Ghana” (76). In particular Indian cotton and embroidered silks were 
imports into the Senegambia region, and “Asian textiles arrived in Guinea as luxury items” 
(Mark 243). These textiles were used to make not only clothing but also tents (Lydon 76). 
Beads, armor, and books were some of the other goods that came from Asia and the 
Mediterranean into West Africa, as well as “copper, glass, foreign pottery, wheat…and 
semi-precious stones” (Guerin 81). This historical and material connection between 
Asian and African markets is often overlooked in Oroonoko scholarship. Scholars like 





conclude that Behn’s Coramantien is therefore “an imagined territory, a romantic place 
that is more in-between than located” connected to Islamic North Africa “in order to 
focus on a part of Africa that may have seemed accessible to an English audience who 
could only conjure up Africa’s interiors in their imaginations” (154). Similarly, Yang 
argues that Behn uses the East to make “Africanness…recognizable to the English reader 
through a set of Orientalized, intercontinental transpositions” (236-37). Both critics point 
to the text’s material culture as evidence for this Orientalization, with Nussbaum citing 
the “couch, carpets, and baths” of the king’s court (155) and Yang suggesting that the 
text’s “commodification of Asian cultures… materializes a fantasy of globality in the 
form of ornamentation” (236).23 Although both these readings are valid ways of thinking 
about how the fetishization of the Orient was deeply imbricated in eighteenth-century 
narrative structures, they depend in part on the problematic assumption that a lush and 
luxurious material culture could not possibly have been an authentic part of Sub-Saharan 
worlds. While such arguments are defensible in their desire to make nuanced distinctions 
between cultures and avoid pan-Africanism, they can have the unintended consequence 
of trapping Africa in a discourse of primitivism.   
As a reminder that the Africa of grass huts and minimal material possessions is 
not more authentic than the Africa of early modern commodity culture, it is worth 
keeping in mind that in the early modern period, Europe’s elites were as likely to be 
swathed in African luxury goods as those imported from Asia. Their summer gowns and 
stockings were made from Guinea cotton and dyed with indigo and their jewelry was 
crafted from African gold and pearls; African beeswax, ambergris gathered from east 





miniatures they wore or carried came from African elephants; and entire generations of 
Saharan ostriches were denuded for the sake of ladies’ hats. Hakluyt opens his Principal 
Navigations by arguing that the Spanish and Portuguese have been lucky in global trade 
in part due to their exchanges with African countries that were “well fraught with 
commodities” like slaves, sugar, ivory, grains, silver, gold, and “other precious wares.” In 
exchange for these exports, African leaders requested luxury goods of their own, 
including European cloth, crystal goblets, and silverware. Hakluyt even gives a list of 
“the commodities and wares that are most desired in Guinie betwixt Sierra Liona and the 
furthest places of the Mine [Elmina]” (52).  
This level of material luxury is reflected in a seventeenth-century French travel 
narrative to West Africa that Behn very well might have been familiar with, Francois 
d’Elbee’s journal, which was published in 1671.24 In this account of establishing a trade 
relationship between France and the King of Ardrah, d’Elbee describes both the king and 
his son as hospitable, handsome, well educated, and civilized. Both the king’s and the 
prince’s knowledge of European politics were so thorough that later English epitomes of 
the narrative would comment on this specifically,25 and according to d’Elbee, both also 
spoke European languages even though they relied on translators for formality’s sake 
(399, 405). The prince and the king are echoed in descriptions of Oroonoko, from his 
understanding of European politics (14) to his “delicate virtues” (16), and like Oroonoko, 
the Prince and the King of Ardrah have grown wealthy and knowledgeable about 
European ways by positioning themselves as major players in the slave trade.26   
In d’Elbee’s account, not only the people, but also the place has parallels with 





porches, and surrounded by cultivated gardens and fruit trees (418).28 The interiors of 
these spaces are described not only as elegantly appointed but as cosmopolitan, as 
intersections of various international trade lines. The palace and the courtiers are draped 
in satin and taffeta (402, 421, 429); they eat from fine dishes (429) and drink from crystal 
goblets (409). When d’Elbee and his company are invited to dine with the Grand 
Marabout, or high priest, they recline on beautifully woven carpets and listen to a chorus 
of female musicians—apparently each young woman one of the Grand Marabout’s wives 
(429). The description is strikingly similar to Behn’s account of Oroonoko and the King 
of Coramantien lounging on carpets watching the women of the otan dance (27). 
I bring up these examples not to argue that Behn’s portrait of Africa serves as a 
mimetic stand-in for any historically or materially locatable African place, but rather to 
point out that her representation was nevertheless inflected by the complexity of 
indigenous trade networks and by the inability of Europeans to gain control—discursive 
or otherwise—over those worlds. Thus, Behn’s narrative places Africa in two different 
geographical worldviews governed by two different representational logics. The first, its 
trans-Atlantic context, is marked by a discourse of empiricism that puts the European 
eyewitness in a place of epistemological privilege in the text. But the second, its trans-
Saharan context, reminds the reader that Africa has both a narrative and a material history 
outside of European contact and that much of the knowledge Europeans did have of 
Africa during this time was born of this context, transmitted through non-European 
accounts that evoke Africa’s global power, not out of the burgeoning empirical practices 





In fact, such empirical representations are not only suspect within the text; the 
narrative suggests that when Europeans do generate rational, objective representations of 
non-European spaces, they put such knowledge to ethically questionable uses. Oroonoko 
is enticed onto the boat of the treacherous captain who betrays him into slavery with 
“globes and maps, mathematical discourses and instruments” (37). Both Molineux and 
Sills suggest that Oroonoko’s fascination with the navigational equipment aboard the 
English ship is ultimately his downfall (“False Gifts” 468; 320), which emphasizes that 
such scientific discourses are not the neutral, raw materials of modern knowledge that 
epistemologies of perceived space would like them to be. Rather, according to Sills, these 
emblems of perceived space are connected with colonization and slavery “in such a way 
that the map and globe become symbolic of a whole way of seeing the world, one that is 
deeply suspect in Behn’s estimation” (321). I would add that this critique depends not 
simply on the map and globe as abstract symbols of Western knowledge’s service to 
mercantile power but precisely on how they are distanced from the African setting of the 
novel. They are contextualized not only as a specifically European way of imagining the 
world, but as a limited vision, epistemologically flawed in how they create an illusion of 
universalization at the expense of the local witnesses engendering their production. 
 
The Inerasable African Witness 
As contradictory as the two styles may seem, the congruence between Behn’s 
descriptions of Surinam and her descriptions of Africa dramatize that such 
representational strategies were common if uneasy bedfellows in early Enlightenment 





the narrative begin to infiltrate Surinam as well, and the narration loses the empirical 
certainty that it promises in the first few pages, hinting at the fact that eyewitness 
accounting and the organization of geographical data into empirical categories does not 
guarantee sure knowledge but is itself a narrative convention.29  
Take, for example, the narrator’s attempt to describe a New World animal, the 
armadillo, by likening it to an Old World beast, the rhinoceros, “all in white armour, so 
jointed that it moves as well in it as if it had nothing on” (51). As demonstrated in Behn’s 
opening description of Surinam, a common strategy in early modern travel writing was to 
compare a new animal or geographical feature to one already known by European 
audiences. The known animal becomes an empirical surrogate, giving the reader a 
concrete context for new and strange animals that travelers encountered. But the 
narrator’s choice of the rhinoceros in fact problematizes this strategy since the rhino was 
known primarily in Europe not as an empirical specimen but through imaginative 
accounts. Although curiosity cabinets often contained the horns or even the heads of the 
animal, the majority of people’s knowledge of rhinos—particularly the notion that their 
skin was jointed like armor—would have come from sources like Albrecht Dürer’s 
woodcut (1515; Fig. 1), which was based on a written description and sketch of a rhino in 
Lisbon that Dürer himself never saw, or from fables about rhinos, for instance that they 
were the mortal enemies of elephants and would fight them if they encountered them in 
the wild or that their horns were an antidote to poison. What is supposed to be an 
empirical surrogate for the reader back home, then, under even rudimentary inspection 

















These moments when the empirical and speculative begin to blend together 
gesture back to the beginning of the novel when the narrator establishes the problematic 
relationship between eyewitness accounting and secondhand narration. This tension is 
echoed again as Oroonoko comes across the Atlantic, through the transposition of the Old 
World into the New. If Behn is drawing attention to the significance of Oroonoko as a 
secondary author of the text—as the authority that shapes the narrative’s larger global 
portrait—and commenting on how a layering of narratives always underpins so-called 
empirical descriptions of non-European spaces, then his death and dismemberment at the 
end of the narrative becomes a gruesome metaphor for how Enlightenment knowledge 
was “divided from the process by which it is known” (McKeon xix). As Withers argues, 
all Enlightenment geographical knowledge is comprised of “global encounters locally 
articulated” (14), meaning that global knowledge was produced through the very 
processes of translation, displacement, and re-narration that Oroonoko dramatizes. 
However, this knowledge is suspect on its own, even more so when it comes from an 
African informant rather than a European observer.  
The solution to this problem was to “disembed” this knowledge “from the matrix 
of experience” (McKeon xix), circulating it as rational and abstract. After the slave 
rebellion Oroonoko inspires fails, Oroonoko is publicly tortured and dismembered. This 
dismemberment is a literal dramatization of how the non-European witness becomes 
simultaneously necessary to and a casualty of the production of Enlightenment 
knowledge, made first visible and then invisible in the kind of epistemological bait-and-





the marks of nowhere,” even though it is always produced “somewhere” (21), and 
irrefutably influenced by the place it was produced.  
As the narrator describes, Oroonoko is torn apart piece by piece, but the parts he 
contributes to her story of the globe survive through “the reputation of [her] pen” (77). 
Several critics have commented on the way that Oroonoko becomes a symbol for 
representation by the end of the novel, most notably Catherine Gallagher, who reads his 
very blackness as “the disembodied, inky darkness of print” (56).30 On the one hand, this 
transmogrification signals immortality, a certain universality: as Behn states in the 
“Epistle Dedicatory,” “the pictures of the pen shall outlast those of the pencil and even 
worlds themselves” (2). On the other hand, as the description of Oroonoko’s execution 
indicates, this universalization of global knowledge often happens through terrible 
violence to the local, particular, embodied conditions that produced the knowledge in the 
first place.    
Yet, when Behn overtly asserts the significance of Oroonoko as the secondary 
narrator of this text she prevents the erasure of the African contribution to her world 
picture from becoming the totalizing process that the end of her novel gestures toward. 
When she reveals the necessity of multiple narratives coexisting at once to the 
advancement of Western knowledge, she reminds us that there are always secondary 
stories underpinning any given eyewitness account. Although on the surface such 
accounts may strive towards synthesis, a close interrogation shows the contradictions 
between the promises of objectivity made by certain epistemological methodologies and 
the actual conditions that produced the way Europeans thought about the world, which 





an example of Wither’s observation that “location makes a difference to the production of 
knowledge and to the contexts of its reception and justification” (97), and thus becomes 
part of the trail of evidence that indicates that the Enlightenment was a globally made 
phenomenon. We have largely overlooked or forgotten about the contributions that 
Africans made to Western knowledge in the early Enlightenment, but due to the generic 
heterogeneity of texts about Africa, traces of such contributions resurface.  
 
Conclusion  
As Behn’s novel highlights, Africa’s impenetrability meant that the knowledge-
producing European subject was forced into a global epistemology where Africa was 
concerned. Where the European eye couldn’t go, narrative and non-European evidence 
was necessary in order to flesh out the continent in the geographical imagination. North 
African Arab geographers were crucial to shaping European impressions of the African 
continent, as were Africa’s internal trade networks and its global trade relationships that 
Europeans were aware of but could not control. The various luxury goods that made their 
way among Asia, Europe, and Africa during this time provide material traces for these 
lines of intercontinental exchange and in Behn’s narrative become signifiers of the larger 
communal networks that generated the Enlightenment worldview, working in tandem 
with or sometimes in contradiction with the rising genre of the eyewitness account.   
The next chapter illustrates how the complex relationships that Oroonoko 
dramatizes between institutionalized epistemological ideals, the limitations of the 
eyewitness in African settings, and Europe’s dependence on African knowledge became a 





few decades of the eighteenth century. As I will show, an awareness of how this structure 
shaped both fictional texts about Africa, like Daniel Defoe’s Captain Singleton (1720), 
and nonfictional texts about Africa, like William Smith’s New Voyage to Guinea (1745), 
allows us to see how African geographies and discourses shaped not only knowledge 






















1 For arguments that examine the African court as an allegory for the political upheaval 
of the British court in the years following Charles II’s death, see Doyle; Gallagher; and 
Molineux, “False Gifts.” For recent treatments of the role of the exotic in Oroonoko, see 
Mallipeddi and Molineux, “False Gifts.”.  
2 Moira Ferguson, for example, calls Behn’s descriptions of the African court “grist for 
the mill of Euro-African fantasy and idealism” (347). Albert Rivero claims that the book 
is endemic of a seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European tendency to understand 
uncharted geographical territory as a “blank space” that cannot be filled “until discovered 
and mapped out by Europeans” (445), and he puts Oroonoko in dialog with Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness, claiming, “It seems there is one story and one story only of 
colonialism” (444). Similarly, Tcho Mbaimba Caulker argues that in Oroonoko, “Africa 
becomes a geographical backdrop or stage on which European fears, desires, fantasies, 
and so forth are played out for an audience of readers” (3). 
3 Gevirtz argues that Aphra Behn’s “narratives reveal a profound interest in the concerns 
and methods of natural philosophy and demonstrate how the ideas, methods, and 
rhetorical challenges of the philosophical debates directly influenced the emerging 
novel’s interests and form” (Women 85). Hayden argues that “Oroonoko provides a 
complex and paradigmatic example of the interface between science, travel, and literary 
discourse and therefore offers some fascinating insight on the development of ‘scientific 






often sited as evidence that she had a “strong understanding” of “the larger implications 
of the ideas, methods, and structures shaping natural philosophy” (Gevirtz, “Behn” 87).  
4 When Katharine Rogers argues that “In its major outlines Behn’s representation of West 
African culture is accurate” (3), she uses an array of European travel narratives as her 
evidence and suggests that they can be used as a stable truth point against which the 
viability of Behn’s narrative can be measured. Conversely, when critics such as Roxann 
Wheeler and George Boulukos argue that fictional accounts of Africa like Behn’s or like 
Defoe’s Captain Singleton are not consistent with the travel writing of the day (114; 54), 
they intimate that such works of fiction work in the realm of the imaginative while other 
travel writing has an irrefutable, material connection to the real. Such readings are useful 
in the sense that they bring up for discussion exactly what the relationship is between 
perceived and conceived space—between empirically measurable geographies as we 
have been trained in the wake of the Royal Society’s efforts to think of them and all the 
possible ways that a place can be imagined to any number of artistic or political ends. 
Yet, often these readings fall into the very privileging of an epistemology of perceived 
space that I suggest Behn’s novel struggles against.    
5 Livingstone identifies Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620) as the text that “Intended a 
reform of all human knowledge,” arguing that “it constituted an eloquent apologia for 
erecting science on the sure foundation of method” (100). 
6 As Carey points out, the Royal Society was not the first or the only organization to 






See 26. In particular, Boyle’s General Heads resembles Spanish inquiry guides that were 
in circulation at the time. See 46.    
7 Two of Behn’s alleged source texts for Oroonoko are prime early examples of this 
genre—Warren’s Impartial Description of Surinam (1667) and the anonymous Golden 
Coast or a Description of Guinney (1665).  
8 For evidence of the influence of The Golden Coast on Oroonoko, see Rosenthal 29. One 
notable argument for the influence of The Golden Coast on Oroonoko is the description 
of the “Princes and Noble Men” who “pounce and rase their skins, with pretty knots in 
diverse forms, as it were branched Damask, thinking that to bee a decent ornament” (42). 
See Lipking, “Confusing Matters” 266. However, this account was first published in 
Hakluyt (333), emphasizing the extent that such texts framed as scientific accounts by 
their prefatory material were in fact reprints of early modern travelers’ tales.  
9 Although The Golden Coast was published the year before Boyle’s General Heads, 
Carey argues that Boyle’s inquiry guide is just the most well known of these in England, 
not the first of them. See 26.   
10 Gazetteers like the Churchill brother’s Compleat Geographer (1704) existed for the 
sole purpose of “abstract[ing]” what travelers had said about different places so the 
reader could avoid the “Tedious Study” of reading the original sources (preface). 
Collections of travel narratives came out every few years, such as Knapton and Bell’s 
New Collection of Voyages and Travels into Several Parts of the World, None of Them 
ever before Printed in English (1711) and Tobias Smollet’s A Compendium of Authentic 






narratives. William Smith lifted whole passages of Willem Bosman’s New and Accurate 
Description of the Coast of Guinea (1701/03) for his New Voyage to Guinea (1744). 
Several of the passages Smith relies on, Bosman himself admits did not come from his 
own first hand observations. See 326.  
11 For a similar take on the relationship between science and travel in the early 
Enlightenment, see Livingstone 145-48. John Bender explains this phenomenon through 
the scientific concerns of Hooke and Newton: “What Robert Hooke called the insantia 
crucis and Sir Isaac Newton the experimentum crusis demands that we place our trust in 
accounts of the historical experience of others and use their accounts to extend our own 
experience to the point of assent—despite the potential for deceit or fictionalization” 
(29).  
12 By purporting to give us “The History of the Royal Slave,” as the subtitle indicates, the 
narrator is ostensibly giving us an account of events rather than places. However, as 
Withers points out, while chronology was considered to be history’s “right eye” in the 
Enlightenment, geography was its “left eye,” making place as vital for completing the 
genre as the order of events (178).  
13 Bender observes that “a certain denial of fictionality marks both the earlier eighteenth-
century novel and early science” (43). Behn is following in this tradition but also, I 
suggest, drawing explicit attention to it.  
14 Robert Boyle’s General Heads asks for descriptions of “what animals the country has 
or wants” and “whether it have any animals that are not common, or any that is peculiar 






“species” through categorical similarities and differences. Thomas Sprat’s History of the 
Royal Society (1667) advocates for the importance of the Royal Society’s repository of 
specimens so that all the species “scatter’d throughout the Universe” could be studied in 
juxtaposition to one another (251).  
15 Sills similarly concludes that Oroonoko counters the notion that geographical space is 
“objectifiably knowable,” and questions the value of “methods of putatively realistic 
representation” for making sense of the physical world (324). 
16 In fact both Leo Africanus and Muhammad al-Idrisi were of Arab descent, and both 
spent extensive time in Europe (Spain and Italy) as well as North Africa.  
17 Catharine Gallagher, for example, argues that “black so called” designates “the 
commodity value of the slave body” (77). Felicity Nussbaum uses the term to designate 
the increasingly “Negrified” black subject in eighteenth-century European literature. See 
“Between ‘Oriental’ and ‘Blacks So Called.’”   
18 Oumelbanine Zhiri writes, “During the few decades following its first publication, [Leo 
Africanus’s text] came to constitute the foundation of the knowledge of a great part of 
Africa in the Early Modern period and beyond. Geographers and historians used it to 
renew their descriptions of a continent still basically unknown to Europeans, to such an 
extent that some texts seem to be basically rewritings of [it]” (176).  
19 Beach has suggested that Behn’s description of the European qualities of Oroonoko’s 
features is evidence for this reading. See 226.  
20 Philip Curtin points out that “One of the myths of African history is the old view that 






continent. In fact trade beyond the village level began on local, African initiative. Traders 
moved out along the trade routes and set up diasporas that crisscrossed the continent in 
patterns of increasing complexity” (15). See also John Thornton who argues about the 
slave trade, “Europeans simply tapped into an existing market” (73).  
21 As Ogilby writes of one kingdom in “Negro-Land,” “The King, if occasion require, can 
raise seven thousand Foot, many of them good Archers, and five hundred Horse….his 
greatest Revenue he raises out of his yearly Customs of Exported and Imported Goods” 
(328). 
22 Lipking, for example, argues of this setting that “Only a few details seem identifiably 
West African: the canopy and carpets, the strict sequestration of the king’s women, the 
frequent wars and sales of war captives—but these are set amid vaguely ‘oriental’ 
ceremonies and dancing” (“Others” 170). 
23 Yang does however point out the importance of the East Indies trade to the Black 
Atlantic as evidenced through “the purchase of African slaves with East Indian textiles”  
(236), and she rightly argues that Oroonoko has an “awareness of global systems of 
commercial and cultural exchange between East and West” (237).  
24 See Lipking, “Behn’s French Connections.”  
25 Astley’s New General Collection of Voyages and Travels (1745) claims to have the 
first English translation of the account (65), although it is more an epitome than a direct 
translation, and it describes the prince as “much better acquainted with the Situation and 
Affairs of Europe than one would well imagine” (67). Similarly, the 1760 Modern Part of 






meeting with the Prince of Ardrah, saying “His highness, who was well acquainted with 
the history of Europe, kept up the conversation with spirit, preserving much gravity, yet 
discovering great vivacity in his remarks, and good sense, penetration, and delicacy of 
taste and genius in his questions” (472).  
26 The king and prince are likely Aja or Fon. Ardrah (Allada) is part of modern-day 
Benin.  
27 The name “Coramantien” is cited as an example of the inventive quality of Behn’s 
narration here since, as Lipking points out, “Behn’s ‘Coramantien’—is not in reality ‘a 
Country’ but only a main English trading station on the Gold Coast, in modern Ghana ” 
(“Others” 170), though the Dutch had actually captured the fort by the time Oroonoko 
was written. See also Gallagher 77 for a similar point. However, it was a common, if 
Eurocentric, geographical strategy to refer to African regions by the people who 
inhabited the area—Coromantee being a term used in the West Indies to refer to slaves 
from the Akan ethnic groups, making it possible that Behn is gesturing broadly to Ghana 
or the Ivory Coast rather than this fort in particular.     
28 In fact, d’Elbee’s description of the architecture is consistent with other accounts that 
describe Benin City, in the same region 300 miles down the coast, which had a palace so 
grand and covered with such elaborate bronze casts of warriors and animals that when the 
British sacked the city in 1897, they assumed the metallurgy was too sophisticated to be 
indigenous and must have been introduced to the natives by the Portuguese. As Mudimbe 
describes this colonial mindset, “Since Africans could produce nothing of value; the 






Portuguese creation; the architectural achievements of Zimbabwe was due to Arab 
technicians; and Hausa and Buganda statecraft were inventions of white invaders” (13). 
However, although they held their own prejudices, the early eighteenth-century writers 
clearly did not share the late nineteenth-century writers belief that Africans were too 
primitive to produce such art or architecture. Thomas Wyndham was the first Englishman 
to bring back an account of Benin City in 1553, as recorded in Purchas (541). The city 
and the bronzes are also described in Bosman (486-487) and Smith (227), and in several 
geographies like Barrow’s New Geographical Dictionary (1759), which describes the 
city’s houses as “large and handsome” (282).  
29 See Markley 209 and Mallipeddi 425, both who make the point that Behn’s 
descriptions of Surinam stylistically evoke empirical discourse but argue such discourse 
serves as a rhetorical comment on the act of representation itself rather than as an 
accurate stand-in for New World landscapes.   
30 See also Pigg who argues about Oroonoko’s dismemberment that “the text has 
identified body with discourse” (110), and Aravamudan who ultimately concludes that 
“Oroonoko, as a literary character, is a cipher echoing lost persons, subject effects, or 
statistical numbers, called up—rhetorically—to represent the Triangle trade, the birth of 






CHAPTER 2: THE “MOST BARREN, DESOLATE, DESERT, AND INHOSPITABLE 
COUNTRY IN THE WORLD”: AFRICA’S INTERIOR IN WILLIAM SMITH’S NEW 
VOYAGE TO GUINEA AND DANIEL DEFOE’S CAPTAIN SINGLETON
The African witness remains an inerasable if obscured figure in Enlightenment 
texts about the production of global knowledge, and African worlds write back into 
Enlightenment texts in ways that preclude us from reading the subjectivity of their 
authors and narrators as the only or even the dominant force that shapes their content. 
These realities complicated the empirical ideals espoused by institutions like the Royal 
Society, as I examined in the last chapter, and the Royal African Company (RAC), as I 
will touch on here, by reasserting the localized origins of seemingly abstract and rational 
knowledge. I analyze three different representations of the African interior all tied to the 
RAC’s trade interests, albeit in dramatically different ways—William Smith’s New 
Voyage to Guinea (1745), Daniel Defoe’s Captain Singleton (1720), and the Mandinka 
myth of the silent trader, repeated in various travel narratives from the fifteenth through 
the eighteenth centuries.  
On the surface, both Smith’s and Defoe’s texts appear to be relatively 
uncomplicated propaganda for the promotion of trade with and in Africa, which was 
spurred by but was not limited to England’s increased role in the transatlantic slave trade 
following the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Working in Africa around the same time Captain 





man. As a surveyor for the RAC, to some extent his very job was to be “the white male 
subject of European landscape discourse—he whose imperial eyes passively look out and 
possess” (9), setting the observer apart from the observed, creating a subject/object binary 
that reifies both the subject’s sense of entitlement and the object’s status as passive and 
inert. Similarly, Captain Singleton appears a prime example of an anticonquest 
narrative—“mimic[king] the accounting procedures of travel narratives” (Aravamudan 
76), and representing indigenous Africans as tractable and the landscape as ripe with gold 
and ivory waiting to be carried out of the interior by ingenious and industrious Europeans. 
Defoe’s own connections to and investments in the RAC are often cited as ample 
motivation for his representing African people and landscapes as no match for superior 
European intellect and navigational technology.1   
Yet, in spite of the critical truism that Europeans wielded their technological and 
epistemological superiority in the contact zone as a mechanism of control, in Smith’s and 
Defoe’s accounts, European knowledge-making methods fail in African spaces more 
often then they are valorized. In these moments we can see the role that African 
technologies and African discourses played in dictating the terms of such encounters and 
their representations, despite attempts by their authors or narrators to assert fantasies of 
European epistemological dominance over the “savage” other. African narratives 
reported in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century travelogues even contributed to the idea 
of the interior of Africa as a “vast, howling wilderness” (103), as Singleton once 
describes it. Mandinka guides—the African middlemen to inland trade—circulated 





hinterland in order to maintain their territory, which had a lasting impact on European 
representations of the continent.   
 Although they have corporate and ideological similarities, when Smith’s and 
Defoe’s texts have been paired before, critics have tended to juxtapose the empirical 
quality of Smith’s narrative with the imaginative quality of Defoe’s, often pointing out 
that Defoe “significantly alters the conditions of contact characteristic of contemporary 
eyewitness accounts” (Wheeler 107-08) by homogenizing the people and landscapes of 
what was often thought of in the eighteenth century as a diverse part of the world. George 
Boulukos goes so far as to propose that Defoe’s Africa in Captain Singleton is “precisely 
the opposite of commercial travelers’ accounts,” and that his “totally barren 
Africa…represents the most uncommon vision” of the continent in the eighteenth century 
(53). These are important distinctions to make since they reinforce the fact that regardless 
of how commercially appealing Defoe’s treasure trove version of Africa might be, it was 
likely taken with a grain of salt by most eighteenth-century readers and not mistaken for 
an eyewitness account. However, such distinctions also draw the line between real and 
imagined representations of geographical space too sharply, in ways that preclude 
investigations into either the constructed literary quality of Smith’s narrative or into how 
African worlds are a fixed part of Defoe’s representations.2  
 I do not dispute that strategies of anticonquest are studded throughout both these 
texts, nor is it my intention to excuse Smith or Defoe either for their participation in the 
institutions that perpetuated slavery and laid the groundwork for colonization or for their 
xenophobic portrayals of Africans themselves. But although the ideological agendas of 





and worldviews nevertheless seep into cracks generated by contact with surprising, 
anxiety-inducing, unfamiliar places. Furthermore, though I hesitate to identify either text 
as subversive, both do demonstrate an awareness of the limitations of their own 
representational abilities in ways that suggest Defoe and Smith, like Aphra Behn, were 
cognizant of limitations of European epistemological methodologies to demystify the 
globe. It is in these moments of narrative and authorial uncertainty that the influence of 
Africa on European texts is most visible as representations, shaped by encounters with a 
complex world.  
 
Epistemological Uncertainty and Indigenous Authority in William Smith’s New Voyage 
to Guinea 
Smith worked in Guinea as a surveyor for the Royal African Company in the 
1720s, and his account circulated in manuscript before it was published posthumously in 
1744 by a bookseller who claimed he was satisfying “the present Curiosity of the Publick 
for whatever may contribute to the rendring the Produce of distant Countries as the 
Manners of Foreign Nations fully and certainly known” (iii). Yet, in spite of this promise 
of full and certain knowledge, the bookseller goes on to market the narrative in terms of 
the very epistemological riddle that Africa presented to those who strove to fill in the 
parts of the globe where mapmakers had hitherto placed “elephants for want of towns” as 
Swift famously put it.3 “There is no Part of the World with which we are less acquainted 
than the interior Part of Africa,” the bookseller writes in his preface. Furthermore, “even 
with respect to the Coast such surprising Revolutions happen there within the Compass of 





Matter” (iii). Although the title guarantees an account of a “New” voyage, the 
bookseller’s preface in fact reveals much about how Smith’s text fits into a longer 
tradition of suggesting that Africa is both representable and not, that knowledge can be 
gained about its regions only to have them undergo such “surprising Revolutions” as to 
make that knowledge unstable.4 The rhetoric of perceived space in such texts—what we 
might think of as the discourse of Pratt’s seeing man—is useful for building trust with the 
audience. But it was not enough to compensate for the fact that empirical practices as 
knowledge-producing methodologies had only a limited application when it came to 
contending with Africa’s inaccessible interior, which Smith’s narrative demonstrates was 
not the stable, geometrically measurable container of things that Euclidean methods of 
representing space imply. 
 Nevertheless, the bookseller’s preface goes to great lengths to assure the reader 
that Smith’s profession as a surveyor and an artist guarantees the accuracy of the text, 
stating that “it may be depended upon that the Cuts were taken from the Life, and the 
Attention requisite in drawing them, must have render’d the Author more accurate in his 
Descriptions than a Man of another Turn would have been” (iv). The suggestion that 
Smith’s artistic eye makes even his written descriptions more precise promises the very 
thing that the Royal Society hoped for from the travelers who brought data back from 
around the globe—that through the “disciplining of the senses,” and sight in particular, 
“much of the space between ‘here’ and ‘there’ could be spanned” (Livingstone 148). This 
idea was clearly taken up by the RAC as well, as indicated by Smith’s commission, 





The inclusion of the commission seems to foreshadow what the text is going to be 
about—the transformation of Africa into perceived space, into abstract knowledge that 
will enable more successful trade relations with African nations and perhaps even a 
colonial takeover. The commission asks for “an exact Survey of [the Gambia] River” and 
its surrounding areas, resulting in “a compleat Knowledge of the said River” (2), perhaps 
to make up for Bartholomew Stibb’s attempt to do the same in 1720, which failed for 
reasons that will be discussed further in the next section. Smith has also been 
commissioned to take an “exact Plan and Dimensions” of the fort on James Island and 
other forts in the area, take a survey of the Sierra Leone River, and “the most exact 
Draughts and Survey” of the Sherbro River (3). This language of exactitude continues 
throughout the commission, which outlines the various forts and rivers that the RAC 
deemed strategic. The logic underpinning the commission suggests that knowledge about 
African geography can be objectively gathered, brought home, circulated, and used in 
order to advance the RAC’s epistemological and economic agendas. Knowledge about 
rivers was particularly coveted because if as Aravamudan suggests the ship was “the 
interface for several centuries between metropolitan and colonial spheres” 
(Tropicopolitans 76), then rivers were the pathways that facilitated contact with the 
farthest reaches of those spheres, the veins and arteries of the terraqueous globe.   
However, rather than foreshadowing the subsequent narrative, the commission 
stands in stark opposition to it. Smith’s narrative does not valorize the usefulness and 
accuracy of the empirical methodologies he was trained in and hired to use. It 
consistently reinforces that the knowledge his narrative produces was mediated through 





Fabian describes European travelers to Africa under near constant influence from 
heatstroke, exhaustion, fear, illness, and drunkenness (3). Like Oroonoko, Smith narrative 
is a balancing act between eyewitness accounting and secondhand narratives from 
African witnesses that interrogate the nature of representation and its relationship to the 
production of global knowledge.  
Despite, or perhaps because of, his profession, Smith is cognizant of the 
limitations inherent in institutionalized practices for gathering geographical knowledge in 
Africa. For example, at one point he visits Elmina castle—a strategically important Gold 
Coast fort occupied by the Dutch. As he is walking around—“innocently” he insists 
(130)—the Dutch General of the outpost follows him. Smith recounts, “[he] catch’d me 
by the Sleeve, and in a sort of abrupt Manner, led me back again into the great Hall… and 
assured me, that tho’ I came abroad to carry home all Guinea in my Pocket, yet I shou’d 
not carry home Elmina Castle with me” (130). The general’s description of Smith’s 
reason for being in West Africa—to carry home all of Guinea in his pocket—seems an 
uncanny description of how critics today understand the ideological function of 
eighteenth-century travel writing. It alludes to both Smith’s geographical project and to 
how the RAC commodified the region, its resources, and its people, evoking pocketsful 
of Guineas of a different kind—the British coins struck from the very West African gold 
the RAC was in pursuit of, in addition to ivory and slaves. It also seems a synecdoche for 
the way modern knowledge was objectified and then disconnected from the specific 
places and peoples that produced it.  
Yet, although this may be the effect of generalized knowledge, and certainly how 





naïve way to think about how such knowledge is actually created. After the General’s 
admonishment, Smith writes, “When I recover’d myself a little, I told his Honour, that I 
thought he was a man of much more Knowledge than to imagine it was possible for 
anyone to take the Dimensions, or Survey of a Place without proper Instruments, as he 
saw I had none, I wonder’d how he could suspect me of coming to Elmina on any such 
Account” (130). By drawing attention to the necessity of his instruments, Smith reminds 
the General, as well as the reader, that geographical knowledge is not acquired by casting 
one’s gaze around a place and then pocketing the results; rather, it is made slowly, 
through a technologically mediated process that is both fraught with error and beholden 
to the environments it tries to master.  
For example, one of Smith’s very first attempts to take a survey of the mouth of 
the Gambia is a complete failure due to the inability of his instruments to adapt to the 
local landscape, reinforcing the centuries-old perception that something about African 
spaces resisted empirical penetration. Setting up his equipment to take the distance from 
the coast to James Island, Smith laments, “I fear’d I had undertaken an Impossibility, all 
the Shore being deep swampy mud, so that it was hardly possible to measure, or even get 
from one Station to another” (13). He does his best to take the survey but ultimately 
concludes that even “Had I been upon the dry Land, it was so cover’d with thick Wood 
and Weeds, that not only my View, but even my Passage must have been intercepted” 
(14). In addition to the mud, the weeds, and the trees, there are giant swarms of “great 
black ants” and “venomous wasps” that plague Smith and his assistant until he is forced 
to concede that “This first Day’s Work seem’d to promise but little Pleasure, or Comfort, 





the tendency for surveyors to fall prey to disease. Despite the General’s suspicion of 
Smith at Elmina castle, he does show him some draughts of the countryside started by 
Dutch surveyors a few years before. “Indeed, the Work was very prettily began,” Smith 
writes. “But alas! these unfortunate Gentlemen, like many others before them, lost their 
Lives before they had Half finished their work” (131). By shifting the reader’s attention 
from generalized knowledge about Africa itself to the conditions through which such 
knowledge was produced—or not, as the case may be, interrupted by everything from 
flies to death—Smith undercuts the power of the gaze, even or perhaps especially the 
technologically mediated gaze, to dominate the land.   
Thus, rather than taking for granted the idea that technology brings the illusion of 
irrefutable objectivity to the act of witnessing and the production of knowledge about the 
natural world, Smith’s account reiterates that the particular and the local were often not 
assimilable to the abstract strategies intended to represent them and that representational 
technologies—including narrative—are not clear media that simply move knowledge 
from one place to another. After all, as Livingstone argues, it was not universally 
accepted in the early Enlightenment that instruments could even be a trustworthy, 
replicable means of divining knowledge about the natural world (139), and at the very 
least, Smith’s detailed account of the limitations of his equipment serve as evidence for 
Withers’s argument that “instrumental measurements are always geographically 
contingent” (97). Smith’s narrative highlights the ways in which the particular and the 






When Smith’s narrative was excerpted in the second volume of Thomas Astley’s 
1745 New General Collection of Voyages and Travels, the introduction complains that 
although Smith writes at length about the labor involved in taking his draughts, none are 
published with the narrative itself. The result of this omission is arguably a text that 
focuses primarily on the particulars, and entails little of the abstracted synthesis that 
would then achieve the Enlightenment imperative of dividing knowledge from the 
process by which it was known.6 Rather, the text makes the constructed quality of global 
knowledge visible by narrating the local conditions of, and the multiple media involved 
in, its production.   
In doing so, Smith’s narrative both valorizes the European self and expresses 
anxieties about its limitations in African contexts. This is illustrated in an early scene that 
details contact not only between Europeans and Africans but also their respective 
technologies. While taking a survey in Cumbo, Smith recounts coming across a group of 
villagers grazing their cattle. He describes these natives as “naturally timorous, and not 
understanding [his] Measuring-wheel, or Theodolite” (15). At first they just watch him 
suspiciously, but when he approaches them about purchasing some of their cattle, they 
loose the cattle into the hills, raise the alarm in town, and call all the men in the village to 
arms. When Smith asks the Africans enslaved by the RAC who rowed him and his 
boatful of equipment out to the survey site about the villager’s “warlike Preparations,” 
the men explain that the villagers are afraid of Smith’s “surveying Instruments,” fearing 
that he was there to “bewitch them” (16). Smith has his mate, the only other European 
present, follow him with a loaded blunderbuss and goes about his work largely ignoring 





villagers surround Smith, who had taken a break from “the excessive Heat of the Sun” 
(17), well armed with “Javelins, Bows, and poison’d Arrows, or European Guns” (18). 
Weak with heatstroke and stricken with fear, Smith reflects “when it was too late, how 
dangerous an Expedition I had undertaken, and was now engag’d in, for the Royal 
African Company, which had cost so many ingenious Men their lives” (18)—one of 
several digs that Smith takes at the RAC throughout the narrative. At the last minute, his 
mate arrives with “a Callabash of good punch,” reviving Smith enough to make a run at 
the villagers, snatch up one of their guns, and chase them off into the forest. The mate 
tries to goad Smith into pursuing the natives, but Smith remarks, “I thought it more 
prudent to decline it, lest by venturing too far, I should by such Rashness bring upon 
myself the Evils I had escap’d” (20).   
The prose of this incident has much of the stereotypical European exploration-
adventure narrative about it. The superstitious natives fear unfamiliar but ultimately 
harmless scientific instruments, they are effortlessly controlled by the presence of 
European with a gun, and when they make their own display of martial power, they are 
overtaken and scared off. Smith walks away from the encounter with a tale to tell to “the 
Gentlemen and Ship’s Crew” (20). On one level, the encounter is about the triumph of 
European intelligence, technology, arms, and bravery over savages just threatening 
enough to make a good story but not so threatening as to undermine European male 
supremacy. Yet, also included in this account are details that unravel this narrative even 
as it is woven.  
Though the villagers are not so savvy with their guns as Smith apparently is, they 





life, reminding the reader that Europeans did not enjoy total control even over their own 
technology in African spaces.7 Furthermore, these guns are included among African 
martial technologies that though seemingly primitive are no less threatening. In fact, the 
detail about the poisoned arrows is particularly revealing—it increases the tension of the 
tale and therefore intensifies the self-aggrandizing quality of Smith’s escape, but it also 
represents the potential for all that was toxic about the African environment to penetrate 
and invade the European body, a body in this instance already weakened by the intense 
heat of the sub-Saharan sun. In fact, Smith has no way of knowing whether the arrows are 
poisoned or not, but coding the weapons this way reiterates that the Africans also 
possessed knowledge and technology that Europeans could not immediately understand 
and that the European subject was powerless against. In a sense, Smith reads the arrows 
with no less superstition and fear of being “bewitched” than the villagers read his 
measuring wheel and theolodite, endowing them with the power not just to penetrate but 
to take over the body. Smith is eventually able to regain control over the situation due to 
the “Calabash of good punch”—a European cure wrapped in an African package. But the 
fact that he refuses to follow the villagers deeper into a geography that he does not 
know—he is specifically wary of “venturing too far”—makes it clear by the end of the 
scene that the information gathered by Smith’s surveying equipment has very little 
practical authority up against the villagers’ knowledge of the landscape, of weapons and 
other technologies best suited for the space,8 and even of what plants and animals were 
harmful or helpful.  
The rest of the narrative oscillates between such images of supremacy and 





they could make better use of the African landscape than the Africans do. As she says, 
“The most revealing English observations about Africa are those suggesting that it would 
be even more beautiful and lucrative, and the inhabitants even more civilized, through the 
active intervention, even insertion, of Europeans into Africa” (“Limited” 19). In many of 
his descriptions, Smith follows the pattern that Wheeler outlines. For example, he 
describes the native inhabitants around the Gambia river as “indolent,” but explains that 
“Nature has afforded them all Necessaries proper for the Support of Life, without any 
great Art or Industry of their own” (28-29). For the natives, the land provides everything 
from food, shelter, and resources to conveniently shaped gourds to use as dishes and 
naturally fermenting palm wine (30-31).  
Yet, rather than suggesting Europeans could easily move into the space—barely 
being used by the “indolent” natives—cultivate, and improve it, Smith’s narrative is 
skeptical about whether Europeans have the necessary knowledge and technologies in 
order to survive the continent even as he sketches out the great promise of its natural 
resources. He concludes the section about the land surrounding the Gambia river by 
saying, “In short, Gambia is a pleasant, fruitful fine Country, but very unhealthy” (34). 
Similarly, in his descriptions of Whydah, he calls it “one of the most delightful Countries 
in the world” (194), assuring the reader that “the imaginary Beauty of the Elysian Fields 
cannot surpass the real Beauty of this Country” (195). But again, he concludes the section 
by stating, “As for the country in general, tho’ I allow it to be the finest I ever saw, yet I 
should never like it because it is so very unwholesome” (198). It is clear from the 
surrounding text that what Smith means is that the land is unhealthy and unwholesome 





purported that Europeans were not biologically adapted for surviving in the torrid zone. 
The origin of this notion, and of Smith’s anxiety, is somewhat understandable when one 
takes into account the fact that between 25% and 75% of any group of Europeans who 
settled in Africa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries died within their first year 
(Brooks 16). 
The solution to making the country more accessible to Europeans, Smith’s 
narrative suggests, is not to rely on European ways of understanding the space but to turn 
to indigenous knowledge and technologies, particularly when it comes to protecting 
against environmental threats including disease, wild animals, insects, and unknown 
territory.9 Although an eighteenth-century traveler’s authority was often grounded in how 
well he or she deployed the language of empiricism in his or her account, and whether 
they were themselves a person of good and trustworthy moral character (Livingstone 
148), secondary authorities with some kind of insider information were also crucial to the 
genre, and the figure of the reliable African who disclosed information about the interior 
of the continent and gave advice on how to survive its dangers was fundamental to almost 
all eighteenth century texts about Africa. They are the “In-land Negroes” that Bosman 
depends on to supplement his eyewitness account who are “such People, that in this and 
other things, I dare assure myself of the Truth of what they say” (208). They are the 
“Country people” who guided Richard Jobson up the Gambia who were “of esteeme” and 
would “deliver no false thing” (8). Sometimes they were remarkable enough to European 
travelers have be named and given histories, such as Francis Moore’s account of his 
relationship with Ayuba Suleiman Diallo—“my Friend Job” (205); John Atkins’s 





“very upright and just…in all bargains” (87); or James Bruce’s dependence on the advice 
of Aster Iyasu to navigate the Abyssinian court detailed in Chapter 5, who he always 
called “the greatest friend I had in Abyssinia” (3: 218). Other times, as in Smith’s case, 
they remain nameless and relatively indistinct as individuals but are no less significant to 
his text for all that, and are considered “generally faithful as to what account they gave of 
things” (77). They became a trope in fictional representations of Africa, as I suggest 
about Oroonoko in the previous chapter and as I will elaborate on subsequently.  
In both travelogues and fictional texts, African informants or guides serve a 
rhetorical purpose of validating the European observer, but it does not necessarily follow 
that they are in and of themselves a rhetorical invention of European texts. Characterizing 
them as such prevents us from seeing the moments when European travel writers become 
lateral to their own texts, recording, as Belcher points out, not what they see or have 
discerned for themselves, but what they are told by others (38). When Smith, for example, 
does not automatically know how to read the villagers’ behavior in the incident at Cumbo, 
he turns toward his African guides for elaboration, reiterating that African cultural 
behaviors and practices were made intelligible to Europeans through intermediaries, just 
as knowledge about the landscape required mediation through instruments. And just as 
the instruments cannot be erased—as Smith reminds the general at El Mina—from the 
production of geographical knowledge, neither can the indigenous sources of European 
knowledge about the continent. Though like many European travelers Smith scoffs at 
African explanatory paradigms, his text simultaneously validates the necessity of 
indigenous knowledge not just to gain access to the continent’s resources but also to 





Smith endorses the value and credibility of African practices by deploying images 
of their health and vigor in contrast to European vulnerability. While Europeans are 
described as overwhelmed by heatstroke, disease, swamps, and terrible storms, the 
Africans are portrayed as athletic, strong, and able-bodied. Indeed, when an African child 
is born, “all its Limbs grow vigorous and proportionate,” unlike the so many “crooked 
People” of Europe (211). While Smith struggles through difficult landscapes, the natives 
“skipp’d like Wild Goats,” with “Activity and Agility” so “surprizing” Smith likens them 
them to “Rope-dancers” and “Tumblers” (17). Clearly this rhetoric has an insidious 
undertone—it should not be forgotten that Smith’s purpose for being here was to advance 
the slave trade, and animalistic descriptions of bodies that remained healthy in the torrid 
zone contributed to the discourse of geosymmetry that encouraged the transplantation of 
African slaves to Caribbean plantations. But against an African backdrop that proved so 
problematic to European travelers, such discourse serves another purpose—it highlights 
the extent that native knowledge was necessary for survival in an environment where 
European practices often proved inadequate.   
It makes sense, then, that one of the most prominent African technologies that 
Smith’s narrative validates is indigenous medicine. In the wake of the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the Western media emphasized that the 
epidemic was worsened by a mistrust of Western medicine and by the fact that many of 
the infected sought care from traditional healers, repeating the longstanding trope of 
pitting the enlightened, scientific European against the superstitious African. This trope is 
so common, it is easy to overlook the fact that Western medicine owes many of its early 





or introduced Europeans to innovative procedures. One of the most well known of these 
figures is Onesimus, Cotton Mather’s slave who first told him about small pox 
inoculation and whose very Africanness became a key part of Mather’s rhetorical defense 
of the procedure.10 Although Smith adopts the same condescending tone that many 
European writers did when forced to acknowledge their dependence on their hosts, he too 
argued for the importance of African medical knowledge. He mentions several times in 
the narrative the efficacy of native remedies, writing about how Africans are “very 
diligent in the Use of Medicines” (203). He calls the natives of one region “skilful 
Botanists,” and says that they “know well the Use of every Herb and Plant, and always 
apply them with such Success that the Cures wrought by them seem, at some times, to be 
little less than miraculous” (163). Later he writes that the natives of another region “make 
Use of Physicians, who are, many of them, as great Cheats as any in Europe,” but then 
goes on to reiterate, “I must however say, that the Medicaments, Plants, Herbs, etc. have 
such Virtues here, that they really perform very surprising cures” (225). Even his snide 
remark about physicians as cheats is notable for how it is phrased—the content of the 
remark indicates a general mistrust of both, and the comparison initially places them on 
equal epistemological footing. But his follow up about the African healers’ remarkable 
cures acknowledges both the superiority and necessity of African healing above and 
beyond what European doctors have to offer.11  
Much of this botanical knowledge went on to become part of the Western canon 
in the very way that Aphra Behn’s narrative suggests it does through the dismemberment 
of her own African authority—by tearing apart the embodied, local, subjectivity that 





and then circulating it as objective, rational knowledge. A perusal of the eighteenth-
century botanical entries of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society yields 
such entries as “A Catalogue of Some Guinea-Plants with their native names and virtues,” 
or “A Catalogue of Plants Growing within the Fortifications of Tangier.” The “virtues” of 
these plants were very likely not discovered by a coterie of gentlemen natural 
philosophers back in England, but the published lists free the knowledge from the 
undisciplined and situated testimony of the travelers themselves, or, even more suspect, 
the African physicians who first discerned the value of the plants. Yet, if the list is a 
genre of making knowledge from “somewhere…[bear] the marks of nowhere” 
(Livingstone 21), travel narratives like Smith’s reiterate the importance of local authority 
in the production of global knowledge. In fact, Smith suggests that local conditions are 
the very thing that gives such knowledge its credibility. By describing Africa as 
simultaneously abundant and unwholesome, yet characterizing the Africans he 
encounters as robust and healthy, Smith crafts them as not only authorities over the 
landscape and its resources but as holding the key to making the continent available for 
Europeans as well. 
Still, the geographical information that African guides supplied was rarely as 
straightforward as British travelers hoped, and not simply due to details lost in translation. 
African guides revealed and concealed information about the interior through carefully 
constructed, savvy narratives. Their rhetorical tactics were designed to give Europeans 
just enough information to remain true to cultural norms of hospitality and to maintain 
good trade relationships. But they also enabled them to then feign ignorance when it 





location of the region’s goldmines, which remained a mystery to Europeans until the 
nineteenth century. African strategies for representing the interior became an indelible 
part of British accounts of the continent, both eyewitness and imaginative.   
 
European Representations of Africa’s Interior and the Myth of the Silent Traders 
African guides were vital not only for surviving but also for accessing the land, in 
particular the waterways that Europeans hoped would open up the interior for direct trade. 
Much of how the interior was represented on maps and in travel narratives grew out of 
African testimony regarding the continent’s waterways past the point of European 
navigation. Native informants gave Europeans detailed oral accounts of where the rivers 
went, what Europeans might expect as they traveled them, and how to navigate the river’s 
tidal flows and potential treacheries (Brooks 10). In one instance, Smith recalls 
attempting to gather information about Sherbro, an inland part of modern day Sierra 
Leone, from a European factor, “having hitherto but an imperfect Account of those places 
from the Negroes” (92). Yet, although Smith initially envisions replacing this indigenous 
account with the authority of a European eyewitness, he ends up repeating the “imperfect 
Account” instead, reiterating that even imperfect accounts from native informants were 
still the most detailed sources regarding interior geography. Organized from the 
perspective of a group of Mandinka traders who travel up the river in their canoes, 
Smith’s report of this region contains such precise information as the number of bends in 
the river, the height of a waterfall, and the ways that their trading patterns are 
orchestrated around the local cycles of rainy and dry seasons (92-93). Smith’s attention to 





long before Europeans ever became part of the economic equation (Brooks 44-46). They 
also become significant when juxtaposed with the fact that the failure of Bartholomew 
Stibbs’s expedition up the Gambia was due to the RAC’s refusal to pay attention to 
native information about how local weather patterns affected river navigation.  
Stibbs and his crew left late in the rainy season—they traveled up the Gambia for 
two months, but the water levels became too low to navigate, and the boats ran aground. 
Finally, the RAC called them back (297). But, ironically, Stibbs had known that they 
were departing too late in the season because the locals had told him so. He remarks in 
his journal, published as part of Francis Moore’s Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa, 
that it was “a great pity…that we were not a Month sooner, for I found it the general 
Opinion of all I consulted there (that were Natives) that we were too late” (246). In fact, 
he observes that there was an entire network native knowledge that ran counter to the 
RAC’s through the journey. The RAC gave instructions to keep the voyage a secret, yet 
as Stibbs recounts that it was “in the Mouths of all the Natives; and where ever I went I 
found myself generally known, and pointed at as the Person who was sent out to bring 
down the Gold” (246).  
Word of Stibbs’s expedition would have traveled quickly along the Gambia trade 
routes that the Mande had worked since their ancestors established the Mali and Songhai 
Empires in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, controlling the westernmost points of 
the trans-Sahara trade.12 Yet, despite Stibbs’s optimism that the Africans are eager to 
bring European trade further up the river (255), it is clear from various accounts that the 
Mandinka only disclosed information about the region on their own terms. In many cases 





how to navigate the Sherbo river, in particular about where European boats might run 
aground (93). Part of the reason for being so open and friendly was surely due to a desire 
to increase trade between Europe and the inland regions, trade that the Mandinka 
themselves would ideally continue to broker. Another part of why Africans looked after 
their European visitors was due to deeply entrenched cultural notions of community and 
hospitality. George Brooks explains, for example, that in much of West Africa in the 
sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, “Landlord-stranger reciprocities mediated 
social intercourse and promoted safe passage for travelers of every kind” (28). Overall, 
travelers were not only given food, lodging, and safe passage by their landlords, they 
were given the knowledge necessary to survive the region.  
 Yet, although strangers were generally welcomed and treated well, it was made 
clear that they were there on the good graces on the landlord—a dynamic that sometimes 
erupted into conflict as in Smith’s account of an African leader who allegedly tried to 
manipulate more than his fair share of  “cole” (tribute) out of the British, insisting that 
“all the country was his, that he only suffer’d the English to reside there upon certain 
Conditions” (59).13 Similarly, when it no longer served the Mandinka to share 
information about the interior so liberally, they deployed narratives about the 
inaccessibility of the interior crafted to limit European access.14 These often revolved 
around some version of the “silent trade” myth that enabled the Mandinka middlemen to 
give Europeans just enough information to appear helpful and but then feign ignorance 
when it came to telling the Europeans what they really wanted to know.  
One of the clearest accounts of this is given in Richard Jobson’s report of his 





George Thompson before him—was traveling the Gambia at least in part with the hope of 
building a British connection into the westernmost point of the trans-Sahara trade. Jobson 
does better than Thompson because he builds good relationships with his native guides, 
in particular, Bucker Sano, who is not only Jobson’s most important and powerful trade 
connection, he is the source of the majority of Jobson’s information about the region. 
Bucker Sano makes a great show of “giving [Jobson] the Country” (99)—agreeing to be 
his broker—but when Jobson wishes to be taken to the place where “the Arabecks” 
traded for a “great store of gold,” Bucker Sano gives a “full and large discourse” of why 
this will not be possible (101). The Arabs do not actually ever see the inland Africans 
who control this gold, and neither do the Mandinka. Rather, they leave their 
commodities—bracelets, beads, but above all, salt—in piles at an agreed upon place and 
then “remaine away for a whole day” (102). The inland Africans then leave great 
quantities of gold in exchange for these goods, with each side giving and taking until both 
sides deem that an even trade has been made, and thus “have a just manner of trading and 
never see one another” (103). All this mystery is not just convention—these inland 
Africans are allegedly “dangerous” (103) and monstrous:   
The reason why these people will not be seene, is for that they are naturally borne, 
with their lower lippe of that greatnesse, it turns againe, and covers the greater 
part of their bosome, and remains with that rawnesse on the side that hangs downe, 
that through occasion of the Sunnes extreme heate, it is still subject to 
putrification, so as they have no meanes to preserve themselves, but by contuall 





Jobson affirms the likelihood of this narrative by reasoning that the people who bought 
his own salt in great quantities (exchanges likely brokered by none other than Bucker 
Sano)15 had “for their owne occasions little or no use thereof, and being demanded what 
they doe with it, they doe not deny to tell us they carry it up further into the country, unto 
another people, to whom they do sell and vent the same” (103).  
 The silent trade never actually existed.16 But the narrative was prolific in accounts 
from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries and was appealing and pervasive 
enough that economists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cited silent trade as an 
important step in the evolution from local to global economies.17 Traveling in the mid-
fifteenth century, Alvise Cadamosto recorded rumors that African gold was controlled by 
deformed or monstrous black miners, and in the sixteenth century, Duarte Pacheco 
Pereira’s account reports that these mysterious inland Africans were Cynocephali or dog-
faced men (de Moraes Farias 13-16). John Barbot, traveling at the end of the seventeenth 
century, gives a similar account to Jobson’s of the these inlanders needing salt to protect 
against purification but reports that the sores are on their scrotums rather than their lips 
(Churchill 78-79). Sometimes African guides did not mention the silent trade in particular 
but otherwise communicated a general sense of the foreboding unknown surrounding the 
gold mines. The natives tell Barbot that the inland gold mines are filled with strange 
noises and malicious spirits (229). Stibbs’s guides tell him they do not know what is past 
Barracunda, the last major city on the Gambia that Europeans had access to. It is “the End 
of the World,” they say, and “full of wild beasts” and “Wild Savage People.” They advise 





At first glance, such stories seem to repeat European tropes about Africa that date 
back to classical times. In fact, though he does not specifically combine the two, 
Herodotus recorded the first accounts of the silent trade and repeated the oft-cited 
proverb that Africa’s interior was full of monsters (de Moraes Farias 9).18 However, it is 
important to note that travelers frequently point out that the source of these stories are not 
classical texts but their African guides. For example, in Cadamosto’s story of the silent 
trade as it is recounted in Purchas, the “Merchants of Mali,” who were the Mandinka, tell 
Cadamosto about their prince attempting to capture one of the inland traders, but he 
refused to speak or eat and died of starvation within weeks (713). Such anecdotes have 
led several historians and anthropologists to identify Mandinka traders as the source of 
not only European but also Arabic versions of the story.19  
I suggest that whether the story of the monstrous, mysterious inland traders 
originated with Herodotus, with North African merchants, or from somewhere in Sub-
Saharan Africa is beside the point. It became—even if it did not originate as—an African 
narrative deployed to meet strategic ends. Both Barbot and Moore understood this. 
Barbot writes that he “had from some rational and judicious Blacks, of the inland parts” 
that they would never tell where their goldmines were, “for politick and discreet they are 
in that point, lest foreigners should know them, and be tempted to invade their country, 
for the sake of those subterraneous treasures” (229). Similarly, Moore footnotes Stibbs’s 
account of the natives telling him that nothing but wild beasts and wild savage people 
could be found beyond a certain point up the Gambia river, pointing out that “it being for 
the Advantage of the Black People about Fatatenda to prevent the White men going 





(267). However, the strategic application of this narrative does not erase its metaphorical 
significance for either European or African literary traditions.  
It became part of West African folklore. R.M. Blench writes about how the Igala 
in Nigeria still tell the story of the Amelu, “the ones who grow tails” (60), traders who, 
ashamed of their animal appendages, hide in holes as they set out their manufactured 
goods to trade to Europeans in exchange for salt. It also had a lasting impact on European 
explanatory paradigms about unseen and unseeable parts of the continent. By 
characterizing the place where the gold comes from as a mysterious and inaccessible one, 
where communication and exchange operates according to rules so counter to what 
Europeans were used to, such narratives reinforced the notion that Africa’s interior was a 
rich but incalculable, unsettling place where European epistemologies had little authority 
or applicability.  
It is possible, then, that European perceptions of Africa’s mysterious, inaccessible, 
and perhaps monstrous interior came not only from preconceived notions, not only from 
an affective fear of the unknown experienced by travelers like Smith who were constantly 
made aware of their own vulnerability, but also from indigenous accounts reported by the 
trusted African witness like Bucker Sano, or like Stibbs’s and Smith’s unnamed African 
guides, who filled in the gaps when empirical methods of knowledge production failed. 
These accounts may have played off European expectations, perhaps even European fears, 
but European explanatory paradigms were grounded as much in what they were told as 
what they witnessed for themselves, meaning, as Belcher points out, that “European 
representations were not always of the real…but of others’ representations of the real” 





for what their African witnesses recount, travel writers enable the generic layering of the 
African travelogue in which the European scientific worldview coexists with indigenous 
discourses, both empirical and imaginary.  
 
Geographical Consciousness and African Discourse in Daniel Defoe’s Captain Singleton 
The limitations of the European explorer and his dependence on African guides 
and technologies, as demonstrated in Smith’s narrative, and the interior as a rich but 
threatening space, as perpetuated by the myth of the silent traders, are two important 
underpinning contexts for Daniel Defoe’s Captain Singleton (1720). Though Smith’s 
narrative was published after Captain Singleton it is representative of the institutional 
aims and hurdles of the RAC during the time that Defoe was in its employ. The most 
prominent issue that plagued the RAC in the early eighteenth century was not whether it 
should be allowed to exist—although abolitionists protested the human trafficking aspect 
of the trade from the very beginning—but whether it should be allowed to maintain its 
monopoly. The RAC needed to demonstrate that it was making significant enough 
territory and trade advances in order to justify its exclusiveness and the money being 
poured into it. Defoe’s work in defense of the RAC published in the 1710s was written in 
support of such a monopoly: Novak writes, “He defended the African Company as a 
good monopoly, operating in hostile territory and so requiring an outlay of money to 
maintain forts” (361). Captain Singleton is frequently analyzed with this aim in mind. 
Defoe’s Africa is filled with goods ripe for the picking, and his Africans, encouraged by a 





In fact, Captain Singleton, perhaps even more so than Oroonoko, seems the iconic 
example of a literary text that creates an imaginative portrait of Africa in order to 
advance a protocolonial agenda, both in how it represents the land itself and how it 
represents African peoples. These types of readings have been, Ian Newman suggests, 
“the most productive accounts of Captain Singleton in recent years” for how they 
“interpret the novel as part of a discourse that seeks to define the human in a colonial 
context and considers the agency afforded to representations of the native communities 
that Singleton encounters as he journeys across Africa” (567). It is true that such readings 
have been valuable for how they map out the visible political consequences of 
imaginative representations of geographical space, and it may very well be the case that 
such politics motivated many of Defoe’s aesthetic choices in the text, although whether 
that was because Defoe himself had invested in the company, whether he was paid by the 
RAC to write about it favorably, or whether he truly believed in it has never been 
conclusively determined.21   
However, even if Defoe was intentionally attempting to weave a fantasy of 
European triumph over African spaces, Captain Singleton nevertheless reproduces the 
same kinds of uncertainties that plague Smith’s narrative and illustrates the same turn 
toward indigenous knowledge in the face of European vulnerability. As a result, African 
discourses became a visible foundation of the global knowledge in Captain Singleton—
global knowledge that the text both reproduces and comments on. Furthermore, even if 
we can read Defoe’s interior as a treasure trove ready for the plundering, his choice of an 
untrustworthy narrator also asks us to question the source of this representation, and to 





examined more closely. Geographical representation, the suspicious quality of 
Singleton’s character reminds us, is not a transparent window into reality but is shaped by 
the informants that mediate it.  
On the surface, Captain Singleton mimics the increasingly institutionalized genre 
of the eyewitness travel account.22 The title page imitates travel narratives that wanted to 
flag their commitment to the general heads recommended for travel writers outlined in 
Chapter 1. It promises a “description of the Place and Inhabitants” of Madagascar as well 
as “an Account of the Customs and Manners of the Peoples” in “the Main Land of Africa.” 
The text contains extensive descriptions of the plant and animal life that Singleton and his 
crew encounter and, even more prominently, descriptions of the different geographical 
features, climates, and natural resources the land affords. However, Singleton undercuts 
the rhetorical effect of such precise details when he tells the reader outright more than 
once that he never actually wrote any of this down. As he is giving the chronology of his 
life, he says that he and his master were taken by an Algerian rover, “which, if my 
account stands right, was about the Year 1695, for you may be sure I kept no Journal” (4), 
the precision of the date destabilized by this admission. He points out again that before he 
embarks on a journey to the East-Indies that he “was too young in the Trade to keep any 
Journal of this Voyage, tho’ my Master, who was for a Portuguese a pretty good Artist, 
prompted me to it” (6), acknowledging an awareness of the importance of good record 
keeping. However, Singleton never develops his master’s penchant for writing things 
down as they happen. Before he and his marooned comrades begin their trip overland 





Aravamudan argues that “The transactional nature and textuality of all accounts, 
whether those of accountants and their auditors, storytellers and their listeners, or writers 
and their readers, are caught up in an activity of rendering them, justifying their 
authenticity, and proving or pretending, through an autofoundationalism, a stable and 
trustworthy origin” (79). Yet Bob not only seems deliberately bad at this, he indicates 
that those who take what he presents at face value are dupes. As he says about the crew 
who mistakes his diligence for trustworthiness, “they thought me honest, which by the 
Way, was their very great Mistake” (7). Rather than reproducing the generic norms that 
would invite the reader to see an empirical reflection of material reality, Captain 
Singleton “draws attention to” not just the “fabrication of all doctored accounts” as 
Aravamudan argues (81), but to the discursive and imaginative nature of all geographical 
representation. As the text asks the reader to be suspicious of its own representational 
power, it becomes increasingly difficult to see Captain Singleton as either earnest or 
straightforward propaganda for the rich potential of the African interior.  
In fact, Captain Singleton emulates the African travelogue of its day precisely in 
how the genre attempts to but fails to establish stable epistemological frameworks. 
Captain Singleton adopts the trappings of empiricism, and, as Jason Pearl points out, its 
narrative is “a dynamic exercise, moving back and forth between experimental and 
abstract forms of knowledge” (109). But the end result is not a narrative of perceived 
space that would have been convincing to eighteenth-century readers. Rather the novel is 
an investigation into the generic layers that constitute geographical representation—
eyewitness details arranged according to conventions, secondhand stories about the 





worldview that may seem comprehensive on the surface but that provokes questions 
rather than answers upon further inspection.  
Though he never traveled much outside of Britain himself, Defoe was interested 
in such questions of geography and global representation. As Paula Backscheider 
observes about Defoe’s A History of Discoveries, “One of Defoe’s great strengths as a 
writer of history was his knowledge of geography” (114), and she suggests that “Much of 
the persuasive power of Defoe’s case for increased colonization comes from the range 
and details of his geographic descriptions” (114-15). Defoe wrote about the importance 
of geography to a good education in a short 1725 essay On Learning,23 and although even 
contemporary critics sometimes accused him of being an “ignorant scribbler” where his 
own geographical representations were concerned (qtd. in Baker 263), “he certainly made 
use of the latest and best geographical material available” (Baker 263). Such sources 
sometimes imply that Defoe’s interest in geography ended here—that he was mimicking 
and appropriating but not necessarily commenting on the geographical strategies of his 
day. Pat Rogers observes that “there is something mechanical about the mode of narration” 
in Captain Singleton, that “it is rather too easy to see Defoe pouring over his maps and 
geography books at home” (“Walking” 113). Yet Captain Singleton dramatizes not only 
an overland journey of Africa but also how knowledge about African geography is 
produced, with Bob Singleton serving as the relatively blank slate on which this 
worldview is inscribed.  
As a character who starts out as a “passive recipient of experience,” as Newman 
argues (565), Bob Singleton is initially void of all geographical knowledge.24 “All the 





should take to get off Madagascar, which is just as well, because as he points out on the 
previous page, he “knows nothing of this Matter one way or another” (46). But as the 
journey progresses, so does his geographical consciousness. The text stages the 
production of global knowledge writ small as eyewitness and secondhand accounting 
come together with pre-existing representations—such as travelogues and maps—to 
produce Singleton’s worldview. Pearl argues that in Captain Singleton “the setting rarely 
exceeds the necessity of the plot” (109). Yet, this is only true if we assume that the text’s 
details cannot exceed Singleton’s point of view. As I will show, the myriad layers that 
come together to produce Singleton’s impression of and representation of Africa 
frequently surpass the seemingly straightforward details of his account. One of these 
layers is the role that African ideas, technology, and discourse played in constituting 
European worldviews. They become an inevitable part of Singleton’s geographical 
consciousness, though he may only articulate the tip of the iceberg.   
The Africa portion of the novel is put in motion when Singleton and a group of 
Portuguese sailors are marooned on the east coast of Madagascar. They decide that their 
best bet for rescue is to build a boat to take them over the Mozambique Channel and then 
to cross the interior of the continent to the trade ports on the west coast where they hope 
to catch a ship back to Europe. Trying to determine the best way to start, they turn first to 
the natives of the island. As Singleton points out, their “Correspondence with the Natives 
was absolutely necessary,” not only to ensure provisions and a place to stay while they 
gather their resources, but also for information about how to proceed to the mainland (45). 
When they ask their African hosts about the journey, their only response is that “there 





each heard about the distance between the island and the mainland. “Some said it was 
150 Leagues, others not above 100. One of our men that had a Map of the World shewed 
us by his Scale, that it was not above 80 Leagues. Some said there were Islands all the 
way to touch at; some say that there were no islands at all” (46). The person who has the 
final word in the debate is not one of the Europeans but one of the villagers: an old blind 
man led about by a boy tells them that if they “stay’d till the End of August, [they] should 
be sure of the Wind to be fair, and the Sea smooth all the voyage” (46).  
Scholars have pointed out, and rightly so, that Defoe’s representations of Africans 
are implausible and offensive.25 Singleton, for example, once refers to a group of natives 
as “a Parcel of Creatures scarce human” (28). But this scene where the sailors debate the 
best way to get from the island to the mainland nevertheless reflects the role that Africans 
commonly played in shaping European perceptions of and access to the interior. The 
coastal natives feign ignorance about the interior through the rhetoric of a wild and 
dangerous unknown, but at the same time provide key geographical information to 
facilitate safe passage for the Europeans. True to early modern African traditions of 
hospitality, the islanders encourage the crew to stay until a better season for travel.  
But the crew is reluctant to stay longer in spite of the blind villager’s invitation. 
Ultimately they decide to “venture over the Main” (47), even though, as Singleton says 
with great authority: “it was the wrong time of the Year to undertake such a Voyage in 
that Country; for, as the Winds hang Easterly all the Months from September to March, 
so they generally hang Westerly all the rest of the Year” (47). Essentially, Singleton goes 
from “knowing nothing of this Matter,” to repeating information about the region as 





says it with such authority that it is easy to forget that the origin of this bit of knowledge 
comes not from European maps or even from Singleton’s firsthand experience. As is true 
about many European representations of the continent, the African authority—the blind 
villager—is obscured in Singleton’s account as the knowledge he provides is rhetorically 
disembedded from its local context and abstracted into the language of European 
scientific discourse by the end of the scene. But the African source of this global 
knowledge is not erased entirely. 
Captain Singleton not only replicates how such appropriation of African 
knowledge was fundamental to Enlightenment texts, it replicates the rhetorical patterns 
through which savvy African traders revealed and concealed information about the 
interior. Given books represented in his library, including Purchas, and his often-noted 
interest in travel writing, it is likely that Defoe would have encountered stories about the 
silent trade and other similar anecdotes about Africa’s unpredictable interior that travelers 
swear were told to them by trustworthy sources, such as the coastal Africans who tell 
Francois Froger that inlanders “boast of being great sorcerers” (36).    
In Captain Singleton, both the inhabitants of Madagascar and the Mozambicans 
that Singleton and his crew enslave employ such rhetoric that both tantalizes and deters. 
Although Singleton states that “the people of Madagascar knew no more of the Shores of 
Africa than we did, only that there was a Country of Lions, as they call it, that Way” (59), 
they also teach the sailors how to signify friendship to the mainlanders using a pole 
adorned with charms, indicating a longstanding trade relationship between the two 
groups.26 When the crew comes ashore on the mainland of Africa, they converse with the 





travelled that Way, they told us Yes, some had gone to where to Sun sleeps, meaning to 
the West; but they could not tell us who they were. When we ask’d for some to guide us, 
they shrunk up their shoulders as Frenchmen do when they are afraid to undertake a thing” 
(64). Like Bucker Sano and other African guides and merchants in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century travelogues, these people are welcoming and glad to engage in trade 
with the Europeans, but when it comes to disclosing specifics that would provide the 
Europeans with access to the interior, they simply smile and shrug. All they tell the 
sailors is that “there were People to be found of one Sort or other every where; that there 
were many great Rivers, many Lions, Tygers, and Elephants” (64). In this parcel of vague 
descriptors, they have disclosed just enough detail to suggest that they do know what lies 
to the west. Singleton chalks their reticence up to fear, not ignorance. But the only way 
the Europeans can gain access to their knowledge is by force, through the eventual 
enslavement of a character they call “the Black Prince” and his fellows. 
Indeed, despite such hedging and qualifying, the Black Prince himself turns out to 
be a competent navigator. When Singleton tells him that the crew plans to carry 
provisions, he “made Signs to us to tell us we need not, for that we should find Provisions 
enough everywhere for fourty Days.” Singleton furthermore comments, “It was very 
difficult for us to understand how he expres’d Forty; for he knew no Figures” (77). The 
Prince ends up communicating the idea of “forty” by laying out 40 stones for the sailors, 
and through this gesture, the Europeans are given some sense of what is to come, and the 
Black Prince’s vital insider knowledge of the continent is established, despite Singleton’s 





Singleton and his crew’s dependence on native knowledge and technologies 
provides an important counterpoint to readings of the text that stress its valorization of 
European technologies over primitive peoples. Such readings are largely grounded in 
descriptions of the crew using their firearms and their medical knowledge in order to 
enslave and ensure the cooperation of a group of Africans on the east coast of the 
mainland to function as guides and baggage carriers for their overland journey. During an 
altercation between the sailors and the mainland villagers, one of the natives is shot 
through the heart, and his fellows are “so terribly frightened; first at the Flash of Fire; 
secondly, at the Noise: And thirdly, at seeing their Countrymen killed, that they stood 
like Men stupid and amazed” (68). Ultimately, according to Singleton, “as they recovered 
themselves, [they] came and worshiped us (taking us for Gods or Devils, I know not 
which, nor did it much matter to us” (70). To further the natives’ awe and submission, the 
crew’s surgeon then heals an important villager—the Black Prince—of the gunshot 
wounds the sailors themselves inflicted, thus giving the natives the impression that they 
have the power over life and death (75-76). The Black Prince swears his loyalty to the 
crew, agreeing to escort them on an overland journey across the continent.   
The effect of such scenes, according to scholars such as Wheeler, is that “Africa 
and its peoples fit into the emerging empire as resources for European exploitation 
secured by superior technology and trading acumen” (136). But Wheeler points out that 
the representation is complex; it is both “a glorification of European technology and a 
critique of European behavior in Africa” (Complexion 107). Similarly, Christopher Loar 
suggests that although firearms are “civility-making” tools in Defoe’s fiction (107), they 





called civilized world through the subjugation of indigenous Africans and Pacific 
Islanders. As was apparent in Smith’s account of his altercation with the Guinea natives 
over his survey equipment, in African travelogues surface narratives of technological 
superiority weave not bulletproof ideologies but a kind bravado that is constantly in 
dialog with Europeans’ fear of the unknown African environment and their dependence 
on indigenous technology and knowledge to survive and navigate it. Captain Singleton 
repeats this trope; Singleton’s own reported impression of events most assuredly 
espouses a fantasy of European superiority, but the fact that the text asks the reader to 
also be suspicious of Singleton’s reliability invites one to look beyond his words and 
consider what other factors might be shaping his geographical impressions. 
In Singleton as in Smith, for example, the arrow is contrasted with the gun in 
ways more complex than advanced technology pitted against primitive technology. 
Singleton gives several accounts where African lances and arrows are no match for 
European muskets, including an incident in which one of the enslaved porters takes an 
arrow in the back, fired from an invisible assailant in a “thicket of trees,” who the sailors 
then track down and shoot “for the Mischief he had done” (152). However, uncertainty 
haunts this episode—the assailant is not actually caught in the act; rather, it appears as if 
the landscape itself is attacking them. They indict the African who pays for this crime on 
the scanty evidence that he carried “a Bow but no Arrow” (152), which they read as a 
clear mark of guilt. But on entering the village of which the murdered man was 
presumably a denizen, bows without arrows start to signify very different things—first, 
the villagers lay down their bows and arrows as a symbol of peace (153) and then, upon 





arrows back up again, run off, and return “with the Bow, but without the Arrows” (153). 
Bidding the sailors to follow, the villagers lead them to a clearing where they have 
procured a deer for them. “This was a Gift to us,” Singleton says, “and it was very 
welcome, I assure you, for our Stock was low” (154).  
The bow without an arrow is thus recoded from an indictment of African guilt to a 
symbol of peace to one of European dependency on African skill, technology, and 
generosity. It reframes the first bow without an arrow in a new light—perhaps the 
African the sailors killed was merely a hunter procuring food for his family and not the 
assailant of the porter at all, or perhaps he was, but it was an accident rather than an 
assault, brought about by the lack of visibility in the forest. Singleton and the sailors’ 
abilities to read that situation accurately is not only called into question here, so is the 
justness of their retribution. Furthermore, such ignorance reifies their vulnerability rather 
than their superiority. As Geriguis argues about this scene, “While the Africans relate to 
the hunting grounds as a place for food gathering, Singleton experiences them as 
threatening spaces full of flying arrows and accurate bowmen” (200). Though, as 
Geriguis observes, Singleton attempts to regain narrative control of this scene by pointing 
out Africans’ nakedness and barbarity (200), the cover-up is thin; the European 
dependence on their indigenous hosts shows through it and their epistemological 
authority—their ability or desire to understand and report accurately on what they are 
encountering—remains suspect.   
Such oscillations between the affirmation of and the failure of European 
epistemologies and technologies recur throughout the text. Scrimgeour argues that 





set down in a primitive environment and with the simplest of tools, can survive, progress, 
and master that environment” (29). Yet, unlike Robinson Crusoe, whose isolation on the 
island spurs his ingenuity to improbable heights, Singleton and his crew are essentially 
useless without the benefit of African knowledge and technologies. When they are first 
marooned on the island of Madagascar and in need of shelter from the elements, the 
sailors build small huts from the boughs of trees (19, 45). The knowledgeable reader 
might recognize the huts from similar descriptions of Madagascar dwellings in Albert de 
Mandelslo’s “Voyages and Travels (1669) or Maximilien Misson’s translation of 
Francois Leguat’s “New Voyage” (1707), texts represented in Defoe’s library. However, 
even readers not familiar with such sources might take the hint that the sailors did not 
engineer such dwellings on their own when they try to set up camp outside a village on 
the north part of the island. When the villagers see that the sailors build the huts “but 
bunglingly,” they come to assist, “and indeed, they were better Workmen than we were, 
for they run up three or four Hutts for us in a Moment, and much handsomer done than 
ours” (50). Throughout the text, “Necessity” may be the “Spur to Invention” (55)—a 
phrase that Pearl points out also appears throughout Robinson Crusoe (104)—but in 
Captain Singleton it is largely the Africans and not the European sailors who are 
invention’s avatars.  
They teach the Europeans how to make ropes “of such Stuff as they made their 
Matts of” (55); they show them how to make pitch from the wood of a native tree (56)—a 
trick that Singleton mentions served him in good stead on future voyages. They teach the 
sailors how to use fire to keep the wild creatures away at night (64), and which roots are 





nothing of the Management or Guiding of” African beasts of burden that inspired 
Singleton to propose enslaving the mainland villagers (67). Indeed, one of the necessary 
services the Black Prince provides is to “procure some Buffloes, or young Bulls…to 
carry things,” among other items their powder and shot, which the Black Prince divides 
into appropriate weights for the animals to handle (78). After the sailor’s laughable 
attempts to make skin bags to carry their provisions, the Black Prince provides them with 
“Skins better cured than ours, and of other kinds, such as we could not tell what Names to 
give them” (81). Perhaps even more importantly, the natives use the skins to make 
pouches to carry water across long distances (83-84). These skin bags also keep the 
sailors’ gunpowder dry (88), and the fact that the European’s allegedly superior 
technology, the very technology of power used to subjugate the Africans, is dependent on 
an African technology here in order to maintain its functionality is representative of the 
text’s broader irony. The Europeans’ seeming superiority is in fact only possible when an 
undercurrent of African ingenuity supports it, not unlike Smith’s revitalizing “Calabash 
of good punch.”  
Although the Black Prince is romanticized, and given a kind of exceptionalism 
due to his royal status, he functions as more than a baggage carrier in the text. He is 
Defoe’s version of the trustworthy African guide or witness that makes the continent 
available to the Europeans both literally and epistemologically.27 He directs them toward 
a river that will enable them to take the boat they built on Madagascar as far inland as 
possible (82), and the sailor’s defer to his authority when it comes to navigating it. 
“When we came past the Swelling of the Tide,” Singleton says, “and had the natural 





quitting our bark” (84). However, “the Prince would by no means agree to that, for 
finding we had on board pretty good Store of Roping made of Matts and Flags, which I 
described before, he ordered all the Prisoners which were on shore to come take hold of 
those Ropes and tow us along by the Shore Side” (85). Due to the prince’s knowledge of 
the river, the ropes that, as Singleton reiterates here, they learned to make from African 
craftsmen, and the prince’s resourcefulness in a crisis, the crew is able to travel 200 miles 
inland this way. Novak comments on the extent that the Black Prince is affected by his 
contact with European technology—he “is sent back to his country, richer and more 
knowledgeable about European weapons and crafts than when he set out” (588). 
However, this exchange works both ways in the text. Whatever else they may be, 
Singleton and the crew are not impermeable European subjects who remain unaffected by 
their encounters with African landscapes, peoples, and technologies. While it may be the 
case that the only benefit Africans might gain from this exchange is “the possibility that 
native peoples may be capable of absorbing enough European inventions to compete with 
them in a hostile world” (Novak 588), the sailors gain the knowledge that enables them to 
survive and even profit from this “most barren, desolate, desert, and inhospitable country” 
(62).  
Captain Singleton thus showcases the ways that geographical knowledge in the 
early Enlightenment was a product of the contact zone, where European epistemologies 
and technologies are blended with, and at times overtaken by, African ones. Such 
portraits of the interior are both real and imagined, European desires colliding with the 
material realities of African environments and with African discourse about the interior, 





Defoe not only evokes the epistemological hybridity of the African travelogue but also 
invites a critical investigation into another significant geographical genre: the map. 
Maps—both within the narrative and without—are a synecdoche for Singleton’s own 
representation of the continent, particularly his account of the interior itself, its riches and 
its treacheries. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that they, too, are a product of the 
contact zone, created between African discourse and European desire. Maps are not, as 
Livingstone points out, “straightforward representations of reality,” but are “controlled 
fictions” (154), a fact that Defoe’s novel ultimately dramatizes in ways that ask us to 
consider how Singleton’s account of the interior might also be a controlled fiction, rather 
than a promise that an investment in the RAC will result in access to incalculable wealth. 
 
 Mapping the Interior in Captain Singleton 
In the wake of postcolonial theory, maps have been identified as an important 
mechanism through which Europeans reimagined and took ownership over non-European 
spaces. Like the gun, they are a technology of power, superimposing European 
worldviews on non-European geographies in an act of epistemological usurpation. 
Livingstone argues that maps’ “cultural power” (154) comes from the very way they 
create distance between the text and the local conditions that produced them: such 
“uncoupling of text and context gives the impression that the map discloses universal 
truth” (158). Yet, Captain Singleton illustrates what happens when this distance is closed 
again as the crew then tries to use a contemporary map of Africa to navigate across the 
interior. The result, as I have argued about the narrative as a whole, is not something to 





global knowledge, and to assess the authority and trustworthiness of representations that 
unmoor this knowledge from its local contexts.  
Notably, in the scene in which the sailors are debating the best way to get from 
Madagascar to the mainland, the European map is not treated as an authoritative source 
of geographical knowledge—it offers one possible choice among many, and by lumping 
it in with stories each man has heard about the distance between Madagascar and the 
mainland and with native advice, the text categorizes the map as a speculative rather than 
scientific representation, inviting consideration into its usefulness, accuracy, and the 
conditions of its creation. Baker, Gary Scrimgeour, and Novak all mention that Captain 
Singleton evokes the maps of Africa available at the time—particularly in how detailed 
coasts “fad[e] into gross inaccuracies about the hinterland and pure conjecture as to the 
nature of the interior” (Scrimgeour 22). Novak observes the irony of the fact that “Defoe 
occasionally mocked map-makers who drew designs or monstrous figures where they had 
no information about the terrain, but in Captain Singleton he too had to create an 
imaginary Africa” (584). Yet, Novak does not comment on whether the text is aware of 
this irony, whether the narrative draws attention to the constructed quality of both maps 
and Singleton’s own portrait of Africa rather than treating either as empirical mirrors of 
geographical reality.  
I suggest that the text is aware of this irony, and invites readers to investigate both 
the map and Singleton’s account of the hinterland as crafted representations.28 In doing so, 
however, Captain Singleton reveals, whether intentionally or not, the extent that both 
maps and Singleton’s narrative are in dialog with the African conditions of their 





how “the fictional place takes part in a variable relationship with the real. Its geography 
assumes a mixed status” (99). The scene where the Black Prince lays out the forty stones 
to indicate forty days travel, for instance, mirrors the way geographical measurements 
reflected on maps often did not spring from European methods of observation and 
geographical theory but grew from native accounts of what lay beyond European 
access—accounts that needed to be mediated from African to European representational 
practices.29  
The real and the fictional converge on the maps of Defoe’s day, particularly in 
how they visualize Africa’s waterways. Not neutral geographical features, rivers are both 
conduits and barriers, and they are shifting signifiers in eighteenth-century texts about 
Africa that both facilitate and foil penetration into the interior. Their courses were 
mapped through a compilation of European, Arabic, and African sources; some of the 
evidence that dictated their shape was empirical or inductive, and some of it was pure 
fantasy.   
The result was that the great rivers of the east coast (the Nile and Zambezi) were 
proposed to be much closer to the great rivers of the west coast (the Niger, Gambia, and 
Congo) than they actually are. Several geographers even theorized that these rivers all 
connected in the middle. According to Francis Moore, both Herodotus and al-Idrisi 
suggest that “a Branch of the Nile runs westward, and after a very long Course falls into 
the Atlantick Ocean….by the Gambia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, being augmented in its 
Passage by all the Waters which fall to the South of Mount Atlas” (28). Moore proposes, 
as further evidence for this, the fact that hippopotamuses and crocodiles inhabit both the 





Another oft considered point of hydrologic speculation was, as Jobson muses, whether 
the Gambia and the Senegal rivers are in fact just branches of the same great river, 
possibly the Niger (14).  
 Such ideas had their roots in classical and early modern Arabic geography, and 
they were fed by African accounts of the interior. Swift’s quip about elephants for want 
of towns aside, cartographer’s representations of the interior weren’t wholly invented 
even though they were not wholly empirical either. They were based in part on the data 
and observations of surveyors like Smith, in part on theory, but mostly on the kinds of 
oral evidence that writers like Smith, Stibbs, and Moore brought gathered from native 
inhabitants. Unless a given location was determined astronomically or through 
triangulation, its placement on a map came from “verbal information” (Thrower 110) that 
mapmakers translated into visual representation. 
As Jobson’s account of the Gambia River attests, once European travelers hit the 
point where they could go no further, part of their job was to ask their guides about what 
lay beyond. Their guides’ answers, not surprisingly, took two shapes. On the one hand, 
African sources gave very precise geographical information that was reported back to 
Europe in letters and travel journals. Francis Moore for example includes an account of 
the lake from whence the Gambia springs—a “Lake overgrown with Canes and Reeds, in 
such a manner as thro’ their Thickness to render the Water impassable for Boats” (304).  
A French map from the 1730s included this “Lake of Reeds, which render it unnavigable” 
in a region clearly denoted as Mandinka territory (Fig. 2). It was a completely wrong 
source for the Gambia, which is a plateau in Fouta Djallon that floods during rainy season, 





informants about inland lakes, with slightly better results: Jacques Poncet and Jeronimo 
Lobo both write about Ethiopian accounts of Lake Tana, the inland lake from which the 
Blue Nile springs (78; 97), and al-Idrisi gathered stories about the interior for his map of 
Africa, which includes the first cartographic representations of Lake Victoria, the source 
of the White Nile (and in al-Idrisi’s rendering, the source of the western rivers as well).  
On the other hand, such geographical details were always shaped by the aforementioned 
ways African guides refused to disclose information about the interior, or told stories 
about its mysteries.  In contrast to Moore, Bartholomew Stibbs insisted that the natives 
never mentioned anything about inland lakes, which Moore attributes to the fact that the 
natives knew “that [Stibbs’s] Intention was to go up and trade, thither; which if he could 
do by the River, he would certainly under-trade them” (300). Instead they tell him that 
the land past the falls at Baracunda, where the gold and ivory comes from, are filled with 
mysterious beasts and savage people.30 Such stories perpetuated ideas about the interior 
as a frightening, unknown, and unknowable space; however, they also evoked the riches 
to be had if Europeans could access the gold and ivory themselves by cutting out the 
Mandinka middleman or if they could tap into a potential overland connection with 
Eastern traders through the trans-Sahara trade. Rivers, as Moore suggests, were the 
conduits through which Europeans imagined this happening, and African narratives about 
what lay just beyond the points navigable for Europeans that were crafted to both foster 
trade and conceal trade routes had a lasting impact on the way maps represented the 
country. For example, the same French mapmaker who included the Lake of Reeds also 










Figure 2: Carte De L'Afrique Francoise ou Du Senegal, 1732. The University of 






Similarly, maps by Willem Janszoon Blaeu (1644; Fig. 3) and John Senex (1721; 
Fig. 4) both put the major African rivers in more or less the right places, and both feature 
plausible positions for the continent’s three biggest lakes. However, both also depict the 
continent’s major rivers extending much further into the interior than they actually do and 
along much straighter courses. Such representations of Africa’s waterways are grounded 
in part in verbal evidence from African guides and in part in the European drive to 
represent the interior as navigable. Senex’s map depicts a connected highway of rivers 
running east to west and also includes a branch of the Nile extending far west along the 
route of the trans-Sahara trade. Similarly, Blaeu’s map shows branches of the river 
separated only by the addition of elephants, lions, and crocodiles. With its cluster of 
elephants in the center, bigger and more numerous than any of the other animals, Blaeu’s 
map in particular suggests fields of ivory with rivers leading straight to them, although 
the cartouche on Senex’s map shows an elephant and a native gathering armloads of tusks. 
The maps suggest, as the Mandinka in Moore’s account fear, that access to the 
continent’s rivers could lead to untold wealth by circumventing the brokers. Yet, these 
rivers are not depicted without their hazards. On Blaeu’s map, crocodiles dot the Niger’s 
path inland. One crocodile is adjacent to the part of the map labeled as Mandinka country. 
The other is on the furthest point of the Niger that Europeans were able to traverse until 
Mungo Park’s expedition at the end of the century. These crocodiles serve as a subtle 
reminder that access to the interior is inhibited by both the natural dangers of the land 
itself, and by its human inhabitants, who—as I explain in Chapter 4—were often 
represented in European writing with the crocodile’s duplicitous, unpredictable, and 




















Figure 4: A New Map of Africa from the Latest Observations, John Senex, 1721. 






Singleton’s account of the interior is a synecdoche for these maps in both surface 
simplicity and underpinning complexity. The overland journey stages the oscillations 
between the real and the imagery inherent in the map’s representational logic, and when 
the Gunner’s map is superimposed back over Africa, what results is a kind of half-real, 
half-imagined wonderland. Singleton says, “we all knew, if we could cross this Continent 
of Land, we might reach some of the great rivers that run into the Atlantick Ocean” (65). 
And indeed, as they follow the rivers further into the interior, the land gets less populated 
and Africa begins to yield up both its treasures and its dangers, rapacious crocodiles 
included. By the end of their journey, they are literally picking ivory out of fields and 
“washing Gold Dust out of the rivers” (170). But even as Captain Singleton repeats the 
surface narrative such maps tell, it both reveals the African worlds and discourses that 
such maps were at least partially rooted in and suggests that this highly imaginative 
worldview might be taken with a grain of salt. 
As the maps do, Singleton’s account retains details and discourses about the 
interior generated by African informants but pushes the Africans themselves out of this 
space. Critics have speculated that Defoe erases them from his interior in order to suggest 
that Africa’s treasures are simply there for the taking. However, the efficacy of such 
propaganda would depend at least in part on taking the piratical Singleton at his word, 
when he himself tells us that “[thinking] him honest [would be] a very great mistake” (7). 
Furthermore, the text gives several clues that the Gunner’s map—like Singleton 
himself—is not to be taken at face value but may be telling multiple stories at once. 
Singleton consistently refers to the Gunner as “our Guide” (104), but his calculations are 





them. When they come upon the river in which they first find gold—conveniently called 
the “Golden River”—Singleton says, “Our Gunner, pulling out his Map, assured me that 
this was either the River Nile, or run into the great Lake; out of which the River Nile was 
said to take its Beginning; and he brought out his Carts and Maps, which by his 
instruction, I began to understand very well; and told me, he would convince me of it, 
and indeed he seemed to make it so plain to me, that I was of the same Opinion” (121). 
The gunner puts forth a seemingly trustworthy and logical argument for his theory, 
convincing enough that Singleton believes him without question. However, as it turns out, 
the Gunner and Singleton are “most surprized” to come across another giant lake, so 
large some of the men mistake it for the sea (135). They follow it for 23 days, 
discovering that it ends in a very great river that also flows north. “My Friend the Gunner, 
upon examining, said, that he believed that he was mistaken before, and that this was the 
River Nile” (136). At another moment, on the other side of the continent, Singleton tries 
to push the crew to head north toward the Niger instead of south toward the Congo, but 
the Gunner opposes this plan, arguing that they should move northwest instead in hopes 
of meeting a river that would either run north into the Niger or south into the lower Gold 
Coast (147). The crew decides to follow this advice because the Gunner “was indeed our 
best guide, tho,” Singleton adds “he happened to be mistaken at this time,” undercutting 
yet again the usefulness of such mathematical calculations in this unpredictable, unknown 
space. The Gunner’s mathematical knowledge seems in the long run a paltry antidote to 
the wildly threatening hinterland, its illogicality and unpredictability symbolized through 





The interior Singleton experiences turns out to be a “country of lions,” just as the 
inhabitants of Madagascar and the Black Prince’s people warned. The inland journey is 
filled with roaring beasts that stalk the men’s camp at night—the physical embodiment of 
the mysteries of the interior that the coastal natives warned them about. The crew builds 
walls of pikes to keep the wild beasts at bay (129), but “Sometimes they come in such 
Multitudes, that we thought all the Lions, and Tigers, and Leopards, and Wolves of 
Africa were come together to attack us” (131). The wild and often hybrid animals 
symbolize all that was incalculable and unpredictable about the continent’s uncharted 
interior transgressing the boundaries that the European crew is desperate to maintain. The 
sailors exhibit what Nidesh Lawtoo refers to as a classic “fear of the dark”—an affect that 
arises when a viewer cannot empirically separate individual beings and the background 
against which they are situated, resulting in “a deeply felt mimetic anxiety of dissolution” 
(238).31 Their ability to gather knowledge about their environment is threatened along 
with this sense of self as their vision and their ability to make sense of the sounds they 
hear are obstructed. 
In fact, their only consistently helpful bastion against total destruction is the Black 
Prince, who protects the crew from voracious animals and finds food, water, and a way 
through the wilderness. Though he is romanticized and infantilized, his presence serves 
as an inerasable reminder that the triumph of the European subject over the land was due 
not to their superiority and ingenuity but to their appropriation of African knowledge and 
technologies. Unable to make shelter one night because there are no trees to make the 
huts they had been sheltering under, the sailors lay awake listening to “the Wolves howl, 





did not understand” (106). However, “The Black Prince told us in the Morning, he would 
give us some Counsel, and indeed it was very good Counsel. He told us we should all be 
kill’d if we went on this Journey, and thro’ this Desart, without some Covering for us at 
Night” (107). He advises them on how to make matting to carry with them and use as 
tents at night, once more indicating that his knowledge of what is to come and how to 
prepare for it is more useful than anything the Gunner’s map has to offer, and he and the 
men figure out a way to carry the makeshift tents over long distances by binding them 
between two poles. This strategy is immediately adopted by the crew: “As soon as we 
saw this,” Singleton says, “we made a little Advantage of it too” in order to carry their 
extra water bottles (110).  
This European imitation of African innovation is mirrored in another scene that 
puts the Black Prince’s and the Gunner’s competing epistemologies in direct proximity. 
During yet another lion attack, Singleton says, “We asked our Black Prince what we 
should do with them?” (118). The Black Prince takes some of the mats, hangs them on 
the end of a pole and lights them on fire, venturing into the darkness to frighten off the 
beasts. The Gunner himself is inspired by this strategy to build “some artificial Fire-
Works and the like,” which he then hangs “on the same Pole that the Matt had been tied 
to, and set it on fire, and that burnt there for so long, that all the Wild Creatures left us for 
that time” (119). Again, this scene repeats the epistemological realities for the 
development of European ingenuity in non-European spaces. The Gunner literally uses 
the structures established by their African guide as a foundation for his own strategy for 
subduing environmental threats, though it is telling that the fuel of the Black Prince’s 





while the fuel of the Gunner’s is the same gunpowder that seems to be at the root of all 
European solutions in the text. Though the Gunner, and Singleton, no doubt believe in the 
superiority of the Gunner’s take on the Black Prince’s strategy, the conditions of 
possibility for such advancement are nevertheless African in origin. This proves to be the 
case regarding the maps in the text as well. Before they even start on their journey—
before they even enslave the Black Prince and his fellows—they consult the maps to see 
if they should head for Angola or for “the Niger, and the Coast of Guiney” (66). They 
ultimately decide to cross toward Angola, “and as we were assured we should meet with 
Rivers, we doubted not, but that by their Help we might ease our Journey, especially if 
we could find Means to cross the great Lake, or Inland Sea, which the Natives call 
Coalmucoa, out of which it is said the River Nile has its Source or Beginning” (66). 
Though the maps are what have given the sailors the impression that following the rivers 
across the continent will be possible, Singleton’s reference to native accounts of the great 
lake that is the source of the Nile serves as a reminder that maps of the interior had their 
foundations not in European eyewitness accounts but in African narratives about the 
interior. His comment that they were “assured” they “should meet with Rivers” suggests 
that they sought confirmation for what the maps indicated, rather than simply trusting 
them to tell the truth.  
 
Conclusion 
Like the maps of his day, Singleton’s representation is more believable in its 
account of the coasts than it is of the interior. The text after all does draw some attention 





points out in his foundational geographical text on Africa (1670). Not only do the 
indigenes on the east coast tell him that there is some kind of people to be found 
everywhere, Singleton himself says early on in the narrative, “even the worst part of 
[Africa] we found inhabited” (62). Perhaps the fact that this detail does not pan out across 
the account itself is just an error of a hastily written text by a hack writer, as Defoe is 
sometimes accused of being, but perhaps it is another invitation to think about how the 
seemingly convincing surface narrative of both maps and eyewitness accounts do not 
actually do what on some level they promise to. If Defoe’s narrative is emulating the 
maps of his day, then, and treating them as such uncertain texts, it is worthwhile to ask 
how earnest Captain Singleton’s own representation of the interior is or whether it is not 
on some level a parody of these maps that promised through their river cartography 
untold riches waiting to be ported out. Evoking the map does not bring a sense of 
empirical security to the text—rather, the text unsettles the map, drawing attention to the 
extent that it is the product not of empirical measurements and observations from 
traditionally trustworthy sources but of speculative infilling, which has roots in African 
narratives about the land. 
Also like the maps it emulates and, I am suggesting, critiques, Defoe’s Captain 
Singleton retains more traces of the African worlds that underpin it than may first meet 
the eye. Singleton’s experience is dictated by native stories about the interior and by the 
Black Prince’s navigational aid even as his retrospective narrative stages European 
desires. European-African contact in the text is shaped by the discourses of African trade 
and the fantasy that European ingenuity and supremacy could co-opt that trade through a 





of this prospect even if on the surface it appears to be an appealing promise of what 
investment in the RAC had to offer. And, indeed, the African traders who controlled 
access to interior goods and the narratives they used to maintain control was a stumbling 
block to European conquest until the mid-nineteenth century. Geographical 
representations, Captain Singleton suggests, are not universal truths that European 
subjects have epistemological authority over but are hybrid and unstable texts, born of 
global contexts. When we take such global contexts into account ourselves, the African 



















1 Defoe wrote propaganda for the RAC when they were struggling in the 1710s including 
two tracts—An Essay Upon the Trade of Africa (1711) and A Brief Account of the 
Present State of the African Trade (1713)—and several updates on the parliamentary case 
over whether the company should be allowed to maintain its monopoly in The Review in 
1709-13. See Kiern 244 and Knox-Shaw 940-41. See also Scrimgeour 21-22, Wheeler 
136, and Novak 361. Though Defoe held “conflicting attitudes toward slavery” (Knox-
Shaw 942), his enthusiasm about proto-colonial trade investments in Africa is legible in 
several of his works.   
2 My suggestion that African worlds are an indelible part of Defoe’s representation is 
neither a revival of arguments common in the early twentieth century that Defoe had a 
shockingly precise understanding of African geography nor a defense of his realism. For 
commentary on such arguments, see Secord 113 and Scrimgeour 24. Rather, here, as in 
all my chapters, I am interested in how the material and the imaginary work together in 
order to produce representations of place that channel even if they do not precisely 
replicate specifically located geographies.   
3 “On Poetry,” 1733. Line 182.  
4 Furthermore, Smith participates in the long tradition of copying sections on some 
countries almost verbatim from previous travel narratives—largely Bosman’s. This 
borrowing is so prevalent that in 1979, H. M. Feinberg wrote an article accusing Smith of 
plagiarism, concluding that “A fraud, however ancient, has been uncovered, and another 






(49). Feinberg’s response to what was in fact a common convention in travel writing at 
the time demonstrates how prevalent the notion of ego-centered writing is in how 
scholars approach such texts. His suggestion that Smith’s narrative contributes no 
valuable knowledge since it is not the product of an individual man’s genius is an 
extreme but revealing example of how prone scholars are to overlook the fact that such 
texts are perhaps better understood as communally produced in the first place. Even Jones 
who wrote a response to Feinberg in 1980 defends Smith on the grounds that he 
“acknowledged his debt to Bosman on at least eight occasions” (327) rather than 
considering the implications of the fact that the genre itself has always subverted 
traditional notions of the author function.   
5 See also Judy Hayden, who argues that “Trading companies and the Royal Society 
adopted similar measures to stabilize the knowledge produced by their member’s reports 
(17),” and that these standards were put in place in order to “control—or even delimit—
the act of representation of foreign geographies” (18). 
6 The draughts were published separately in the late 1720s. Defoe, in fact, owned a copy. 
See Payne 107.  
7 Although Defoe codes European firearms with the power to shock, amaze, and exert 
control over seemingly savage Africans in both Robinson Crusoe and Captain Singleton, 
as this passage demonstrates, European firearms were a technology that most coastal 
Africans were intimately familiar with and were one of the most common commodities 
that African potentates demanded in exchange for gold, slaves, and ivory. For more on 






8 As Thornton points out, Africans had guns, but maintained their indigenous weapons 
because European guns were not always useful in African warfare: “Although they had 
great range and penetrating power…they had a very slow rate of fire. For Africans, who 
generally eschewed armor, the advantages of range (penetrating power being relatively 
unimportant) were more than offset by the disadvantages of the slow rate of fire, except 
in special circumstances” (113-114).  
9 This notion was not unprecedented in early Enlightenment literature about hot climates. 
Thomas Tryon argued for the value of this very strategy in his Friendly Advice when he 
suggested that Europeans should follow the diets and practices of natives in hot climates 
if they wanted to survive in torrid zone, claiming, “in Guinea, tho’ it be a very hot 
Country, and generally the Constitution of the Air accounted very unwholsome, yet you 
shall see the Ethiopians frequently live One Hundred and Twenty Years in great strength 
and vigour” (52). Contrary to assumptions that Europeans went to great lengths to 
establish discursive boundaries between themselves and the African other, Tryon and, to 
a lesser extent, Smith ultimately suggest that some element of going native is necessary if 
colonial and commercial expansion is going to succeed.   
10 Kelly Wisecup argues that Mather “supported inoculation by presenting Africans’ 
spoken testimony and arguing that their words reflected trustworthy evidence regarding 
inoculation, and, by extension, slaves’ status as reliable witnesses” (27). As she points 
out, although some refuted the credibility of African evidence, “African medical 






more importantly, inspired colonists to experiment with various literary strategies for 
representing authoritative medical knowledge.”  
11 Smith echoes Tryon in his appreciation of African healing as well. In the master/slave 
dialog in Tryon’s Friendly Advice, the slave’s father is described as “a Sophy,” who “had 
studied the Nature of things, and was well skill’d in Physick and Natural Magick” (151). 
When the master protests that an African who has never read the foundational medical 
texts could not possibly be an effective physician, the slave replies that “God and Nature 
have endued [the Africans] with Gifts of knowing the Vertues of Herbs, and that can by 
genuine Skill, administer good Medicines, and perform greater Cures, than your famous 
Doctors with their hard Words and affected Methods” (196-97).  Both Tryon and Smith 
seem attuned to the fact that, as E. Bolaji Idowu explains, “A really good African doctor 
is usually a person who lives close to nature and has the opportunity of close observation 
even of the medical habits of animals and birds” (201). 
12 The Mandé were the founders of the Mali and Songhai Empires and controlled the 
westernmost points of the trans-Sahara trade. Within this group, the Mandinka were the 
primary traders, and are often referred to by European and Arab writers as the Wangara 
or the merchants of Mali. By the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Mandinka 
had settled and who worked along the Gambia river where Smith, Stibbs, Francis Moore, 
and other British factors concentrated much of their trade efforts due to the fact that 
Britain’s primary holding was James Island (now Kunta Kinteh Island) in the mouth of 






13 According to Smith’s note, the “cole” was “a certain Tribute or Custom paid yearly by 
the Royal African Company, not only for Rent or Acknowledgement for York Island, but 
also for Liberty of trading up the River for Camwood and Teeth” (60).  
14 William Snelgrave complained in his travel narrative that he “could never obtain a 
satisfactory account from the Natives of the Inland Parts” because of their “Jealousy,” 
determined as they were to keep the trade routes to themselves (Preface). 
15 Early on in their acquaintance, Bucker Sano vows to be the one to “make bargains, to 
deliver and receive, according to the trust reposed upon him” (97). 
16 See de Moraes Farias 9; Garrard, “Myth and Metrology” 443; and Sundstrom 22-31.  
17 According to Wilfred Dolfsma and Antoon Spithoven, proponents of New Institutional 
Economics—who contend that “the prices of goods and services are the result of 
impersonal forces of supply and demand, in a setting where agency does not play a role” 
(519)—still often assume that the silent trade was a real economic phenomenon that 
“constitute[s] the first step ‘as trade moves beyond the border of the village’” (517).  
18 Historically, there has been some debate over whether Herodotus’s silent trade is the 
same silent trade as the one referenced in accounts of west Africa. E. W. Bovill proposed 
in the 1920s that Herodotus was writing about the westernmost point of the trans-Sahara 
trade, which was controlled by the Wangara (see 27) who were the same Mandinka 
settled along the Gambia river that brokered trade with people like Jobson and Stibbs (see 
Wilks 337). However, Timothy Garrard points out that “Herodotus does not mention 
West Africa; he speaks only of Libya and the Pillars of Hercules, both north of the 






story of silent trading into two strands—a classical strand based in Northern Africa that 
can be traced to Herodotus and a west African version in which the Wangara played “the 
role of middlemen between the gold producers and the Arabs and Moors or Europeans” 
(9).  
19 See de Moraes Farias 11, Garrard also suggests that “stereotyped accounts of [the] 
‘silent trade’ were propagated by Mande middlemen” (Akan Weights 43). 
20 As Hans Turley points out, critical readings of the novel tend to divide the second half 
of the novel, a piratical adventure of the high seas, from the first half, an imaginative 
narrative of an overland journey across Africa that “can be seen as a precursor to such 
novels as Heart of Darkness and other colonial and post-colonial works” (200).20 
Wheeler argues, “The novel envisions an Africa emptied of commercial infrastructure, 
including trading and communication networks” (108). This allows the novel to 
“rehers[e] certain cultural fantasies of expanding the empire through plundering Africa 
and describing a continent ripe for European commercial development” (109). 
21 See Keirn 246.  
22 As Wheeler argues, “Not surprisingly, several scholars have insisted on the travel book 
quality of the novel, and many have devoted their essays to source studies and to 
ascertaining what kind of geographical knowledge about Africa was available to Defoe” 
(107).  







24 Newman is contrasting Singleton with characters like Robinson Crusoe here, pointing 
out that Crusoe’s character is the product of “self-conscious reflection” (565) while 
Singleton allows circumstances to shape him. Similarly, John Richetti understands 
Singleton through Bakhtin’s definition of the picaresque hero as “a moving point in 
space” who “has no essential distinguishing characteristics,” which thereby “enables the 
artist to develop and demonstrate the spatial and social diversity of the world” (225).  
25 They are “nameless, naked savages in a bleak, empty landscape” (Boulukos 40), 
“exist[ing] only…as slaves, luggage-bearers, traders, and suppliers of food” (Scrimgeour 
30). 
26 The fact that this device carries meaning across cultural and geographical borders may 
simply be one of Defoe’s devices, deployed for the sake of moving the plot forward. 
However, as Novak points out, there are Africans in the text for whom this sign for peace 
has no meaning, indicating that such “Gestures and signs are not universal” (588). 
Although Singleton states that “the People of Madagascar knew no more of the Shores of 
Africa than we did, only that there was a Country of Lions, as they call it, that Way” (59), 
the fact that the friendship pole is intelligible across the Mozambique channel indicates 
that lines of contact and exchange transcend this supposed ignorance. 
27 Laura Brown observes that “the Black Prince far exceeds the minimal status of slave 
driver for which Captain Bob originally designed him and performs, instead, the role of 
facilitator of all the travellers’ projects; he is a kind of proto safari guide and thus stands 
as an intermediate figure, interceding between the Europeans and the continent of Africa 






century to find the African intermediary. While Brown’s historical materialist reading 
ultimately treats the Black Prince as a creature of European creation, “an agent of the 
bauble industry” (162), and the novel itself as mapping out a “proto-colonialist economy” 
(156) in which Europeans exploit and bully in order to exchange “cheap English 
manufactured goods for gold” (157), I am interested in how the novel depends, however 
unwittingly, on the material realities of African encounters, including indigenous 
economies and the narratives African merchants used to control them. 
28 This is not to suggest that a crafted representation is the same thing as an imaginary 
space. Rather I am interested in how the real and imaginary work together to produce 
early Enlightenment geographical impressions.   
29 Singleton belabors the fact that the Black Prince communicated with them primarily 
through signs and gestures until he grows fluent in Portuguese, mentioning it several 
times per page in their first interactions (76-81). Though the amount of detail the Black 
Prince is able to convey through this impromptu language may stretch the bounds of 
plausibility, the repetition of this point drives home the extent that knowledge of African 
geography was produced through the translation of African accounts into European ideas, 
not just or even primarily through European subjects’ observations and mathematical 
calculations. 
30 Singleton reiterates that Europeans did not know where the goldmines were, remarking 
at one point, “we were in a Country where we all knew there was a great deal of Gold, 
and that all the World sent Ships thither to get it,” but reiterates, “we did not indeed know 






31 Lawtoo is drawing here from the work of the French Surrealist Roger Caillois, who 
argues for the effect that confronting the phenomenon of animal camouflage has on 
human psychology, and he explains that “[f]or Caillois, this disquieting form of mimesis 
whereby a figure disappears against the homogenous background that surrounds it is not 
simply a visual, external phenomenon. It also reveals an affective, interior phenomenon 
that pulls a being on the side of death while leaving it on the side of life: or better, while 






CHAPTER 3: AFRICA’S NEW MONSTERS: SCRIBLERIAN SATIRE AND THE 
LIMITS OF EARLY NATURALISM
One of the most prominent recurring themes in Defoe’s Captain Singleton is the 
beasts the sailors encounter in the interior of Africa, whose origins, it is suggested, come 
from no familiar mating pairs but are monstrous hybrids. One of the animals Bob 
Singleton slays in the night “seem’d to be of an ill-gendered kind, between a Tyger and a 
Leopard” (133), and several creatures are described only through the “Yelling, and 
Howling, and all sort of such Wilderness Musick” they make (118). They are threatening 
precisely because the sailors cannot visually separate them from the continent’s literal 
heart of darkness. These animals encroach on the men’s encampment night after night, 
battering against the flimsy protection separating the sailors from the vastness not only of 
the landscape itself but of their own lack of understanding. The encounters are endemic 
of the forfeiture of epistemological control that travelers to Africa regularly experienced.  
 As I briefly addressed in my introduction, Pliny the Elder stated that the idea of 
the monstrous African hybrid can be traced to Aristotle and “the common Greek Proverb, 
that Africa is continually bringing forth something new.”1 The travelers, geographers, and 
natural historians of the early Enlightenment took this proverb as a foundational tenet of 
their own accounts of Africa. As George Abbot wrote, “This may be said of Africke in 
general, that it bringeth forth store of all sorts of wild Beasts, as Elephants, Lyons, 





Oportet novi. Oftentimes, new and strange shapes of wild Beasts are brought forth there” 
(186). Writing about such animals firsthand in his 1703 account of his travels to Guinea, 
Willem Bosman corroborated that “To this day, the Saying is very just,” and John Atkins 
agreed in his own 1735 account that the “Proverb of all Ages” regarding Africa is that “it 
is continually producing something new or monstrous” (36-37). The proverb is a kind of 
“cultural fable” of the early Enlightenment, to use Brown’s term for “stories without a 
text, imaginative events without an author” that are “built from the concrete materials of 
modern European experience, and they pervade and surpass the various movements, 
forms, genres, and modes of eighteenth-century English print culture” (Fables 1). As I 
will show, in the early eighteenth-century, attempts to understand African animals 
through early naturalist taxonomies kept this fable alive rather than dispelling it as an 
imaginative fancy.  
More recognizable today as “something new is always coming out of Africa,” in 
its original context, the proverb was less benign. As Feinberg and Sodolow write, “One 
should keep in mind that both Greek kainon and Latin novum, meaning ‘new,’ connote 
something strange, even undesirable… This connotation certainly squares with the 
application of the phrase to monsters of nature” (258). Pliny’s use of adferre in particular, 
they argue, indicates something unnatural, something aberrant, which is echoed by 
Pliny’s subsequent description of African watering holes where “so many strangely 
shaped Beasts are there produced, for the Males, either by Force or through Wantonness, 
mix with the females of various Kinds” (Pliny 23). The suggestion that the “new” things 
produced by the African wilderness challenged rather than reified the natural order of 





 This cultural fable did not simply function or circulate in the realm of the 
imaginative in the early Enlightenment. It was adapted and reinforced by both travelers 
and natural historians attempting to make sense of African animals and their material 
worlds. Furthermore, it became an important part of how some early Enlightenment 
authors represented the racial and cultural difference of African peoples, although such 
representations were not yet reducible to the biological arguments for racial difference 
that would begin at the end of the century. Encounters with African animals and their 
worlds were crucial not only to how both Europeans and Africans understood African 
spaces, but also to broader questions about what defines humanity and how humans and 
other animals fit together in ecological systems. I detail some African responses to these 
questions, and the way that African representations of the animal-human boundary 
influenced European thought, in the next chapter. Here, I focus on how European ideas 
about the self and world were influenced by encounters with African animals and how 
one group of well-known writers, the Scriblerians, repurposed the cultural fable of the 
hybrid African beast in order to critique the viability of naturalist methodologies that 
sought a god’s-eye view of the world through specimen collecting and taxonomies.  
The proverb surfaces across various Scriblerian works, particularly the texts that 
satirized early naturalists like John Woodward, Edward Tyson, or Hans Sloane—fellows 
of the Royal Society who believed that empirical methodologies, the identification of 
species’ individual characteristics, and carefully organized specimen collections would 
produce systematized and reliable knowledge about the world.2 While scholars no longer 
assume that the Scriblerian criticisms of the new science stemmed from a Tory rejection 





generally accepted that Pope, Swift, Gay, and Arburthnot were at the very least skeptical 
about the Royal Society’s particular brand of natural philosophy.3 Marjorie Nicholson set 
the tone for the line that much of this more recent scholarship follows when she 
suggested that the members of the Scriblerus Club were not backward-looking and anti-
science (Arburthnot was even a Fellow of the Royal Society) but rather wanted to caution 
the Royal Society on the limitations of its methodologies and temper the tendency of its 
members to carry their experiments and theories to a point of irrational excess. 
Nicholson’s angle has been taken up by a variety of scholars, all of whom more or less 
conclude that although none of the Scriblerians wholly rejected the potential of the new 
science as a knowledge-producing method, they were generally cognizant of its limits 
and of the problems illusions of epistemological certainty could cause.4 The African 
animal’s tendency to escape the taxonomical bounds put around it—in both narrative 
traditions and natural history practices—was a crucial aspect of this critique. 
 
Africa’s New Monsters and Early Taxonomy 
As Royal Society fellows such as Robert Boyle and John Woodward encouraged 
travelers to record their observations of animals in accordance with newly devised 
empirical and categorical methods, travelers focused less on finding evidence for 
unicorns or dog-headed men and more on descriptions of elephants and apes. Still, the 
lineage of the hybrid African animal did not disappear from how either the continent or 
its animals were represented in European literature. Scholars like Foucault, Horkheimer 
and Adorno, and Pratt have theorized about the influence that the categorization of nature 





establishment of stark boundaries between species—and particularly between humans 
and other animals—was key to early modern understandings of the self and world.5 
However, a growing body of scholarship has challenged this model, suggesting that the 
early eighteenth century was a time, as Brown puts it, in which “the relationship of 
animals and humans also involved substantial confusion and ambiguity” (Fables 224). 
Even though the Great Chain of Being may have provided a broad conceptual rubric for 
understanding connections among living things during this time, Diana Donald observes 
that it “raised as many difficulties as it solved,” its links “impossible to establish” (30-
31).6 Even at a time when natural specimens were becoming “things,” as Foucault argues, 
detachable from their larger contexts—both literary and ecological—and encoded 
through a “grid of language” that seeks to arrange the world into a stable, quantifiable, 
and transferable system of knowledge (xxiii), encounters with animals continued to 
trouble this system. African animals in particular—with their reputations as creatures that 
crossed nature’s boundaries at will—were important symbols for the limitations of early 
taxonomy.  
The process of classifying a distinct “species”—from the Latin for “appearance” 
or “form”—is to pinpoint an animal’s unchanging characteristics in a way that clearly 
separates it from other, similar beasts. John Ray was the first naturalist to define “species” 
in this way: according to his 1686 History of Plants, “Animals…that differ specifically 
preserve their distinct species permanently; one species never springs from the seed of 
another nor vice versa” (qtd. in Wilkins 37). These differentiating characteristics were 
usually identified visually or empirically, as the word’s etymology indicates. Yet, the 





chameleon’s ability to change color, and striking similarities between humans and other 
simians, for example, all challenged the viability of individuation by empirical 
observation. Often, this was due to a failure to define the ontological line between an 
animal and its environment, as was the case with crocodiles, or between species, as was 
case with apes and humans. In short, Africa was rife with what Donna Haraway refers to 
as “boundary creatures”—creatures that trouble “constructions of nature” (2) in the sense 
that they reveal the constructed quality of seemingly natural categories. By doing so, they 
became Africa’s new monsters: as Haraway observes, “boundary creatures are, literally, 
monsters, a word that shares more than its root with the word, to demonstrate. Monsters 
signify” (2). If nature functioned according to a logical, orderly system that could be 
known through the identification of its individual parts, as eighteenth-century materialists 
argued it did and could, then animals that did not fit clearly into any category were as 
unsettling as Pliny’s hybrids born from two different seeds. 
Furthermore, in the early days of natural history, such creatures were understood 
through multiple, sometimes conflicting discourses. As Christopher Iannini argues, in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the natural world was still being 
represented through what he calls the “specimen-as-emblem” (25), through a blend of 
symbolic and empirical descriptions. Take, for example, the crocodiles that almost all 
travelers to Africa give extensive accounts of, even though the beast was hardly the most 
foreign specimen encountered on such expeditions. The crocodile has been a symbol of 
duplicitousness since at least as far back as Aesop, where in the fable of the “Dog and the 
Crocodile,” the lucky dog is wise to the crocodile’s devious attempt to get him to “take a 





for a Mornings-Draught” (187).7 In Britain, the crocodile’s reputation for duplicity was 
popularized by The Travels of Sir John Mandeville where it is written that the 
“cockodrills,” which dwell on both water and land, “slay men,” and then “eat them 
weeping.” This notion of the crocodile crying to either falsely mourn or to attract its prey 
persisted through the early modern period—the metaphor making appearances in at least 
three of Shakespeare’s plays—and into the eighteenth century, where as late as 1746, 
some naturalist texts were proclaiming that “to decoy men, [the crocodile] sets forth Cries 
much like those of a Person in Distress” (De Coetlogon 45).8  
Travelers like Willem Bosman, William Smith, and John Atkins transformed the 
legend of crocodile tears into an early explanation of animal crypsis. They all tell stories 
about encountering crocodiles in the wild and barely escaping with their lives, not 
because the crocodiles are so large and ferocious—although they are—but because they 
couldn’t see them until it was almost too late. For example, like many travelers before 
and after him, Smith denies that crocodiles weep; however, he assures the reader, 
“Though not by Tears, yet, I declare, I have been deciev’d by a Crocodile in the 
following Manner” (46). He goes on to tell the story of how, while out walking with a 
companion and his dog, he saw what appeared to be “the Trunk of an old Tree left there 
by the Tide; but we were quickly undeceiv’d for when the Dog had got close by the Head 
of it, it made a Spring at him…with such sudden Motion so terrified us, that we took to 
our Heels” (47). For Smith, the legend of crocodile tears is explained as an “ancient 
figurative way of Writing, wherein the Treachery of the Crocodile is describ’d” (46), an 






Early modern specimen collecting would seem to mark the foreclosure of such 
duplicitous behaviors. Once it is hanging from the ceiling of a curiosity cabinet in 
London, the animal that fools the senses can deceive no more. Held in observable stasis, 
such specimens seem to be the objective of natural philosophy literalized. Yet such 
stagnation also brings up problematic questions about whether studying such animals in 
extraction from their habitats produces either true or useful knowledge about the natural 
world. A natural historian may be able to observe a dead crocodile in a laboratory in 
London, or even a living one in the Royal Menagerie or an animal show, but studying the 
creature in these contexts sheds no light on how one can know the animal in its own 
habitat—that is to say, how one can distinguish it from a log in the river in time to escape 
its jaws.  
The extent that an animal’s environment defined it was a question that plagued 
many natural historians, including John Arbuthnot, who rejected the notion that 
individual characteristics were a fixed part of a being’s identity at all. As he explains in 
his Essay Concerning the Effects of Air on Human Bodies (1733), “The Bones of 
Animals in hot Countries are more solid, and specifically heavier, than of those in cold 
Climates, as may be seen in comparing the Bones of the Limbs of African Horses, and 
those of Northern Countries” (154). Furthermore, the blood of animals in hot climates is 
“thicker and blacker,” and “The Animal Juices, in hot Countries, are more exalted; this is 
true in venomous Creatures” (155). This is an explanation for the fact that, as he states 
earlier in the work, “African Animals can hardly endure the Coldness of the open Air of 
England” (92). It is clear that although some knowledge about these animals can be 





qualities in and of themselves that make up an animal’s fundamental being but how the 
animal is connected with its ecology, keeping in mind that in the eighteenth century 
“climate” meant not just temperature but also “soil, topography, etc.” (Wahrman 88). 
Instead, in Arbuthnot’s theory, the larger network of connections that surrounds the 
animals shapes their beings.9 
The Scriblerians are now well known for taking on the limitations of early natural 
history projects in their satires, and several scholars have noted the importance of the 
theme of monstrous hybridity to Scriblerian works. As Nash argues, “Swift’s Pygmies 
and Yahoos, Pope’s Monsters of Dulness, all occupy the liminal space defined…as 
monstrous: at once failing to reproduce the same, they are too dangerously similar to be 
classified as ‘other’… The ‘monster breeding’ dunces of Pope’s Dunciad ‘get a jumbled 
race’” (29). Similarly, Dennis Todd argues that in The Memoirs “monstrosity becomes a 
figure the Scriblerians use to give shape to the puzzles of identity” (130). However, such 
analogies had a relationship to a specific geographical location in the early Enlightenment 
cultural imagination. I suggest not only the cultural fable of the African hybrid but Africa 
itself gave the Scriblerian critique this particular conceptual shape.10  
Take, for example Pope’s description of such an animal in his “Satyre IV.” At one 
point, the speaker encounters, “A verier monster, than on Africk’s shore/ The sun e’er got, 
or slimy Nilus bore,/ Or Sloan or Woodward’s wondrous shelves contain,/ Nay all that 
lying Travellers can feign.” In short, the beast is a combination of one of Pliny’s classical 
monsters, a crocodile, which was a common symbol for the Nile in eighteenth-century 
literature), a specimen in a natural history collection (Sloan’s or Woodward’s), and a 





always suspect in the early eighteenth century even though advancements in naturalism 
were dependent on such accounts. The beast is also an excess of all these things—
something uncanny. Pope illustrates here the monster that emerges when such conflicting 
epistemological practices and mechanisms for representation are interbred and collapsed 
together. The fact that Africa is the backdrop of this kind of critique is not a coincidence; 
Africa appears in several Scriblerian satires as both a space that resists epistemological 
penetration and a site where the Enlightenment turn toward categorization and taxonomy 
is troubled.  
 
Homo Sylvestris and the Animal-Human Boundary in Concerning the Origin of the 
Sciences and The Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus  
This interplay among the monstrous African animal, the geography that serves as 
its backdrop, and European for making sense of them is at the heart of the satirical essay 
Concerning the Origin of Sciences: Written to the Most Learned Dr.--- F.R.S. From the 
Deserts of Nubia. The text is attributed to the “Learned Martinus Scriblerus,” but was 
largely penned by Pope and Arbuthnot.11 In the essay, Martin comments that although 
natural historians have traced the origins of human knowledge to the “Aegyptians and 
Indians…from whom they first received them is as yet a secret” (287), and he sets out to 
solve this puzzle by speculating about pygmies deep in the heart of Africa. The essay was 
a spoof of Edward Tyson’s 1699 book, Orang-outang, Sive Homo Sylvestris: or, The 
Anatomy of a Pygmie Compared with that of a Monkey, an Ape, and a Man, in which 
Tyson, in an early attempt at comparative anatomy, tried to identify the distinctions 





addition, Tyson hoped to prove that the hybrid animals “the Ancients called Pygmies, 
Cynocephali, Satyrs, and Sphinges…were only Apes and Monkeys” (iii).  
Tyson’s text, like William Smith’s empirical explanation for the legend of the 
crocodile’s tears, seeks the material logic behind Africa’s fabular monsters, hoping to 
dispel the myth once and for all. Tyson finds it hard to believe “that if the whole was but 
a meer Fiction, that so many succeeding Generations should be so fond of preserving a 
Story, that had no Foundation at all in Nature; and that the Ancients should trouble 
themselves so much about them” (2). Baboons, chimpanzees, and monkeys, Tyson argues, 
are the genesis of these stories. It is thus without fear of undermining the scientific 
integrity of his own dissection that he calls his specimen a “Pygmie.” “Tis necessary to 
give it a Name,” Tyson writes, but implores us not to read too much into it. “By no means 
do I look upon it as a product of mixt Generation; tis a Brute-Animal sui generis, and a 
particular species of ape” (2). Yet, as Brown argues, the effect of Tyson’s comparisons 
among humans, chimpanzees, monkeys, and mythological beasts is an animal with a 
“composite valence—familiar and strange at once” (Homeless Dogs 40). It furthermore 
firmly aligns the new specimens travelers and scientists were encountering with the old 
proverb. Indeed, despite the fact that Tyson argues chimpanzees lack the divine spark of 
humanity—contending that “An ape is an ape, tho’ finely clad” (82)—the sliding scale 
that Tyson presents nonetheless provided more questions than answers regarding the 
relationships between primate species. In his epistle dedicatory, he describes “the 
Transition” as “so gradual” that the chimpanzee seems “the Nexus of the Animal and 






Critics agree that Concerning the Origin of the Sciences picks up on this 
inconsistency, but it is a matter of some debate whether Tyson’s work or the satire of it is 
more upsetting to the categorical boundaries between humans and other animals. Nash 
argues that Tyson’s text forges more anatomical similarities than differences between 
men and apes, which the Scriblerians used to “solidify the bond between humans and the 
monstrous other” (32). According to his reading, “This troubling and problematic kinship 
provides the central anxiety as well as the crucial joke in An Essay of the Learned 
Martinus Scriblerus, Concerning the Origin of the Sciences” (30), as the human 
sovereignty and autonomy that taxonomy is meant to establish comes apart through the 
Scriblerians’ seamless conflation of animal and human worlds. Raymond Corbey takes a 
slightly different position than Nash, suggesting that the Scriblerian tract “tentatively 
challeng[es], but ultimately reinforc[es], the threatened animal-human boundary” (42). 
Similarly, Brown argues that the Scriblerians are satirizing the way Tyson integrates the 
chimpanzee into the classical mythology, and it is they, not Tyson, who seek to preserve 
“the privileged position of human-kind” (Homeless Dogs 45-46). Both Corbey’s and 
Brown’s readings are more in keeping with canonical assumptions about Scriblerian 
belief in the sovereignty of rational man.13 In Pope’s “Essay on Man,” after all, humans 
are still distinct from other beings in the great chain even if their capacity for knowledge 
is necessarily limited.  
Still, Concerning the Origin of the Sciences does exhibit a level of comfort with 
unstable categories, perhaps because the methodology it satirizes is an epistemological 
one rather than an ontological one. Their critique has more to do with what man can 





human per se, though this does not preclude the possibility that humans experience a 
dissolution of the self when confronting such border creatures. The aim of Martin’s 
project, to discover the origins of knowledge, in and of itself evokes questions about 
where humans fit in the taxonomy of species. In tracing the genesis of science, Martin is 
ostensibly tracing the very thing that makes humans distinct, if we take their defining 
characteristic to be the ability to acquire and implement rational knowledge about the self 
and world. However, what begins as a project to identify the seed of the very thing that 
makes humankind unique devolves into a world where man becomes indistinguishable 
from beasts.  
Martin speculates that knowledge of the arts and sciences in fact originated with 
the “Pygmaeans” deep in the heart of Africa “where they lived undisturbed, till they were 
found out by Osiris in his travels to instruct mankind” (287). Unfortunately, driven 
further and further into the interior, the Pygmaeans have been forced, pace Pliny, “to mix 
with beasts,” a process by which they have “sunk into the bruta natura.” Even with all 
this monstrous mixing, the Pygmaeans have retained qualities of rational intelligence—
they can imitate man; some of them can even still speak. Language, which is ostensibly 
empiricism’s handmaiden for identifying the individual things of the world, instead blurs 
such divisions. 
Concerning the Origin of the Sciences thus questions whether natural 
philosophy’s attempts to identify what make humans unique are warranted, or if it is the 
human condition for man to “hang between…. In doubt to deem himself a God, Or Beast,” 
as Pope’s Essay on Man puts it (2: 7-8). Patricia Carr Brückmann argues, for example, 





but surveying the whole” (78). Their satire shows that taxonomy does not successfully 
dispel the existential anxiety that humans experience as they struggle to understand their 
place in the world. Furthermore, it suggests that reducing things to individually studied 
categories creates more epistemological problems than it solves.  
After all, one of the great drawbacks of anatomical dissections or curiosity 
cabinets or repositories as a technical model for the natural world was that things could 
only be examined in extraction from their contexts. The knowledge produced there might 
take into account a specimen’s relationship to other specimens but largely assumed that a 
creature’s identity was determined through its individual characteristics rather than 
through its relationship with its environment. As Defoe does in Captain Singleton when 
he superimposes the map back over African geography in order to demonstrate the 
potential pitfalls of rational, abstract knowledge production, Concerning the Origin of the 
Sciences satirizes the viability of Tyson’s method by taking Tyson’s chimpanzee from the 
dissection table in London and putting it back into the African wilderness. The essay 
suggests ultimately that the fable of the hybrid African beast is not dispelled through 
Tyson’s experiment but has simply changed shape.   
The Pygmaeans occupy the border between the world of man and the world of 
animals, between the known parts of the globe and fabular interior, and thus, Africa is 
treated as a place where the very emblems of what makes human beings unique (language; 
knowledge of the arts and sciences) are inextricably folded into the surrounding 
geography through both interbreeding and a retreat into the interior, a place where both 
the scientific practice of species individuation and the autonomy of the human subject are 





specific qualities through objectification, reinforce how unstable the process of 
categorization is, how deeply embedded such knowledge is in a discursive history rather 
than in the correct identification of a set of zoological characteristics, and how even that 
discursive history fails to shed light on the mimetic dissolution that arises from 
confrontations with homo sylvestris. The satire questions whether examining species—
including humans—in abstraction from the world is valuable, or even possible. 
Such questions are even more prominent in the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, a 
fragmented, and unfinished, account of Martin’s life story, which pokes fun at the 
virtuosos and natural historians that comprised the early Royal Society. 14  The paradox 
between fascination and anxiety, between the knowable and the unknowable, embodied 
by the African animal was embedded in the organizational and cultural logic of specimen 
collecting throughout the early modern period and well into the early Enlightenment.15 
Such collections were grounded in the very fabular or adventure romance associated with 
animals like the crocodile that such systems were ostensibly meant to detach from.16 
Christopher Plumb suggests about the elephant, for example, that “even as modern 
anatomical descriptions were created, the elephant’s anatomisers were reluctant to reject 
all previous accounts of the animal. Observation and antiquarianism were often made to 
go hand in hand as anatomists claimed to discern the mythological qualities of the 
elephant evinced in its anatomy” (529). Part of why this was the case was due to how the 
repository of the Royal Society—its collection of natural and artificial specimens—was 
founded in the late seventeenth century and the struggles between the members’ hopes of 
what it could do for the advancement of knowledge about the world and the reality of its 





collection of specimens could create a technical replica of the natural world began with 
Francis Bacon and was then taken up by members of the Royal Society for both scholarly 
reasons and as a way to advertise their projects and methods to potential benefactors (84). 
The foundational objects of the repository were purchased from or donated by owners of 
private curiosity cabinets like Robert Hubert, members of England’s wealthy, genteel 
virtuoso community. But as a result, the repository itself became a product of what 
Michael Hunter calls the tensions between virtuoso and scientific collecting (124)—that 
is, collecting specimens for their curiosity and rarity versus collecting specimens for their 
relative ordinariness in an attempt to create a global model of the natural world that could 
be studied in London.  
 This latter purpose is articulated in Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society 
(1667), where he claims that the repository will some day amass “a General Collection of 
all the Effects of Arts, and the Common, or Monstrous Works of Nature,” so that they 
have “drawn together in one Room, the greatest part of all the several kinds of things, that 
are scatter’d throughout the Universe” (251). Sprat’s account of the repository, in other 
words, embodied the kind of logic that Foucault recognizes in The Order of Things—the 
idea that knowledge can be advanced by identifying natural phenomena as things and 
ordering them accordingly. However, this aim was never fully realized in part because 
the material foundation on which it was built was not the natural world in and of itself but 
the artificial world of the curiosity cabinet, marked as it was by an investment in the 
wondrous and the rare reflected even in Sprat’s description of the repository as a house 
for “Common, or Monstrous Works of Nature.” The curiosity cabinet not only comprised 





were categorized in spite of the taxonomical system that John Wilkins developed, it 
permanently marked the project in the public imagination as it became both one of 
London’s tourist attractions (Hunter 124) and, as Swann argues, a means through which 
the Royal Society continued to garner support among the elite virtuosos by adopting 
“their distinctive mode of collecting” (83).17 Thus, while the relationship between 
virtuoso and scientific motivations for collecting were perhaps more of a continuum than 
the binary that Hunter initially suggests,18 his observation captures the way the these two 
seemingly contradictory motivations for collecting animal specimens coexisted in the 
same epistemological space.  
A chapter in The Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus illustrates this problematic 
relationship between virtuoso collecting and natural history practices. And when Martin 
discovers Mr. Randal’s curiosity show in west London, the African animals featured on 
its advertisement become a metaphor for how the intermixing of somewhat contradictory 
methodologies fundamentally underpinned the naturalist project. 19 The chapter opens 
with Martin walking through “the Western Confines of the famous Metropolis of Albion, 
not far from the proud Battlements of the Palace of Whitehall whose walls are embraced 
by the silver Thames” (85). However, as he is traveling against this quintessentially 
English backdrop, Martin comes face to face with a large canvas that offers a glimpse 
into a much more foreign landscape: 
Upon it was pourtrayed by some accurate pencil, the Lybian Leopard, more fierce 
than in his native Desart; the mighty Lion who boasted thrice the bulk of the 
Nemaean monster, before whom stood the Jackall, the faithful spy of the King of 





Monomotapa, by whose side were seen the glaring Cat-a-mountain, the quill-
darting Porcupine, and the man-mimicking Manteger. (85) 
Martin’s way of reading the advertisement demonstrates the extent that the kind of 
narrative organizing principles of curiosity cabinets still reigned supreme in the early 
Enlightenment, and in this scene the public animal show becomes a space that throws the 
cultural logic of the repository of the Royal Society into sharp relief. Although the 
advertisement is obviously for a sensationalist exhibit, this transportation of a foreign 
landscape into the heart of London has resonances with what the Royal Society 
repository was meant to be according to Sprat’s description. The animals are “pourtrayed 
by some accurate pencil,” implying that the artist has sought a representationally stable 
way to capture the animals’ true character. But Martin interprets their representation 
through classical, mythological discourse—the lion larger than the one fought by 
Hercules; the jackal defined through its fabular relationship to the lion.20 The fact that the 
leopard is more fierce outside of his natural habitat sets up the public animal show not as 
the repository’s lurid opposite but rather its unruly double, designed for public 
consumption at the price of “a silver sixpence” (86). This serves as a reminder, too, that 
the dissemination of scientific knowledge in the early eighteenth century took the form of 
public exhibitions that were often indistinguishable from their sensationalist coffeehouse 
or rarie show counterparts (Livingstone 25).  
Although the animals on the advertisement for Randal’s show can also be found 
in India and Anatolia (Randal assures Martin that “not all the Desarts of the four Quarters 
of the world furnish out a more compleat sett of Animals than what are contain’d within 





Africa is the primary geographical space referenced in the description of the 
advertisement itself. Martin uses the continent’s geography and its associations with 
mythical animals and peoples to read the advertisement as promising a show where the 
exotic beasts of unknown parts of the world are transported to the heart of London. The 
fact that it is a “Lybian Leopard,” Lybia being the Greek term for the parts of Africa that 
weren’t Egypt, suggests that it very well may be one of the wild cats drinking at the 
watering hole where “so many strangely shaped Beasts are…produced.” And as the 
Churchills’ Compleat Geographer (1709) notes, “Monomotapa” or “Lower Aethiopia” is 
as of yet unknown to Europeans in the early eighteenth century. Rather, descriptions of 
the place come from inhabitants of neighboring countries, which the geographical 
dictionary call “fabulous Stories of such as have deliver’d their own Imaginations for 
certain Truths” (216). As the initially stark division between the English and African 
landscapes begins to break down, so does the boundary between human and animal 
worlds when the African prince, vying for supremacy on the canvas with the king of 
beasts, is followed by the “man-mimicking Manteger,” a mandrill or baboon-like creature. 
The advertisement, in other words, promises a confrontation with things so monstrous it 
can cause a temporary dissolution of human sovereignty even as the “accuracy” of how 
they are represented plausibly anchors them in the realm of an orderly natural world.   
Thus Randal’s show is clearly a sensationalist and market venture, using the fable 
of the monsters that emerge from Africa in order to market the very kind of animal and 
specimen collecting that the Royal Society purported to eschew. Yet, in his interactions 
with Martin, who in this scene is playing “the youthful Virtuoso” (85), Randal begins to 





of the empirical witness when he assures Martin “twice have I sail’d round the Globe, 
these feet have travers’d the most remote and barbarous nations” (86). Throughout their 
interactions, Randal gradually transforms more and more into this empirical figure, trying 
to persuade the virtuoso to invest in his collection as a reliable representation of the 
natural world. However, Randal’s (ultimately ordinary) specimens don’t satisfy the 
virtuoso’s vision of what such a collection should be. Instead, Martin chides him for his 
lack of classical monstrosities: “did’st thou ever risque thy self among the Scythian 
Cannibals, or those wild men of Arbarimon, who walk with their feet backwards? hast 
thou ever seen the Sciopi…canst thou procure me a Troglodyte footman…. Hast thou 
ever measur’d the giganick Ethiopian, whose stature is above eight Cubits high, or the 
sesquipedalian Pigmey? Hast thou ever seen any of the Cynocephali, who have the head 
and voice of a Dog…?” (87). These bestial hybrids from Pliny, Herodotus, and other 
classical sources, several although not all of which were associated with the African 
hinterland, are not represented in Randal’s show; however, Randal tries to assuage 
Martin’s doubts on two points, both of which reflect how the Royal Society built up their 
early body of naturalist knowledge from somewhat suspect foundations.  
First, Randal assures Martin that while he has no such creatures in his collection, 
“all these have I beheld upon my honour, and many more which are set forth in my 
Journal,” casting the travel narrative once again as the epistemologically unstable source 
of much naturalist information, yet transformed just like Randal himself is into a 
scientific authority. Then, like Tyson arguing cynocephali are nothing but baboons, he 
uses the logic of taxonomy to dispel the myth of at least one of the creatures in Martin’s 





before you; this is naturally the fiercest, but by art the tamest Manteger in the world.” 
This replacing of evidence of a fantastical creature with a logical explanation from the 
observable world was one of the ways that the catalogers of the repository attempted to 
rewrite their inventory from a collection of extraordinary specimens to a collection of 
plausible beasts–for example, when Nehemiah Grew re-categorized a “giant’s thighbone” 
as an elephant’s bone in his 1681 Musaeum Regalis Societatis (32). Yet, also like Tyson, 
Randal’s renaming does not contain the threat that such slippery specimens posed to the 
autonomy of human being.  
As it turns out, the Manteger is in some ways the most ominous of Randal’s 
monsters. He is “tame” enough that he is allowed to walk around unchained and uncaged, 
lacking the physical restraints that keep the threat of the other show animals in check. 
Furthermore, he walks around on his hind legs performing the functions and gestures of 
men, acting as both a spy and a manservant for Randal. Yet, although he can perform the 
polite gestures of a man, he ultimately rushes one of the conjoined twins “like a 
barbarous Ravisher” when she is hanging out the window with her dress flipped up over 
her head in an attempt to elope with Martin (100). This variation on the “miscegenation 
anecdote” that Brown identifies as a recurring theme in early eighteenth-century texts 
about Africa (Fables 238-39) ultimately marks the Manteger as a beast that violates the 
human–animal boundary in more ways than one.       
It is no wonder, then, that Martin is unsatisfied with this explanation and 
continues to quiz Randal about his lack of classical monsters. This time, Martin is 
looking for animals that could plausibly exist in Randal’s collection—hyenas, ostriches, 





ostrich that is taller than a man on horseback, or a hyena who can “counterfeit the voice 
of a shepherd,” in one instance dishing out the pointed insult that Randal’s “Crocodile is 
but a small one” (88). Thus, even these seemingly ordinary beasts present a threat to 
speciation. The specimens that Martin wants to see are fascinating because the bonds that 
scientific explanation places around them are not enough to contain them. However, “Mr. 
Randal made no satisfactory answer to these demands, but harangued chiefly upon 
modern Monsters, and seem’d willing rather to confine his instances to the Animals of 
his own collections, pointing to each of them in their order with his Rod” (89). Although 
the virtuoso community is spoofed here, with Martin emblemizing the end result of what 
happens when empirical evidence, classical accounts, and travel narratives are all brought 
together to form a picture of the world, the extent that Royal Society fellows fought to 
inscribe artificial order over this mass of suspect evidence is equally brought to light. 
Randal’s only response to Martin is to “harangue” on “Modern monsters,” trying to show 
how complete and representative of the world his system is by pointing to each one in 
orderly turn. But the “monstrous” nature of his specimens keep rising up to subvert this 
order—indeed, it was the very thing that Randal used to sell his show to the public in the 
first place.  
  
Natural History and Racial Difference in Scriblerian Satire  
Such comments on Africa as a space where the boundary between the animal and 
the human is troubled raise important questions about how the cultural fable of the 
monstrous African hybrid fit in early Enlightenment discourse about racial difference. On 





and its inhabitants are disorderly, undisciplined, and aberrant. It is an accepted premise in 
the history of critical race theory that Africans were often represented in early 
Enlightenment texts as closer in their habits and behaviors to the animal world than the 
human world. As Palmeri argues, although some notions promoted “unbounded mixture 
or continuity between humans and other animals…in European cultures, such 
intermixings have also been associated with other and usually non-European peoples, 
who have then been regarded as less than fully human” (5). Similarly, Woodard argues 
that “the earliest images of blacks as uncivilized, sordid, and bestial were formed in 
eighteenth-century thought and letters” (99) and that such representations excluded them 
from the humanist discourse of civility that would have entitled them to freedom, 
effectively placing them below Europeans in Pope’s great chain (16). In his 1613 
Purchas his Pilgrimage, Samuel Purchas, drawing from Leo Africanus, writes that in 
“Negroland” the people live “like beasts, without King, Lord, Common-wealth, or any 
government, scarse knowing to sowe their grounds: cladde in the skinnes of beasts” (537). 
Similar rhetoric likening Africans to animals was rampant in early Enlightenment texts.  
On the other hand, as Roxann Wheeler, Dror Wahrman, and others have argued, 
its important not to conflate eighteenth-century—particularly early eighteenth-century—
attitudes toward racial difference with the systematized, biological arguments for racial 
difference of the nineteenth century.21 In spite of the temptation to read the categorical 
projects of speciation and racialization as logically going hand in hand, throughout early 
eighteenth-century texts about Africa the overarching rhetoric suggests that if Africans 
are barbarous, it is because they have lacked the benefit of Christianity and a civilizing 





Europeans. For example, William Dampier (1697) describes the natives of Natal in 
southern Africa as “very just and extraordinarily civil to Strangers” (112) and states that 
“their Aspect is altogether graceful” and that “they are nimble people” (110). But their 
downfall is that they are “very lazy: which is probably for want of Commerce” (110). 
Willem Bosman (1703), whose descriptions of Guinea’s inhabitants run the gamut from 
violent and uncivilized to intelligent and reasonable, rejects the idea that wildness or 
barbarousness is innate; rather, “some may be comparatively called Wild, or Brutes,” but 
their behavior stems not from the lack of a “Rational Soul…but from their reasonable 
Soul’s being degenerated by barbarous Usages, and for want of Conversation with 
civilized Nations” (489). The Ethiopians of East Africa, in part due to their long history 
of Christianity, were described by travelers like Charles Jacques Poncet (1709) as 
sophisticated and well educated. Authors such as Smith (1744) who write of Africans in 
general as uncivil and brutish tend to portray individual Africans with complexity, and 
even James Houstoun’s likening of Guineans to animals (1725)—“As for their Customs, 
they exactly resemble their Fellow Creatures and Natives, the Monkeys” (34)—
emphasizes their cultural behavior rather than any innate biological relationship with the 
beasts of the forest.22  
Furthermore, visual representations of Africans during this time did not portray 
them as grotesque or bestial in their postures and features, even though they were often 
dressed in animal skins or in close proximity to a totem like an elephant or lion. 
Representations of racial difference in the early eighteenth century were still a far cry 
from the bushman witchdoctor, the black Sambo caricatures, or the racist propaganda of 





and African peoples were common in European art, but they were more conceptual and 
allegorical than biological, which enabled a level of play among racial and taxonomical 
categories. 
The critique in the Memoirs of natural history’s taxonomies implicitly asks 
questions about how human difference fits into such categorical schemas. The little 
criticism that has been written about Randal’s show tends to focus on the conjoined twins 
who are on display, Lindamira and Indamora, with one of whom Martin falls in love. As 
Martin absconds with and marries Lindamira, Randal—loath to lose one of his star 
attractions—marries Indamora to the African prince, leading to a legal trial to determine 
whether Indamora and Lindamira “together made up but one lawful wife” (105). If yes, 
the prince would be found an adulterer; if no, Ebn-Hai-Paw-Waw’s marriage to Indamora 
should by all rights prevent Martin from being able to take the twins away. Others have 
discussed in-depth the way the trial over Indamora and Lindamira’s personhood brings to 
light contemporary debates about identity, the soul, and the legal status of women, but the 
African prince himself is largely treated as a mere plot device. Part of why this might be 
is also part of what makes the prince relevant to my point here—Ebn-Hai-Paw-Waw is 
not on trial at any point in the narrative. The status of his humanness is, at least legally 
speaking, never in question.  
From the beginning of the chapter, he is characterized as intelligent and civilized, 
like a miniscule Oroonoko: “Though his Stature was of the lowest, yet he behav’d 
himself with such an Air of Grandeur, as gave evident tokens of his Royal Birth and 
Education” (89). It is true that he is associated in the narrative more closely with the 





becomes a living embodiment of how Africa was allegorically portrayed in much of the 
early modern art world: a regal-looking, dark-skinned African surrounded by elephants, 
lions, crocodiles, etc., such as might be seen in the cartouches that adorned seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century maps or the Africa panel in Jan van Kessel the Elder’s allegorical 
painting of the four continents—cultural images that Randal’s poster for the show itself 
may very well be evoking. However, Ebn-Hai-Paw-Waw is not himself conflated with, 
for example, the manteger, who assaults Indamora (100). The racialized body in the scene 
is discursively aligned with figures whose humanity is under interrogation, in the case of 
the twins, or outright rejected, in the case of the manteger, but remains biologically 
distinct. As I argue in detail in the next chapter, such conceptual associations between 
African subjects and uncanny animals continued to destabilize European epistemological 
models in African travel writing throughout the eighteenth century.  
When the cultural fable of the hybrid African animal does becomes conflated with 
human behavior in Scriblerian texts, more often than not Europeans rather than Africans 
are the intended object of criticism, as illustrated in Arburthnot’s It Cannot Rain but it 
Pours: Or, The First Part of London Strow’d with Rarities (1726). The essay describes a 
visit to London of two African Ambassadors, who are first described as “Black Arabian,” 
which has lead Nash to identify them as Moroccan (129). And there were indeed 
Moroccan ambassadors in King George I’s court; diplomatic relationships between the 
two countries extend at least as far back as Elizabeth I’s reign. However, further on in the 
tract the speaker identifies the Ambassadors as being from Senegal, “which is between 
Salley [in Morocco] and Guinea” (5), associating their homeland as much with Sub-





cannot just be reduced to one of many times when early eighteenth-century writers used 
vague, non-European “savages” to critique uncivilized behavior in the European gentry, 
although it serves that function as well.23 (Arbuthnot points out, for example, that the 
ambassadors are completely unacquainted with “Displaced or Falling Minster[s], Africa, 
their Country, breeding none of that Sort of Monsters” [10].) The African backdrop is 
necessary for setting up the satirical structure of the tract, which, like Concerning the 
Origin of the Sciences, collapses the boundary between England and Africa in such a way 
that makes it impossible to tell, at the level of representation, where the supposedly 
civilized, European, human world begins and the uncivilized, non-European, animal 
world ends. When the ambassadors are first introduced at court, “The Gentry and Quality 
Flock’t round them, taking them for Masqueraders” (6). As a result, Squire Heidegger—
that is, John James Heidegger, the manager of the opera at Haymarket Theater and 
promoter of the masquerades held there—comes running into the room, “in a great Fright, 
least his Ball should be brought from the Opera House without his knowledge, and any 
body should presume to make Monkeys of Mankind besides himself” (6). However, the 
“Monkeys” in this scenario are not the ambassadors, they are the courtiers who “flock” 
around them like animals, gawking and pointing. The punch line of the text depends on 
the cultural assumption that Africa is a wild place, but it also relies on the reader’s 
willingness to see the African Ambassadors as civilized humans and the citizens of 






Crocodile Tears in Three Hours After Marriage 
In Concerning the Origin of the Sciences and in The Memoirs of Martinus 
Scriblerus the cultural fable of the monstrous African animal becomes an analogy for 
problematic methods of classifying the natural world. Having established this, it becomes 
possible to discern this same pattern structuring works in which Africa doesn’t 
immediately appear to be playing a significant role, such as the Scriblerian play, Three 
Hours After Marriage. Written in 1717 by John Gay with some assistance from Pope and 
Arbuthnot, Three Hours After Marriage satirized the virtuoso community, and while it 
was more or less a commercial success, it was a social failure in the sense that it 
infuriated enough powerful people in London to be roundly criticized. One of the people 
targeted was John Woodward, the naturalist and antiquarian who found himself the butt 
of more than one Scriblerian joke, and he had powerful enough friends to cause at least 
Pope to regret that his name was attached to the play.24 The satire was an extension of the 
kinds of issues outlined in the Memoirs regarding the relationship between monstrous 
epistemologies and curiosity cabinets. As Brückmann points out, “The monstrous and the 
curious, those related phenomena, are central to the madly ruinous world of the Memoirs, 
but they are even more manifest in Three Hours After Marriage” (79). The play literally 
dramatizes the collapse between human and animal behaviors when the scheming 
Underplot shows up in the aging virtuoso Dr. Fossil’s museum disguised as a crocodile in 
order to seduce Fossil’s new wife, Mrs. Townley, away from his partner-turned-rival 
Plotwell (who is equally disguised as a mummy).  
Moreover, there is something about displaying these tensions on stage that was 





becoming the target for the majority of the indignation (Ferguson 22). Diane Dugaw 
argues that Gay’s works are characterized by the phenomenon she calls “deep play,” 
whereby “actions and relationships evoke by analogy other actions and relationships” (25) 
until the text becomes a mechanism that interrogates the “deep structures of power and 
thought” at work in Georgian England (24). In this section, I argue that the actions and 
relationships between African animals and monstrous intermixing in the cultural 
imagination was one of the things underpinning this play that made that scene in 
particular so controversial. Three Hours After Marriage evokes this cultural fable in 
order to demonstrate how the virtuoso community’s interest in perpetuating narratives 
about an animal’s mysterious, curious, or monstrous qualities remained in paradoxical 
conflict with naturalist attempts to explain them away.  
 Animals with mysterious or mythical associations were prized not necessarily for 
their rarity in and of itself, or for the way they filled out a systematized schema of 
African wildlife, but rather for the way such beasts ultimately escaped epistemological 
containment of the specimen collection. This is illustrated early on by the frontispiece to 
Ferrante Imperato’s Dell’Historia Naturale (1599; Fig. 5), which is the first engraving of 
a natural history cabinet in Europe. The image features an enormous domed room 
covered every square inch with animal specimens. In the lower right corner, a guide with 
a long stick (possibly Ferrante’s son Francesco) directs two visitors towards the 
collection’s crowning glory, an enormous Nile crocodile attached to the very center of the 


















 room, even the men. Both of the visitors are gazing upwards at the beast, one of them 
pointing, while Ferrante himself leans nonchalantly, ankles crossed, against the back wall, 
the master of the monster that the other men in the room are appreciating.  
Such a specimen was indeed something to appreciate—reading the specimen 
emblematically, the capture of a crocodile was not simply a symbol of man’s power over 
the largest land predator in the world; it was a symbol of man overpowering the 
vulnerability that results from deception, from a fooling of the senses.25 A creature that 
seemed to inhabit the very in-between spaces of reality in the wild, the crocodile hanging 
from the ceiling of Ferrante Imperato’s curiosity cabinet appears to mark the end of such 
duplicitous behaviors. Yet, while the way the image guides the eye first to the viewers of 
the collection, then to the source of their curiosity, then to the owner of the specimen tells 
a story about the domination of such a beast, the thrill of bearing witness to the specimen 
implicit in the image lies not in its novelty or even its size but in its mythological status 
as an animal that under normal circumstances evades such circumscription. Consequently, 
the mastery over nature that the engraving suggests is only, and can only ever be, 
temporary because the animal’s ability to evade capture—its ability to render humans 
vulnerable in other circumstances—is the very thing that gives significance to its place of 
honor in the room. 
This contradiction is satirized in Three Hours After Marriage as Fossil and 
Townley are returning to Fossil’s home after the ceremony. Fossil, a collector of animals 
and artifacts, refers to Townley as his “best of curiosities,” and assures her, “You may, 





her among his collection of animals, she reminds him that “Marriage is not to be 
undertaken wantonly, like brute beasts,” to which he replies, “Thou art a virgin, and I a 
philosopher; but learn, that no animal action, quatenus animal, is unbecoming of either of 
us” (3). Yet, in a sudden anxious aside over whether he will be able to perform in the 
bedroom, he wishes for Townley to be dosed with laudanum in order to “settle the 
present ataxy of her animal spirits, and prevent her from being too watchful.” The 
mention of “animal spirits” is, of course, a reference to Descartes’s theory that animal 
spirits in the blood stimulate the Pineal Gland, the ostensible material location of the soul 
(the “Cartesians are for matter and motion” as Fossil explains in Act IV). According to 
Lund, the Scriblerians rejected Descartes’s theory because it relies on scientific 
mechanism and “eliminates the ‘will’ as the initial moral determinant of human action” 
(144). As he suggests, the play seems to be proposing that any attempt to locate the soul 
in the material properties of the body is absurd. However, in this scene Fossil arrives at 
the notion of animal spirits through a reference to his collection of animals, of which 
Townley—the object of his bestial desires—is now one, inviting speculation into how 
such a critique might work not only on the microlevel of the human mind and soul but 
also the macrolevel of the larger ecologies and taxonomies that the curiosity cabinet 
attempted to materialize.   
The play suggests that the largest barrier between the curiosity cabinet and true 
knowledge of the animals it houses is that the specimens are merely stuffed bodies and 
are thereby missing a fundamental thing that gives the animals their being (their “animal 
spirit”), just as boiling the human soul down to a body fundamentally misses the question 





wife is already making plans to cuckold him with Plotwell that he realizes the danger of 
introducing a living being into his curiosity cabinet: “Couldst thou not still divert thyself 
with the spoils of quarries and coal-pits, thy serpents and thy salamanders, but thou must 
have a living monster too!” he admonishes himself (7). As he goes on, “One may… 
confine bears, lyons, and tygers…but a wanton wife, who can keep?” Although Fossil 
believes he has mastery over the contents of his collection, the introduction of the living, 
wanton wife into the mix makes it clear that Fossil’s supposed mastery is only viable in 
the abstract, and abstracted, world of the curiosity cabinet itself. According to Katherine 
Mannheimer, Fossil represents a contingent within the play connected with 
straightforward reading practices (66), while the world of the play itself demands “an 
improvisatory and performative mode of interpreting the world” (63). This is a 
reasonable explanation for why Fossil has no true knowledge of the beasts in his 
collection, just as he has no true knowledge of Townley, her virginity or her fidelity, 
which is the central tension that keeps the plot in motion, leading Plotwell to moan in Act 
III, “How true is that saying of the philosopher! ‘We only know, that we know nothing’” 
(40).   
The absurdity of trying to understand the natural world through specimen 
collecting is made even more overt in the scene that caused such a stir among London 
audiences, in which Plotwell infiltrates the curiosity cabinet dressed like a mummy in 
order to abscond with Townley. He is able to sneak in because Fossil mistakes him for 
his shipment of “Egyptian rarities” that he has been waiting for. When Fossil temporarily 
locks Townley in with him, she takes note of Plotwell’s mummy disguise and asks him, 





play-house can dress mummies, bears, lions, crocodiles, and all the monsters of Lybia” 
(57). His reference to the classical proverb aligns the space of the curiosity cabinet with 
the fraught epistemological space of Africa’s geography featured in other Scriblerian 
works. It also proves to be both a prescient and a literal observation, as moments later a 
great scaly crocodile suddenly comes to life and embraces Townley. She screams until 
Plotwell convinces her it is just Underplot in disguise. “Why should not the play-house 
lend me a crocodile as well as you a mummy?” Underplot asks. “How unlucky is this!” 
Townley replies, now inundated with more lovers than she knows what to do with. 
Turning to the other animals, she says, “You snakes, sharks, monkeys, and mantygers, 
speak, and put in your claim before it is too late” (59).  
The mechanics of this scene were so ridiculous as to make a lasting impression on 
London audiences and make even Gay regret the scene in a letter to Pope, who had 
apparently advised against the inclusion of the crocodile specifically.26 But beneath the 
ridiculous costuming and bawdy innuendoes is a subtle critique of early collecting 
practices, as Underplot’s sudden appearance exposes the epistemological gap between a 
crocodile hanging in a curiosity cabinet and encountering one in the wild. As he emerges 
from the seemingly motionless background, he is behaving outside the logic of the 
naturalist’s collection—where the specimens are supposed to stay dead—but his sudden, 
monstrous, hybrid appearance is in keeping with the logic of the African wilderness that 
the collection is supposed to emulate, or at the very least shed light on. As Smith’s 
account indicates, understanding that crocodiles unexpectedly appear out of nowhere to 





As Plotwell and Underplot compete with each other to win Townley’s affections, 
the line between specimen and environment becomes blurred as they themselves begin to 
take on the qualities of the things they are dressed as. Plotwell declares, “If I don’t love 
you above all your sex, may I be banish’d to the studies of the virtuoso’s,” to which 
Underplot counters, “If I don’t love you more than that stale mummy, may I never more 
be proclaim’d at a show of monsters, by the sound of a glass-trumpet” (59). Plotwell tries 
to sell Townley on his “balsamic kiss,” his “balmy breath,” his “erect stature,” while 
Underplot tries to seduce her with promises of his “embrace,” his “beautiful row of teeth,” 
and his “long tail” (60). The paradox of Ferrante Imperato’s curiosity cabinet—in which 
a specimen’s attraction is proportional to its ability to evade capture—haunts Dr. Fossil’s 
curiosity cabinet throughout this scene. 
London critics considered this seduction attempt crude and disgusting. E. Parker 
reproduced the dialog in his Complete Key to the New Farce call’d Three Hours After 
Marriage (1717), and then sarcastically states, “Such is the polite dialogue of Messieurs 
Arbutnott, Pope, and Gay, and the latter modestly gives out, that for the fine Entendre 
and Humour rais’d him Four Hundred Guineas to divide between him and his Partners” 
(13). Samuel Johnson wrote in his entry on Pope in The Lives of the Poets that the play 
was “driven off the stage, by the offense which the mummy and crocodile gave the 
audience” (301). Dugaw argues that London audiences found the play threatening 
because it brought together the “high” theatrical form of a stage play with the “low” 
genre of the mumming play in a way that revealed the “artificiality of social rank” (144), 
but the play’s hybrid genres is just one example of how Three Horus After Marriage 





that Townley is contemplating sexual contact with the two things that transgress the 
boundaries of the human—a corpse and an animal—London audiences found the 
possibility abhorrent. But I argue that this scene is not just an attempt at crude humor. 
Rather, this joining of things that do not belong together is the remainder when the 
narrative of mastery over the animal that is represented in Imperato’s engraving is 
undone, leaving only the blurring of the self that occurs from confronting the collapse 
between the knowable and the unknown. The arbitrary and fanciful epistemological 
systems that are inscribed over the curiosity cabinet in the play are no protection against 
this threat when the specimens start to come to life. 
Who the dupe is of such misplaced assumptions about what constitutes 
knowledge is made clear when Dr. Fossil reappears on the scene. Plotwell and 
Underplot’s competition is never resolved because they are interrupted by Fossil coming 
into the room with two of his colleagues, Dr. Nautilus and Dr. Possum, eager to show off 
his newly acquired Egyptian rarities, although Possum takes the wind out of Fossil’s sails 
a bit by commenting about Underplot, “This an alligator! Alack a day, brother Nautilus, 
this is a mere lizard, en eft, a shrimp to mine” (61). The doctors proceed to fight over 
who has the specimen in their collection that is the most “curious,” that is, who has the 
specimen that is marked by its incalculability. But when Plotwell and Underplot suddenly 
“leap from their places” (65), in effect embodying what is “curious” about a curiosity, the 
doctors are even more frightened than Townley was. Fossil asks Plotwell if he is the 
“ghost of some murder’d Egyptian mummy,” while Nautilus cries out, “A rational 
question to a mummy! But this monster can be no less than the devil himself, for 





walk upright on two legs like a human. However, Nautilus’s declaration reveals the 
limitation of the specimen collecting as a route to true understanding of nature if we take 
a true understanding to mean—as I have argued in the previous section the Scriblerians 
did—considering a natural phenomenon in its wider ecological context.  
What Nautilus is responding to is the fact that the crocodile is behaving in a way 
that is counter to his expectations of how even a living crocodile should act. But he is 
forgetting the fact that crocodiles in their proper environments do deceive in ways that 
challenge such individuation, whether imaginatively, in the case of crocodile tears that 
mimic human weeping, or literally, in the case of the crypsis that proved so troubling to 
travelers like Atkins and Smith. Nautilus is revealing the ignorance of the collector who 
mistakes the dead crocodile specimen in a curiosity cabinet for the true exemplar of an 
animal’s ontological qualities. Such virtuosos would find the same animal a “devil” in its 
own environment just as we refer to their natural habitats as “infested waters” today. 
When Fossil kicks Underplot out of his house, calling him a “hypocrite of an alligator,” 
he is oblivious to the fact that his Egyptian rarity has simply behaved as a crocodile 
would, just as it is in the scorpion’s nature to sting.   
The poor crocodile’s fate is a further reminder of the impracticality of taking a 
living monster from the African wilderness and bringing it to London for study. We are 
told by Townley’s maid and a footman that when Underplot ran out into the street, a 
woman “swore she knew him to be the devil,” because she heard him call for a coach in a 
human voice, while a sailor “said he might be a crocodile for all that, for crocodiles could 
cry like children” (68). As the mob sets on him, he is “saved” in the nick of time when 





monster, and so he is now attended by a vast mob, very solemnly marching to Hockley in 
the Hole, with the bear in his front, the bull in his rear, and a monkey upon each shoulder.” 
This movement from the naturalist collection to the role of monster at Hockley in the 
Hole echoes the moments in the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus where the reader is 
reminded that the curiosity cabinet’s proximity to the sensationalist animal show is 
significantly closer than the Royal Society would have preferred. Furthermore, the 
prognosis for the crocodile in the bull- and bear-baiting ring is not good, bringing to mind 
Arbuthnot’s statement in the Effects of Air on Human Bodies that “African Animals can 
hardly endure the Coldness of the open Air of England” (92). Accordingly, in this play as 
in other Scriblerian works, the cultural baggage associated with specimen collecting, and 
with trying to identify the animal–human boundary through speciation, is brought to light 
when the rhetorical boundaries used to separate empirical evidence from fabular evidence, 
and scientific practices from virtuoso practices, are flattened out. Like Pope’s bringing 
together such variant layers of associations to make this point in his “Satyre IV,” Possum 
captures the equivocating relationship among animal specimens, fables, and the 
epistemological crises of Three Hours After Marriage when he tells Fossil, “Your 
Crocodile has proved a human creature, I wish your wife may not prove a crocodile” (68).      
Thus, even a play that has seemingly little to do with Africa can bear the mark of 
how contact with the continent shaped certain kinds of metaphors and intellectual 
frameworks for a British audience. To see the widespread implications of the cultural 
fable that each year Africa was bringing forth a new monster, one needs to look no 
further than the criticism of Three Hours After Marriage, which echoed these very 





of the Authors” that concludes his key, he attacks Pope hoping that although he is popular 
now, London will “drop him as soon as it finds him out to be a Beast, whom it fondly 
now mistakes for a Human Creature” (4). As Parker elaborates, “He is a Beast and a Man, 
a Whig and a Tory, a virulent Papist and yet forsooth, a Pillar of the Church of England, a 
Writer at one and the same time, of Guardians and Examiners…” (4). He is, in short, one 
of Pliny’s monstrous beasts produced through the intermixing of species that do not 
belong together, a hypocrite of an alligator. Similarly, in “Joseph Gay’s” (John Beval’s) 
The Confederates: A Farce (1777), the character of “Colley Cibber” (who played 
Plotwell and whose involvement with the play resulted in his own conflict with the 
writers) criticizes the scene between the mummy and the crocodile, asking, “How could 
you dream the Company would clap? Such Monsters breeds your Nile (the Learned say), 
One Half is Frog, and t’other Half is Clay” (24). These reactions are a testament to the 
fact that London audiences not only picked up on the Scriblerian analogy between Pliny’s 
proverb regarding African beasts and a failed, hybrid intellectual project, they did so 




The cultural fable surrounding the notion that Africa was continually producing 
monstrous beasts underpinned early Enlightenment curiosity cabinets and animal shows, 
highlighting the extent that such centers of the empirical knowledge of taxonomy and 
speciation were actually grounded in a deeply felt anxiety regarding animals’ 





that such fables functioned on the allegorical level only, it was material contact with 
African animals themselves, and how that contact was communicated through travel 
narratives and natural histories, that perpetuated the idea of Africa’s unknowable interior. 
Furthermore, confrontation with animals like apes and crocodiles forced early 
Enlightenment thinkers to reconsider whether such defining boundaries are knowable at 
all, inscribing these animals with their own monstrous associations. The Scriblerians used 
this cultural fable about Africa as a framework for several of their works that critiqued 
naturalist methodologies for engaging with the animal world. Works like Concerning the 
Origin of the Sciences, The Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, and Three Hours After 
Marriage all suggest that if it is possible to know what makes human beings uniquely 
human, such knowledge is not to be found by trying to pinpoint an animal’s defining 
characteristics in abstraction from the larger environments that necessarily influence their 
beings. Although the Scriblerians may have intended for this slippage between animal 
and human worlds to be epistemological rather than ontological—Concerning the Origin 
of Sciences for example asks naturalists to confront the question of whether and how it is 
possible to represent, and therefore know, the defining differences between humans and 
animals—their analogical method brings this slippage to bear on the very question of 
what it means to be human. 
 In order to make their critique, the Scriblerians relied on a model of Africa in 
which the interior, not knowable by empirical means, became a stand-in for the 
limitations of empirical evidence more generally and its ultimate dependence on narrative 
and classical evidence specifically. Their satire arose from and had a significant impact 





human, and how Africa was represented throughout the early eighteenth century. While I 
have dwelt here on the relationship among accounts of African animals, European 
taxonomies, and early Enlightenment naturalist methodologies, in the next chapter, I 
consider that such questions may have arisen not only from the evolution of European 
scientific discourse but also from confrontations with African representations of animal 























1 For Pliny’s full account of Africa, see his Natural History, book 8. For a detailed 
history of the proverb itself, see Harvey M. Feinberg and Joseph B. Solodow. 
2 For the most in-depth documentation of these rivalries, see Levine.  
3 Ashley Marshall has recently raised the question of whether there is enough similarity 
among Pope, Arbuthnot, Swift, Gay, and Parnell’s individual works for the “Scriblerian” 
moniker to realistically signify anything coherent. See “Alleged ‘Scriblerians’” in chapter 
5 of The Practice of Satire. However, I have maintained the term since I am using it 
largely to refer to the works attributed to “Martinus Scriblerus” and to the scenes of 
Three Hours After Marriage—coauthored by Gay, Pope, and Arbuthnot—that have 
thematic similarities with the Scriblerus texts. Additionally, although I mention the 
Scriblerian reaction to early Enlightenment epistemological methodologies, it is in 
reference to broad parallels visible even in their individual work. This is not to suggest 
that the nuances of such beliefs or critiques were exactly the same or that outside of the 
jointly written works their respective satires were seen as a coherent whole in the public 
imagination.   
4 John Cartwright and Brian Baker argue that Pope “praise[d] Newton” but also 
“remind[ed] his readers that even a Newton is subject to the limitations of human 
knowledge and has his place on the endless chain” (104), and suggest that Swift’s well-
known lampooning of the Royal Society in Gulliver’s Travels illustrates not an outright 
rejection of science but a rejection of the application of scientific and mathematical 






appropriate” (111). For more on Swift’s satire of the Royal Society in Gulliver’s Travels, 
particularly regarding the Laputans, see Cartwright and Baker 110-111; Lund “Res et 
Verba,” 64-67; and Gregory Lynall, Swift and Science chapter 4. Similarly, Clark Lawlor 
suggests that although Pope’s poetry is “freighted with Newtonian terminology and 
ideas,” ultimately Pope, “feels compelled to point out the limits of science” (44), and that 
although Arbuthnot was a man of science himself, he “chose to express his doubts and 
fears about the brave new universe in the best medium then available: poetry” (39). 
David Shuttleton reminds us that Arbuthnot was educated by the “Scottish Newtonians,” 
and that “his non-satirical writings reveal him supporting the New Science, and even 
publishing on antiquarian studies himself” (47), while Pat Rogers points out that “much 
of Scriblerian satire deals directly in antiquarian currency” in such a way that shows 
“close familiarity with this area of inquiry” (240-41). 
5 See Foucault, The Order of Things 130-131;  Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment 17-18; and Pratt, Imperial Eyes 24-25.  
6 See also Nash 15, Palmeri 11, and the introduction to Glinis Ridley’s animal studies 
special issue of the Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies for similar claims.  
7 From Fables and Stories Moralized: London, 1715. Such collections of and references 
to Aesop’s fables were immensely popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
what Jayne Elizabeth Lewis calls the “Aesop craze” (4). Interestingly, Aesop himself was 
often depicted as physically deformed and monstrous prior to the eighteenth-century, 






“complexion and physiognomy” of a “politically dominant group with access to the 
classical canon” (94).  
8 Dennis De Coetlogon. A Tour through the Animal World. London, 1746. The fable was 
likewise espoused in heraldry guides and emblem dictionaries well into the eighteenth 
century.8 In one popular eighteenth-century emblem dictionary, the caption under one 
illustration of a crocodile reads, “It weeps to devour” (xiii) while the caption under 
another reads, “I await my opportunity” (lvii). Emblems, for the Entertainment and 
Improvement of Youth. London, 1735. 
9 Arbuthnot was furthermore a proponent of climate theory as an explanation of human 
variation. Dror Wahrman points out that Arbuthnot believed “that human diversity can be 
explained through the external effects of the natural environment” (88), thus aligning him 
with what Wahrman calls the ancien regime of identity—the notion that the self is crafted 
from the outside in. 
10 Other than a fairly extensive look at how descriptions of Cape Hottentots inspired the 
Yahoos in Gulliver’s Travels there has been little research published on the importance of 
Africa to Scriblerian satire. There has been some work done on Scriblerian interest in or 
influence on the Augustan slave trade. Helena Woodard argues that both Pope’s and 
Swift’s humanist rhetoric contributed at least partially to the discursive systems that 
excluded blacks from the discourse of Enlightenment (xv), and a handful of works have 
touched on Pope’s somewhat ambiguous position on slavery in Windsor Forest, written 
following the treaty of Utrecht (1713), which gave Britain rights to the slave trade under 






patron. See for example John Richardson, “Alexander Pope’s Windsor Forest”; Pat 
Rogers, The Symbolic Design of Windsor-Forest; Dustin Griffin, Swift and Pope: 
Satirists in Dialog 91. John Richardson has argued for the significance of the slave trade 
to the work of Pope, Swift, and Gay even though the slave trade is rarely if ever explicitly 
mentioned in their texts. Although slavery is a “shadowy presence” there (2), he suggests 
that not only did the Scriblerians’ connection to the Harley administration mean that they 
had some political stake in the slave trade, but that “slavery and the slave trade had their 
part in ordinary public discourse” (15), meaning that even subtle references to it would 
have resonated for an early eighteenth-century audience. Following Richardson’s lead, 
the fact that discussions of Africa more generally were also part of public discourse—
particularly the naturalist discourse I am interested here—it is safe to assume that even 
passing references to Africa would have evoked the much broader rhetoric surrounding 
the continent that my project as a whole sketches out. 
11 According to Nash, the tract was likely written around 1714 but not published until 
1732. See 30-31.  
12 Martinus calls the “Oran Outang” the last of the line of pygmies, “Orang Outang, by 
whose dissection the learned Dr. Tyson has added a confirmation to this system, from the 
resemblance between the homo sylvestris and our human body, in those organs by which 
the rational soul is exerted.”  
13 Paul Fussell, for example, took as one of his criteria for “Augustan humanism,” which 
he identified Swift and Pope as the progenitors of, “that man is absolutely unique as a 






14 Like Concerning the Origins of the Sciences, the Memoirs first circulated in manuscript 
and was not published until Pope’s collected works in 1741. 
15 A “prodigy of science” (8), Martin’s mind was “burning with a Zeal of benefiting his 
follow-creatures, and filled with an honest conscious pride, mixt with a scorn of doing or 
suffering the least thing beneath the dignity of a Philosopher” (4). He has spent his life on 
a “quest for natural knowledge,” and in the process, he writes, “I have found in Dame 
Nature not indeed an unkind, but a very coy mistress” (6). Paul A. Olson points out that 
Martin is a “chameleon persona” (109) who takes on multiple identities throughout 
memoirs. At one point, he may be an empiricist, his understanding “so totally immers’d 
in sensible objects, that he demanded examples from material things of the abstracted 
Ideas of Logick” (47), while at others he becomes a neoclassicist or an armchair 
philosopher. Although this shift may be due to the fact that the Memoirs are, “typically 
fragmentary and, as such, possibly distressing in its own way to readers in search of 
clearly articulate wholes” (Brückmann 4), Martin’s chameleon persona also allows him to 
function as a stand-in for the larger class of professional scholars whose sometimes 
radically divergent methodologies did all come together to make up the body of 
institutionalized knowledge in the early Enlightenment. 
16 In The Order of Things, Foucault classifies the difference between Renaissance natural 
history and early Enlightenment natural history as a process of disconnecting a 
representation of a plant or animal from its narrative history. “To the Renaissance,” he 
writes, “the strangeness of animals was a spectacle: it was featured in fairs, in 






bestiary displayed its ageless fables. The natural history room and the garden, as created 
in the Classical period, replace the circular procession of the ‘show’ with the arrangement 
of things in a ‘table’” (131). However, as scholars like Susan Scott Parrish and 
Christopher Iannini have argued, early naturalists employed a blend of emblematic and 
empiricist methodologies well into the eighteenth century, rather than making the clean 
break that Foucault suggests. See Parrish 9 and Iannini 25. See also Donald 30-31.  
17 A similar dynamic existed between Royal Society members and the Tradescant 
collection that became the foundations for the Ashmolean natural history collection at 
Oxford—John Ray transformed the collection into the “stuff of science” by 
“reacquisition and renaming” (Ritvo 21). 
18 As he points out later in the chapter, “we should beware of underestimating the extent 
to which those active in the Royal Society shared the values that Hubert exemplified and 
to which he appealed…. It is clear that the same exotic or abnormal objects could be 
approached from different points of view…as specimens worthy of serious scholarly 
scrutiny” (135). 
19 Mr. Randal is referenced in a note in John Beval’s spoof of Three Hours After 
Marriage, The Confederates: A Farce as a “famous monster monger” in London’s 
Channel Row (Prologue).   
20 In the Tatler 121, Joseph Addison describes the relationship “between the squire and 
the hound to be of the same nature with that between the lion and the jackal,” and in his 
travels in Guinea, Atkins writes about how the jackal procures the lion’s prey (45-46). 






beasts to Mesopotamia, arguing that the African animals were blended into the fable 
through Greece’s contact with Egypt and Lybia. See History of the Graeco-Latin Fable 
321-22; 328.   
21 See Wahrman 176 and Wheeler 5.  
22 Interestingly, one of the few writers who did propose a polygenesis theory at the time 
was John Atkins when he writes that he is “persuaded the black and white Race have, ab 
origine, sprung from different-coloured first Parents” (39). However, he calls this view 
“heterodox,” indicating that it was not widespread even as late as 1735 when his narrative 
was published, and he furthermore suggests that the idea of Africans interbreeding with 
apes is implausible regardless of how similar to humans the apes may seem (108). The 
fact that he among all the eighteenth-century travel writers sought to find common 
ground between Europeans and Africans suggests that this line should not be taken as an 
argument for their bestiality or even their inferiority, although it may seem that way taken 
out of context.  
23 For a full account of the “fable of the native prince” in eighteenth-century British 
writing, see Brown, Fables chapter 5.  
24 As Diane Dugaw explains, “While Three Hours was a moderate success, running for a 
full seven nights, it provoked heated response to its pointed spoofs of antiquarian John 
Woodward and critic John Dennis. The play seems to have offended powerful Whigs in 
London and was something of an embarrassment to Pope” (135).  Its seven-night run was 
the longest consecutive one for any play of the season—see Ferguson 19. However, 






success: “Pope’s enemies saw in the production of Three Hours After Marriage an 
opportunity to revenge themselves on him for his lacerating lampoons. Their method was 
to create uproar at every performance of the play, and they succeeded” (232).  For a full 
production history of the play, see Sherburn.  
25 Emblems, as William B. Ashworth explains, were an important part of how early 
modern thinkers read the nature and were intended to be a stand-in for “the entire web of 
associations that inextricably links human culture and the animal world” (313).  
26 Gay wrote to Pope in a letter: “Too late I see, and confess myself mistaken in relation 
to the comedy; yet I do not think had I followed your advice and only introduced the 
mummy, that the absence of the crocodile had saved it. I cannot help laughing myself 
(though the vulgar do no consider it was designed to look ridiculous) to think how the 
poor monster and mummy were dashed at their reception.” The letter is included in the 





CHAPTER 4: WEST AFRICAN WORLDVIEWS IN THE CONTACT ZONE: 
AFRICAN REPRESENTATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT TRAVEL WRITING
In the previous chapter, I argued that Africans were aligned conceptually and 
culturally in European texts with epistemologically destablizing animals in ways that 
were not yet synonymous with the biological arguments for racial difference that would 
begin to appear at the end of the century. I am not suggesting that such representations 
are any less problematic than late eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century scientific 
arguments for race as a biological difference. However, they do remind us that 
descriptions of Africans in early Enlightenment travel narratives grew out of self-
conscious attempts to interpret performances of culture, which means we can approach 
them as texts that engage directly with African discourse rather than texts that simply 
project pre-assumed, European narratives of African difference onto the continent. Such 
discourse was often misunderstood by even the most well-meaning travel writers, like the 
eventual abolitionist John Atkins, but it does not necessarily follow that it was then 
rendered void of meaning or influence. In this chapter, I argue that we can read several 
moments in Willem Bosman’s New Voyage to Guinea (1703/05) and John Atkins’s 
Voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West Indies (1735) as recoverable expressions of West 
African ideas about the self and world. Sometimes, as in Bosman’s case, the narrative 
voice is largely unaware or uninterested in the fact that an African worldview is manifest 





text’s world even without authorial intent or consent. Yet in other cases, such as John 
Atkins’s, travelers reflected on how African ways of looking at the world challenged or 
complicated their own, revealing the extent that such discourses permeated the way 
Europeans thought not just geographically but philosophically. Both Bosman and Atkins 
were enormously influential on the way Europeans pictured Africa; as William Pietz 
argues, “the Guinea known by the Enlightenment was above all Bosman’s Guinea” (4), 
and Atkins’s travel narrative became a foundational text for the abolitionist movement, 
revived throughout the century by writers like Anthony Benezet and Peter Peckard. 
Exploring how African thought infuses Atkins’s and Bosman’s texts enables us to 
consider how European impressions of West Africa were at least in part a product of the 
intersections between European and African representational practices.  
To ground the specific African discourses I am tracing in these texts, I turn to 
African art objects and artifacts that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not 
only common in the regions that Bosman and Atkins wrote about, they were collected in 
European curiosity cabinets as well. Bosman discusses such art directly in his narrative, 
and both Bosman and Atkins turn to the African objects of power and the rituals 
surrounding such objects for insight into West African religion and philosophy. I look at 
how ivory carvings, bronzes, and the more abstract African “fetishes” represent a 
worldview that challenges the categorical boundaries between the self and world 
espoused by traditional Western metaphysics. Given the prevalence of certain animal 
motifs in West African art, such representations became part of the cultural fables 
discussed in the previous chapter, in which the unstable signifier of the African animal 





Reading African Representation as Philosophical Discourse  
Literary scholars’ arguments for why Africa functioned as blank space in the 
Enlightenment imagination are at least partially based on the assumption that there was 
no textual exchange between Africa and Europe during that time. Such claims assume a 
narrow definition of “text” that includes only alphabetical representation, yet the objects 
that artisans crafted either for African use or for the specific purpose of trade with 
Europeans contain culturally significant inscriptions that entail a sophisticated literacy.1 
These are objects through which Africans expressed their experiences and identities and 
can be analyzed as such by triangulating their iconography with contemporary African 
accounts of traditional culture and myth, and with historical European narratives, like 
Bosman’s and Atkins’s. As Elizabeth Isichei puts it, this may result in “ambiguous 
voices—but there are sometimes no other voices to be heard” (239). Doing this work, 
ambiguous though it may be, can give present-day scholars a way to conceptualize 
African worldviews in the contact zone, which in turn enables us to examine exchanges 
in European travel narratives with a sensitivity to how African self-expression existed 
and dictated terms within those encounters, however misunderstood by the European 
observer.  
In the wake of postcolonial and postmodern theory, the discourse used to analyze 
and talk about African art has grown increasingly nuanced and culturally sensitive. In the 
1970s, Douglas Fraser was one of the first art historians to challenge the notion that 
African art is a pure expression of primitive emotion, suggesting that “African art forms, 
generally regarded as ‘aesthetic’ (from the Greek word for feelings), are equally 





African art is still haunted by the specters of both pan-Africanism and primitivism; 
artifacts are still sometimes treated as if they represent a homogenous African worldview, 
grounded in a kind of intuitive, primal human experience (Spring 27). Although I wish to 
avoid both oversimplifying African thought and defaulting to such stereotypes of either 
primitivism or mysticism regarding African art traditions, there are some broad claims 
that can be made about both the worldviews and the art and artifacts from regions in 
which Bosman and Atkins traveled.  
As George E. Brooks explains, most early modern Guinea belief systems 
espoused a similar metaphysics, and he identifies three categories of supernatural 
phenomena central to this worldview: a creator god who is omniscient yet does not 
directly intervene in human life; ancestors who can act as intermediaries between the 
world of the living and the world of the dead; and spirits or agential energy that can 
inhabit both natural things, including plants, trees, stones, and animals, and created 
things—what eighteenth-century Europeans knew as idols, “fetishes,” or “gris-gris.”2 E. 
Bolaji Idowu describes this last category in his foundational study on traditional African 
religions as “the African world swarm[ing] with spirits” (133) that can move from an 
animal or object into a human and back again and can bridge the divine and quotidian 
realms (174).3 Such spirits—abosom in the Akan conceptual schema and orisha in 
Yoruba, for example—are the mechanisms through which humans interface with the 
divine.  
Although how these belief systems manifest can be highly individualized—ritual 
practices and iconography even within cultural or language groups vary from region to 





human, the natural world, and the divine world as porous if not entirely absent.4 In his 
essay on decolonizing traditional African religion, Kwasi Wiredu argues that in the 
traditional Akan worldview, for example, “the absolute ontological cleavage between the 
material and immaterial” necessitated by Cartesian subjectivity does not even exist (33). 
He points out that the Akan have no word for the existential verb “to be.” As he claims, 
the closest equivalent, wo ho, “always prompts the question, ‘To be what, where?’ or, 
‘Being what, where?’” (xvii). Thus, “in the Akan language existence is necessarily spatial. 
To exist is to wo ho, to be at some location” (xxiii). The word captures the way that for 
many West African belief systems, reality is not produced through a strict separation 
between being and world, the way Cartesian dualism has allegedly dictated Western 
concepts of being.5 All entities, including humans, objects, and spirits, have being 
because they have a spatial location—space that they sometimes share with other material 
objects.6 Thus, while it is not accurate to describe natural or created objects as having 
souls or spirits it is overly simplistic to describe them as mere conduits for immaterial 
energy. Rather, natural and created objects enter into complex spatial relationships with 
spirits or divine energy, relationships that can be dictated to some extent by ritual, 
symbolism, and performance—what I refer to in this chapter as West African 
representational practices.  
At the core of this variance between African and European art histories—at least 
for my purposes here—are different theories about the nature of representation itself. At 
the most extreme, early art historians proposed that Africans had no concept of art at all 
and that their representational practices were entirely practical if mystical—idols meant 





etc. More nuanced understandings of the role of representation in traditional African 
societies recognize it as simultaneously practical and aesthetic—unable to be “divorced 
from its content of belief” (Fagg 12) but still intelligible as the product of “slowly 
changing, highly conservative artistic traditions” (Spring 27), and still recognizable as the 
abstract and self-aware articulation of complex and nuanced worldviews.  
What is a more pressing question than how early modern Europeans and West 
Africans defined art is how they defined the relationship between representation and the 
represented. In both European and African eighteenth-century conceptual schemes, 
representation deals with issues of translation and displacement—how to transfer 
something from one place to another, how to recreate the essential qualities of one thing 
through the medium of another, or how to evoke the absent through a surrogate presence. 
For Europeans, this often meant translating the material into the conceptual, whether 
practically speaking, like making a map to represent a geographical space, or more 
aesthetically, like a painting that evokes certain ideas or emotions in the viewer, or 
replicates an experience or point of view. But for West African representational practices, 
which imagine the metaphysical relationship between the material and the conceptual 
differently, what is being re-presented (that is, translated from one place to another) may 
have life or energy of its own, resulting in tangible rather than just a conceptual 
transferal—what Wiredu calls “method[s] of making use of the super-human resources of 
the world” (34). Because European schemas understand this as a matter of material cause 
and effect, such artistic traditions are sometimes understood as practical and functional 
and therefore less cerebral or “intellectual” than Western art, even though traditional 





This general metaphysics in which the essences of existence are not bound by 
categorical individuation and can move among the living, the nonliving, and the divine 
underpins the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century art objects, artifacts, rituals, and 
performances that Bosman and Atkins encountered on the Guinea coast. The bracelets 
and brass casts discussed below served a separate cultural function than an idol, fetish, or 
masquerade did, but this worldview is fundamental to making sense of all of these 
representational practices.7 
 Since ivory was carved for people in positions of authority whether African or 
European, ivory carvings in particular can tell us much about how Africans of the Guinea 
coast conceptualized state and military power in the early Enlightenment, the expression 
of which played a significant role in shaping Willem Bosman’s depiction of African 
culture. Take, for example, the iconography on a pair of carved Yoruba armbands from 
the Owo kingdom (Fig. 6). Although they were housed in a curiosity cabinet in Denmark 
in the late seventeenth century, the distinctly African motifs and forward-facing, static 
posture of the figures indicate that, unlike many ivory objects from that time period, these 
were not carved for export to Europe. Multiple seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
travelers, including Bosman and Atkins, mention that such “Ornamental rings made of 
Ivory” worn around the arms was a common part of ceremonial garb in the Guinea states 
(Bosman 119, Atkins 61). The alternating figures carved into the armbands have human 
heads, torsos, and hands. Heads and torsos are the most important parts of the human 
body in much West African art, which is often reflected in the proportions of human 
figures, the head standing in as the locus for leadership and human will and the torso as 















 usually shorter and smaller (Cole 43-45). However, in these armbands the figures’ legs 
are not human at all; instead, the figure splits into two different creatures at the groin, 
which bend upward, and are gripped in the figure’s hands—a motif of “self-dompting” 
that was common in the pre-colonial art of both the Owo kingdom and Benin. 
The posture emphasizes the dual nature of African kings and leaders, who were 
thought to belong to both the spiritual and physical world (Fraser 11).8 One of the “legs” 
turns into an elephant, an animal that authority figures are often seen holding or riding in 
Benin and Yoruba art (although elephants were not domesticated in West Africa as they 
were in parts of Asia; the motif is purely symbolic). During the height of the Mali Empire, 
the Akan referred to the king of Mali as “the great elephant” (338). The other leg turns 
into a crocodile. A powerful character in many different African belief systems, the 
crocodile was venerated for the same reasons it was decried by Europeans: as an animal 
that could live both on land and in the water, that seemed able to appear and disappear 
without warning, the crocodile was treacherous, but also a symbol of cleverness, 
protection, and adaptation. The crocodile, like the king, bridged the spirit world and 
quotidian realms—in both the Edo and the Yoruba pantheon, crocodiles are the 
messengers of Olokun, the god/dess of the sea (Fraser 10). Crocodile masks feature 
prominently in contemporary West African masquerades—an “art of transformation…. 
often concerned with the process of harnessing the powers and forces of the spirit world 
and bringing them into the human world” (Spring 26)—and a similar notion is suggested 
by the physical conflation of the human and animal imagery in the armbands: that the 
powers of the divine and natural are available to human leaders not just metaphorically 





by the crocodile and the elephant), spiritual power (symbolized by the self-dompting), 
and human power (symbolized by the head and the heart) all converge on a single 
metaphysical plane, the boundaries between them fluid, and accessible at least for one 
with as much political significance as the original owner of these armbands must have 
had.  
Willem Bosman mentions similar African carvings twice in his travel narrative, 
once on a visit to the Edo kingdom of Benin and again in a description of an Akan 
celebration he witnessed while serving as a factor for the Dutch East India Company in 
what is now Ghana.9 In Benin, he describes carvings that adorn the palace walls, busts 
“cast in copper” (likely examples of the now famous Benin bronzes), and “elephants teeth 
on pedestals of ivory” (464-65). In Ghana he describes ceremonial trumpets carved from 
whole elephant tusks (138). In neither case is he particularly impressed with the 
aesthetics of the carvings, although he calls the “large Copper Snake” that adorns each of 
the three gates to the palace in Benin City “very well cast or carved…the finest I have 
seen in Benin” (463). In fact, he criticizes both works for the same reason: the images in 
Benin he describes as “Human Figures: but so wretchedly carved, that it is hardly 
possible to distinguish whether they are most like Men or Beasts” (464). The horns in 
Ghana are made “of small Elephant’s Teeth; though not so very small but some of them 
weigh betwixt twenty and thirty pounds, and others more: To adorn these they cut in 
them several Images of Men and Beasts; and that so finely that it seems to be done 
Litterally in Obedience to the Second Commandment; for indeed ‘tis difficult to discern 
whether they are most like Men or Beasts” (139). At first glance, such descriptions seem 





traditions for centuries, and on one level they are. But it may in fact prove illuminating to 
take Bosman’s statements at face value, not that the images are wretchedly carved but 
that they bind man with beast and thus evoke a worldview where vital energy is not 
contained in individual things but is transferred among them in various ways, including 
via the “swarming spirits” fundamental to several West African worldviews.   
This conceptual scheme is tangibly if obliquely articulated in Bosman’s description of the 
ivory trumpets. Such instruments were significant cultural artifacts in both Africa and 
Europe between the fifteenth and the late seventeenth centuries. Although a great number 
of trumpets were carved for African use, many were also carved for European clients, 
some of whom commissioned specific European designs like heraldic beasts, coats of 
arms, and scenes of stag hunting. The trumpets carved for African use are usually less 
elaborate and have an embouchure on the convex side of the tusk rather than the tip; 
however, they too were adorned with both human and animal symbols of power, as 
Bosman notes (Fig. 7). The most common icon on these trumpets from West African 
regions including the Sape, Akan, Benin, and Congo is a crocodile head, which was often 
carved in three dimensions into the narrow end of the trumpet (Fig. 8), actually becoming 
part of the embouchure in the European versions and growing more dragon-like the more 
clearly European the intended owner. In other examples, human figures, or figures that 
blend human imagery with animal imagery, adorn the dense smaller end of the tusk. A 
mid-eighteenth-century side-blown trumpet from a collection in France that Bassani 
describes as “unequivocal[ly] African” (287) features a man riding on the back of some 










Figure 7: Sideblown Sapi Trumpet, c. 1500. Musee de l’Homme, Paris 
 
 
Figure 8: Crocodile Head Trumpet, c. 1600. Musee de l’Homme, Paris 
 
 


















Such imagery relies on various relationships between men and beasts to articulate 
notions of power and authority. As Herbert Cole argues, in much African art a mounted 
figure “fuses human intelligence with animal strength, creating an awesome presence far 
greater than the sum of its parts” (116), and in some cases “the rider figures are spirits, 
and the ‘horses’ they ride are really their human devotees” (119). Other common animals 
carved into the body of African horns include chameleons and lizards, snakes, and human 
heads or human figures that are either on top of an animal, as seen in figure 10, or 
growing out of an animal, as seen in figure 9, which combines the crocodile and human 
motifs for adorning the tip of a trumpet. Although the crocodile appears to be eating a 
human here, more likely this carving is a symbol of social order, with the crocodile a 
stand-in for either the king or a god. Devouring metaphors for hierarchy are part of 
traditional Akan culture, for example, as articulated in the proverb, “If the catfish in the 
stream grows fat, he does so to the benefit of the crocodile (who eats him),” which 
expresses not the crocodile’s voraciousness per se but his power and authority (Garrard, 
Akan 207).  
Such trumpets were and still are used for various ritual and political purposes 
across Africa. Bosman describes the ceremony he witnessed as a show of status, 
organized by “those enriched either by Inheritance or Trade” (139), although, as he 
mentions later, trumpeters were also officers for local rulers (193). In his account, seven 
trumpeters play at once (135), accompanied by drums, and “they produce a sort of 
extravagant Noise; which they reduce to a sort of Tone and Measure, and vary as they 
please: Sometimes they blow upon these Horns so well, that though it is not agreeable, 





(139).10 What he his likely witnessing is what ethnomusicologist Joseph Kaminski has 
termed “sound barrage,” an Ashanti musical ceremony still practiced today in which 
ensembles of seven trumpeters (26)—along with drummers and other musicians—play 
“separate songs simultaneously” in order to “create a protective sonic barrier against any 
potential evil” (9). The theory behind this practice is dependent on the metaphysical 
principles outlined above, particularly the notion that “the world teems with spiritual 
beings,” as Kwame Gyekye puts it (79). The specific beings engaged here are abosom, 
what Bosman refers to throughout his narrative as “Bossom,” which he understands as 
false gods, but which are more accurately described as essentially neutral deities that can 
be the cause of either good or evil effects in the human world, depending on how they are 
engaged by worship or witchcraft (Gyekye 124).  
The purpose of the sound barrage, according to Kaminski, is to create a kind of 
force field, to use sound, combined with ritual, to literally drive abosom with evil 
intentions away from the village or city.11 The trumpets, or ntahera, are able to do this 
because a spirit resides inside them (70), and thus the object is an asuman, infused with 
sunsum—a force that exists in and can act from objects that humans interface with 
(Kaminski 70). Indeed, sunsum can be thought of as a kind of divine animating or 
agential power that comes from Nyame—the Akan supreme being—and permeates the 
human world with both abosom and ancestral spirits acting as intermediaries (Gyekye 73). 
African representational practices—the specific rituals, substances, symbols, and 
language used to channel this energy—give it its particular conceptual or metaphysical 





example, in the case of the sound barrage, the sonic waves give the sunsum the shape of a 
force field.  
Most modern-day ntahera are plain, but seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
versions, as Bosman describes, were decorated with the kinds of motifs pictured above. It 
makes sense that crocodiles, which represent both authority and the permeability of 
natural, human, and divine worlds, would be a recurring motif for these instruments, 
giving another specific conceptual shape to the sunsum animating the instrument. When 
the trumpet player puts his mouth over the emboucher, sending the power of the 
instrument out into the world through his breath, he, too, becomes ontologically 
connected with the larger system of power exchanges that the sound barrage engages, and 
the material of the trumpet itself connotes strength and authority: as another traditional 
Akan proverb about the sovereign’s supremacy over all things notes, “When the elephant 
steps on a trap, it does not spring” (Mato n. pag.).  
Thus, when Bosman describes the carvings on the ntahera as images that collapse 
the boundaries between the human and the animal, and describes the sound of the 
trumpets playing all at once, he understands something more technical about African 
representational practices than he perhaps realizes. Even though at first the sound seems 
as if there is no logic to it, each player blowing “as they please” or “in accordance with 
their moods,” Bosman admits that the variances in measure and tone seem to serve some 
kind of ritual purpose, and although he does not connect the practice specifically to the 
sound barrage, elsewhere he describes the Akan driving “devils” out of their villages and 
















The Benin art that Bosman describes would have featured more realistic human 
figures than the Yoruba bracelets or the ivory trumpets above, but traditional Benin art is 
rife with iconography that plays with similar conceptual boundaries, and since the Edo 
had control of the Owo empire on and off through the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, there are clear borrowings between their aesthetic styles. Figure 11 is a 
seventeenth-century example of a bronze plaque, which lined the walls of Benin palace 
and may have been the “carvings” that Bosman refers to. Typical of Benin art, the head is 
proportionally larger than the body, emphasizing that this figure is a leader or king. 
Although his body isn’t physically turning into animals as in the bracelet above, he holds 
two leopards by their tails, symbols of life force or longevity. His arm position is 
reminiscent of the self-dompting seen on the Owo armbands—indeed he has such 
armbands around his own wrists—and although he doesn’t grip his ankles, two mudfish 
hip masques project from his sides in a way that suggests they could be an extension of 
his torso as much as his legs are. Mudfish, like crocodiles, are emblems of liminality in 
Benin art. Due to their proto-lungs and stiff flippers, mudfish can move from one stream 
to another across dry land, and as Allen Roberts writes, “Mudfish in Benin art refer to 
important gods and spirits, such as Olokun, ‘Lord of the Great Waters.’ The Oba, or king, 
mediates between Olokun’s watery realm and everyday life on dry land” (87). The fact 
that the mudfish take the form of hip masks in the plaque is also important: hip masks are 
worn for the same reason that masks are worn over the face during ritual masquerades—
to channel certain qualities from the natural and spirit world into a person or community 





It is impossible to tell how much of the literacy embedded in the Benin carvings 
or bronzes would have been intelligible to Bosman. But right after his description of the 
Benin carvings as so bestial as to be unintelligible to a European, he writes that in spite of 
this fact, “my Guides were able to distinguish them into Merchants, Soldiers, Wild-Beast 
Hunters, etc” (464), indicating that he received some kind of explanation of how the 
wild-looking iconography of their carvings translated to African beliefs, particularly 
about different expressions of mercantile, military, and masculine power. Thus, 
Bosman’s comments about both the Akan carvings and the Oba carvings collapsing the 
boundaries between man and beast tap into a complex aesthetic and philosophical 
tradition that he was at least curious, if not knowledgeable, about.  
After all, Europeans coveted and collected such objects for a reason. It may be 
tempting to assume that they were seen as simple artifacts of a primitive people and, 
therefore, not examined all that closely, as Mudimbe does when he suggests that although 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “one finds [African artifacts] in well-
organized curio cabinets…. they are seen as simple curiosities” gathered in accordance 
with the sort of heads and inquiries discussed in chapter 1 (9-10). However, it is 
important to keep in mind that curiosity was not an idle thing in the early Enlightenment. 
Susan Scott Parrish argues that during this time, “both people and things were curious 
and depended on each other to evince this quality.” This mutual constitution challenges 
“the division between the self and world, between the investigator and the investigated” 
inherent in notions of the Cartesian subject (American Curiosity 59). Thus, the fact that 
Bosman doesn’t overtly or fully understand the philosophy behind African 





worldview or his text—the investigated art objects and the beliefs they engender become 
part of the creative force that produced Bosman’s narrative.  
Initially drafted as a series of letters to a friend back in Europe, at several points 
in the narrative Bosman indicates that he was often caught up by African ideas in spite of 
himself. When giving a detailed report on a series of African ideas about the creation of 
the Earth and the differences between the sexes, Bosman interrupts himself, writing, “’tis 
time to stop my Hand; for if I should particularize all their Notions concerning the 
Creation, the Moon and Stars, instead of being short, should grow insupportably tedious” 
(147). On the one hand, this could be read as a complete dismissal of the complexity and 
persuasiveness of African explanatory paradigms, but on the other hand, it illustrates the 
fact that Bosman pursued such knowledge in detail and with interest (the point he 
interrupts himself on—how some Africans of “the Gold Coast would perswade us that 
the first Men came out of Holes and Pits” [147]—is a passingly accurate if oversimplified 
account of one still popular Ashanti creation myth). Similarly, a few pages later in the 
midst of a lengthy description of oath-taking practices, he justifies the amount of detail he 
has gone into by arguing that, “it is a part of [the African’s] Religious Worship,” so he 
then has “some excuse for pursuing that Subject yet a little farther” (150).12 None of this 
is to suggest that Bosman was aware of how much he might have been internalizing 
about the societies he lived in proximity to for almost fifteen years. But his detailed 
attention to African representational practices, despite his arrogant judgment and 
Westernized analyses, provides a plausible reason to examine his text as a hybrid one—
shaped by European and African forces alike. In the following section, I examine how 





of how Bosman describes his encounters with various African leaders, particularly in 
situations where their authority is greater than his own. 
 
Performances of African Power in Bosman’s New Voyage to Guinea 
Eighteenth-century travelers to Africa often used the same language to talk about 
African peoples that they used to talk about African animals. Bosman, for example, 
believes the stories of the crocodile’s “voracious fierceness” and is irritated by the fact 
that “All the Rivers in this Country are pestered with vast Shoals of them,” preventing 
Europeans—as effectively as proprietary African leaders did—from spreading into the 
interior because they are not to be “trust[ed] in the Water” (246-47). Overwhelmingly, 
Bosman’s descriptions of African peoples similarly focus on what he considers to be their 
treachery, untrustworthiness, and duplicity. In one of his descriptions, he claims that in 
general the natives of the Gold Coast are “Crafty, Villanous and Fradulent, and very 
seldom to be trusted” (117). The people at lower Ante are “Martial and Praedetory” (14); 
at Infuma they are “Intractable, Fraudulent, and Villanous” (14). However, such labels 
are also accompanied by frustration over the way that the Africans prevent Europeans 
from claiming control over the region and its resources. Bosman describes the potentates 
of the Guinea states as not only treacherous and duplicitous but also as “very Powerful 
and Rich” (25). It is foolish, he warns, to assume that Europeans have any real control 
over African gold mines the way that the Spaniards controlled the gold of the New World; 
rather, “The Negroes esteem [the mines] Sacred, and consequently take all possible care 
to keep us from them” (90). This dichotomy of signifiers not only sets the tone for how 





Smith and Moore borrowed heavily from Bosman for their own accounts), it correlates to 
other African expressions of military and political authority in Bosman’s text. 
For instance, Bosman gives a lengthy account of what he calls the “Commanian-
War” (29), a series of conflicts between the Akan states around Axim and the Dutch and 
British factors that had trade agreements with their leaders. The Europeans were regularly 
on the losing end of these conflicts because the “King of Commany” was “Villainous” 
(30), using “Pretence[s]” in all his dealings with the Europeans (29, 30). In one instance, 
the Dutch, thinking they had won the skirmish, “fell greedily to plunder,” when the King  
unexpectedly marched toward us with fresh Forces, who had their Musquets 
turned the wrong way in order to deceive us; which took so good effect, that we 
taking them for our Friends, continued our greedy course of Plunder, till the King 
came upon us, and his Men turning their Musquets fired so briskly at us, that they 
diverted us from the Prey, and obliged every Body to save his Life as well as he 
could. (33) 
At the same time Bosman describes the King of Commany as “excell[ing]… in Valour 
and Conduct”—and seems to be at least passingly criticizing the Dutch for their 
looting—he clearly disapproves of the king’s trickery. Yet, there is no questioning its 
effectiveness. As Bosman indicates, the Commanians enjoyed a “second complete victory” 
as a result of this tactic (33), and he argues that the Dutch leader’s fatal error was the “too 
great Opinion he had conceived of himself and his followers, and his too contemptible 
thoughts of his Enemies” (32). In other words, treachery and trickery—although frowned 





military and political power, and Bosman suggests here that to mistake it for anything 
else is foolishly naïve.   
I argue that the language Bosman uses to describe African leaders comes partly 
from a xenophobic tendency to categorize everything unfamiliar as suspicious but is also 
the result of Bosman’s encounters with and interpretations of African representational 
practices. In another similar instance, Bosman recounts trying to take possession of a 
gold mine near Axim where he was factor. “We lost our Footing there in a very Tragical 
manner,” he explains,  
For the Commander in Chief of the Negroes, being closely Besieged by our Men, 
(as Fame Reports) shot gold instead of Bullets, hinting by signs that he was ready 
to Treat, and afterwards Trade with the Besiegers, but in the midst of their 
Negotiation he blew up himself and all his Enemies at once, as Unfortunately as 
Bravely, putting an end to our Siege and his Life, and like Sampson revenging his 
death upon his enemies. (12) 
The only eyewitness left alive was one of the Dutch East India company’s slaves, “and 
since we could get no better account, we were obliged to believe this,” Bosman writes 
(12). Perhaps for the African reporting the story, the commander shooting gold bullets—
whether a factual detail or a narrative embellishment—was symbolic of the bravery and 
efficacy in battle that Bosman himself admits to, but for Bosman the gold is a complex 
symbol of the African commander’s duplicity. Initially appearing as one thing—a signal 
to start a treaty—the gold quickly becomes emblematic of something else, an ambush. It 





whose political and martial maneuverings are only partially intelligible to the European 
factors.  
 The fact that gold becomes the simultaneous stand-in for the African 
commander’s power and his untrustworthiness in this anecdote is significant for thinking 
about the role African art, artifacts, and ritual practices might have played in how 
Bosman interpreted such behavior. Throughout the account, gold is tied both to the 
illegibility of Africans’ political and trade relationships with Europeans and to how they 
represent their gods. In a telling passage, he gives an account of some natives who 
devised “a sort of Artificial Gold, composed of several Ingredients; among which some 
of them are very oddly shaped. These Fetiche’s they cast…into what form they please” 
(74). They not only use this fool’s gold to make statues and jewelry, they then trade it to 
Europeans, keeping all the pure gold for themselves. A few letters later, he goes into 
greater detail regarding the word “Fetiche” in a religious context. But first he writes, 
“Before I proceed to inform you how they represent their Gods, I shall only hint that all 
things made in Honour of their False Gods, never so mean, are called, Fetiche: and hence 
also the Artificial Gold mentioned in my sixth Letter derives its Name” (155). Thus, the 
natives’ duplicitous and treacherous behavior is not traced to some fundamental aspect of 
their character—as quoted in the last chapter, Bosman did not ascribe to the idea that 
Africans were essentially different from Europeans (489)—but to their religious beliefs, 
and particularly to how such beliefs were manifest through representation.  
For Bosman such representations and the beliefs they engender constituted 
idolatry. The natives “worship both Gods and Devils in Human and Brutal Images, some 





take every thing which seems extraordinary in Nature for a God, and make Offerings to 
him; and each is his own Priest, in order to Worship his Gods in whatever manner pleases 
him best” (454). They imagine these idols, Bosman writes, as “mediators betwixt God 
and Men.” This philosophical concept behind West African representational practices—
that an object or performance can mediate more than just an idea—directly correlates for 
the Protestant Bosman with a violation of the Second Commandment (and he, like many 
Protestant writers, compares African “fetish” worship to Catholicism). Although Africans 
would not have understood the art objects described above in the same category as 
objects of power used for prayer and meditation, Bosman conflates the two with his 
comment about how the images on the ivory trumpets were done “Litterally in Obedience 
to the Second Commandment” (139). The point here is presumably that Exodus 20:4-6 
declares, “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness that in 
heaven above, or that in the earth beneath, or that in the water under the earth” (KJV; 
emphasis added); thus, a graven image that doesn’t specifically look like any of these 
things, or conflates one or more of these things, would technically obey the 
commandment. The wider implication, of course, is that such African objects are graven 
images by Bosman’s standard, becoming not only illustrations of the Africans’ 
heathenness but an explanation for their duplicity. 
Furthermore, it is not just idolatry as an abstract category that inflected Bosman’s 
particular descriptions. Specific African iconography arguably plays a role in how 
Bosman represents both African conceptual schemes and people as well. At one moment, 
trying to make sense of the practice of snake worship in Fida (Whydah, populated in the 





certain signifiers are fought over in African and Western representational practices. When 
he writes that snakes “possess the chief Rank among their Gods,” he then goes on to 
reflect on the “contrary Opinions of the Sons of Adam…For as we take the Serpent for 
the Fatal Destroyer of Human-Race; so these of Fida on the contrary esteem him their 
Supreme Bliss and greatest Good” (368). The snake’s very characteristics that make it 
deplorable in Christian symbolism—its forked tongue, the fact that it slithers on the 
ground, its trickery—are not necessarily negative or evil according to the doctrine of 
these snake cults. Its twisting and writhing, the fact that one cannot immediately tell its 
head from its tale, as well as its ability to shed its skin, mean that it is often used in 
African art as a symbol of renewal and eternity (Roberts 62). Indeed, John Mbiti notes 
that in general “creeping animals feature in [African] religious concepts more than do 
other wild animals” (66), significant for the way they become emblematic of a 
metaphysics where the vital forces of the universe continually cross material thresholds. 
The way these animals fool human perception and disrupt the boundaries between the 
self and world is their very symbolic power in African representational systems. These 
animals were not only inscribed on objects of power in Bosman’s day—like the 
crocodiles and lizards on Akan trumpets or the Yoruba armbands, emblemizing the 
potential for the representations of such creatures to literally bring their qualities into the 
human world—they were often the protagonists of what would come to be known as 
trickster stories, putting the trickery of the two warriors discussed above into a different 
cultural light.  
Among the Akan, the best known of these figures is Ananse the spider, whom 





believe that Man was made by Anansie, that is a great Spider: the rest attribute the 
Creation of Man to God” (146); at another he describes finding a “hideous great Spider 
against the wall” with legs “as large as a Man’s Finger, ten in number, being hairy and 
the thickness of a little finger” (322). “The Negroes call this Spider Ananse,” Bosman 
says again, “and believe that the first Men were made by that Creature: And 
notwithstanding some of them by conversation with the Europeans are better informed, 
there are yet a great number, that remain of that Opinion” (322). Because Nyame has no 
direct contact with the quotidian realm, in the oldest Ananse myths, Ananse spun the 
world on Nyame’s behalf, the first creature to bridge the divine with the earthly. As a 
“spinner of doubleness,” Ananse “emobdi[es] the paradox of the threshold” (Roberts 50), 
serving as a both an intermediary between Nyame and men and as the keeper of stories, 
the embodiment of wisdom in language. Furthermore his ability “to cross those 
boundaries separating the animal and the human, the living and the supernatural, the 
highly structured society of the Ashanti and the chaotic but creative realm of imagination 
and wishful thinking” is not simply metaphorical (Poliner 14). The fact that Ananse is 
spider, storyteller, and creator rolled into one provides a reminder that in the Akan 
conceptual scheme the natural world, representation, and the divine are not separate. 
Certain representational practices including art and ritual can bring divine energy into the 
quotidian realm, the material substances of the natural world giving such energy its shape. 
Thus, what manifests in some stories as Ananse’s trickery is also his divine power, and 
similarly, the King of Commany’s and the commander’s so-called pretenses are also 





Bosman’s narrative has several more instances where devilish or creeping animals 
become a metaphor for African soldiers at war. When they train or fight they are able to 
“put their Body into very strange Postures, and so artificially cover themselves with their 
Shield, that ’tis impossible to come at them” (186).  Indeed, earlier Bosman complains,  
In fight the Negroes don’t stand upright against one another, but run stooping and 
listening that the Bullets may fly over their Heads. Others creep towards the 
enemy, and being come close, let fly at them; after which they run away as fast as 
they can…. In short their ridiculous Gestures, stooping, creeping and crying, 
make their Fight look more like Monkeys playing together than a Battle. (182)  
Such postures may appear absurd and bestial to Bosman, but it is important to keep in 
mind that such descriptions come on the heels of Bosman’s several accounts of Africans 
besting Europeans. Like the deception of the African commanders, such stooping, 
creeping, and crying ensure their military successes.   
In addition, Bosman emphasizes the fact that they were often adorned with animal 
skins or carrying weapons or shields emblazoned with animal imagery. He writes about 
how Akan soldier’s swords are adorned with “Horse Hair” on the handle, kept in a leather 
sheath “to which, by way of Ornament, a Tygers Head, or a large red Shell is hung” (185). 
Furthermore, “They have a Cap on their Heads made of a Crocodile’s Skin, adorned on 
each side with a red Shell, and behind with a bunch of Horse Hair, and a heavy Iron 
Chain, or something else instead of it, girt round their heads.” Tigers are as treacherous 
an animal in Bosman’s estimation as the crocodile: “They spare neither Man nor Beast” 
(245), and although factors have tried to tame them, Bosman warns that “they are not to 





likely served a dual purpose: it made them appear physically intimidating, but as with the 
sound barrage or the practice of West African masquerade, an aesthetic performance is 
always assumed to engender a tangible effect on the material world. Seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century African soldiers depended on rituals to channel energy or the spirits in 
the correct way to ensure victory. As Richard Reid argues, “diviners were critical in 
providing sanction and even tactical guidance, while particular gods—specializing in 
violence—were routinely consulted in advance of the campaign. Ultimately only spirits 
could keep men safe, and only through spiritual observance could post-war healing take 
place” (10). An object like a horse’s tail or an animal head may have been infused with 
spiritual power by a priest to ensure success or protection on the battlefield, and animal 
hides like the crocodile skin cap were simultaneously practical—according to Bosman 
bullets cannot pierce crocodile hide (246)—and emblematic. But for Bosman, the effect 
of this costuming, along with the fact that they paint their bodies, is that “our Heroes look 
liker Devils than Men” (185), and he finds something unsavory about this just as he is 
uncomfortable with the fact that their gods seem to him to be half-devils as well (159).  
For Europeans, as outlined in previous chapter, animals that embodied such 
characteristics provoked anxiety, a lack of control, and the failure of categorical systems 
to demystify the natural world. Thus, the fact that Bosman uses the same kinds of 
descriptions to characterize African leaders and warriors, particularly in situations where 
he and the European factions he represents are effectively powerless, seems coherent. At 
the same time, examining African methods of representation gives us an additional way 
to think about the genesis of such strong conceptual and representational associations 





performances of cultural and military power provoked these kinds of interpretive 
practices through how they evaded predictability and destabilized the categorical 
methodologies that European travelers used to render geographical space legible. Even 
though Bosman refuses to recognize the logic underpinning such a conceptual scheme—
imagining such practices as a violation of the Christian prohibition on idol worship and 
graven images—the way that Africans intentionally blurred the lines between human and 
animal worlds in their art, rituals, proverbs, and folktales played a role in his perception 
of them and their culture and the way he described them for readers back in Europe. This 
combination of factors provides another possible explanation for why there were deep 
conceptual links between African animals and African peoples before arguments for 
biological difference were part of the European cultural imaginary: framed through a 
European metaphysics, certain African cultural practices must have appeared simply as 
men imitating and worshiping beasts rather than part of a complex worldview.  
The end result of such a misunderstanding is arguably no different from biological 
arguments for racial difference—animal parallels still became a way that Europeans 
characterized Africans as uncivilized and therefore not entitled to autonomy over 
themselves or their land—but understanding such representations as something more than 
simply a discursive precursor to late eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century biological 
racism enables us to see how a nuanced influences than European fear of the Other 
produced Europe’s perception of Africa. Perhaps more importantly, we are reminded that 
in such contexts, African explanatory paradigms enabled expressions of military and 
political power that kept Europeans from seizing total control over territory and trade 





conceptual schemes discussed above as ignorant superstition, this was not true of all 
travel narratives in the early eighteenth century. John Atkins’s account of the same region 
is more self-conscious about identifying the overlaps between African and European 
worldviews, and his narrative argues for the philosophical value of taking such a 
metaphysics seriously.   
 
West African Metaphysics and John Atkins’s Voyage to Africa, Brasil, and the West 
Indies  
John Atkins was a surgeon who from 1721-23 traveled with two naval ships sent 
to eradicate a band of pirates from the west coast of Africa. His narrative, A Voyage to 
Africa, Brasil, and the West Indies, was published in 1735 and is particularly noted for its 
overt arguments for abolition. Specifically written at least in part as a refutation of 
William Snelgrave’s paternalistic argument for slavery in his New Account of Guinea and 
the Slave Trade (1734),13 Atkins denies the claims circulated by Snelgrave and others that 
the Africans of Guinea were better off as slaves, arguing instead that “to remove 
Negroes…from their Homes and Friends, where they are at ease, to a strange Country, 
People, and Language, must be highly offending against the Laws of Justice and 
Humanity” (178).14 Furthermore, perhaps as part of his abolitionist tactic, he writes about 
African beliefs and cultural practices as fundamentally logical, if misguided. This is not 
to suggest that his representations of African culture are anthropologically correct or 
ahead of their time—as Roxann Wheeler argues, his narrative exists on a continuum with 
writers like Snelgrave and Francis Moore rather than in binary opposition to them 





understand African worldviews and to find common ground between African and 
European cultural practices. Such contemplation, particularly of African religious objects, 
became an opportunity for Atkins to examine his own beliefs about matter and the 
relationship between matter and the divine.  
 Bosman’s association of African objects of power with the violation of the second 
commandment is a typical example of how African culture was deemed practically 
synonymous with idol worship in the European imagination. Jan van Kessel the Elder, for 
instance, titled the African quadrant of Die vier Erdteile komplett “Le Temple des Idoles,” 
and the central panel features various African figures sitting among statues with shells, 
coral, and other detritus scattered across the floor, while preserved animals hang from the 
walls. One of Theodor and Johann de Bry’s engravings for F. Pigafetta’s Relazione del 
Reame di Congo (1598; Fig. X) shows the burning of idols in the middle of an African 
city, although in the back corner, a not-yet-persuaded man kneels before a winged 
carving on an alter, emulating the carving by stretching his own arms out, palms to the 
sky, indicating that although conversion was temporarily successful, even instituted on 
the governmental level, Africa’s natural inclination was to revert to heathenism.15 Indeed, 
the failure of the Catholic conversion to eradicate the practice of idol worship in the 
Congo is further illustrated in a drawing from a 1750s manual for Capuchin missionaries 
written and illustrated by Bernardino Ignazio di Vezza d’Asti in the same region of the 
Congo, which shows a missionary burning an idol house, animal statues and animal parts 
strewn on the grass in front of it, as the offending natives flee the scene (Fig. X).16 
Purchas explains that in Guinea, the inhabitants “worship Images of Wood, to whome 





Angola, “every man adored [that animal] which best liked him,” including crocodiles, 
goats, tigers, owls, bats, “birds of darkness,” snakes, and adders (584). “The skinnes of 
them, being dead, being stuffed with straw,” the idols are kept on alters and again 
Purchas states that they are offered food and drink (584). 
 Thus, the expression of African belief systems seems to be fundamentally scorned 
as ridiculous superstition by the majority of European representations. Indeed, 
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that, “Enlightenment has always regarded 
anthropomorphism, the projection of subjective properties onto nature, as the basis of 
myth. The supernatural, sprits and demons, are taken to be reflections of human beings 
who allow themselves to be frightened by natural phenomena” (4). However, although 
we often assume that Enlightenment thinkers rejected these kinds of notions outright, as 
Srinivas Aravamudan argues, “Enlightenment interrogation…was a complex questioning, 
with multiple objectives and orientations” during which “the self was under critique as 
much as any other” (3). We can see evidence of such cross-cultural comparisons in John 
Atkins, who made an earnest attempt to understand the origins of African religion and 
identify its similarities to European culture. On one level, by attempting to give a 
reasonable explanation for African beliefs and comparing them to European practices like 
carrying charms, Atkins fundamentally misunderstands the worldview that he is trying to 
make sense of. He commits the same error that many contemporary scholars do of 
describing African belief systems through European metaphysical premises. However, 
again, this does not mean that the engagement with such discourses had no impact on the 





Like Bosman, who regardless of his eventual dismissal of African conceptual 
schemes clearly put a great deal of time into gathering information about them, Atkins 
takes a particular interest in the practice of “fetish” worship on his own trip to the Gold 
Coast. Atkins not only gathered a wide range of accounts of the practice from his African 
hosts; he asked them detailed questions, such as the ones he puts to “Captain Tom,” 
whom he refers to as “a great Acquaintance” who would “always satisfy [his] Curiosity 
about the Fetish” (100). Atkins ultimately considers African spiritual practices “a vain 
Religion” full of “strong superstition” (38). Yet, he is reluctant to construct such beliefs 
in opposition to European notions, likening their ritual objects more than once to “what 
we in Europe call Charms” (38, 56). Again like Bosman, Atkins discusses the phenomena 
of snake worship at Whydah, but rather than drawing a strict separation between 
European and African associations with snakes, Atkins uses it as an opportunity to 
establish common ground between the two worldviews. Atkins offers as a plausible 
explanation that “this Snake-Worship might be taken up as of old the Aegyptians did 
their Ox and Cow, their Crocodile and Cat, etc. They had some moral reason [for this], 
tho’ overwhelmed in Fable and ridiculous superstition” (117). That reason, Atkins goes 
on to explain, is that domesticated animals like oxen and cattle enabled the tillage of the 
land while crocodiles and cats “preyed upon those Reptiles that devoured the Fruits of 
their Husbandry, like as these very Snakes are said to kill the black and poisonous sort, 
and to destroy various Species of Vermin.” The animals enable humans not only to 
survive but to flourish, making them worthy of respect if not worship. Lest the European 
reader find this too absurd, he reminds him or her that, “We bear (far from Egypt) a 





often on no other Foundation than Heathen Fable” (117). Atkins makes it clear that the 
natives of Guinea have taken their reverence for these animals too far, to the point of 
“silly Circumstances,” but he reminds readers that Europeans rely on the same kinds of 
ritualized narratives to define their own relationships with animals. “If we laugh at 
Sambo for inflicting Fine or Death on whoever hurts or kills the Snake,” Atkins asks, 
“May not he in his turn justly laugh to hear that in some Countries it is Death to steal a 
Sheep, a Horse, etc”?  
Ultimately, Atkins does not see this kind of religious expression as evidence of 
the Africans’ heathen stupidity but of their fundamental rationality. Clearly a proponent 
of the stadial theory of human development, the seeds of which started in the seventeenth 
century and became full fledged in the mid-to-late eighteenth through supporters like 
Adam Smith (Wolloch 93), Atkins invites the reader to “imagine then a part of our 
Species started up in the World, without knowing how or why, (the Negroes Case) and 
examine strictly in our own Thoughts, what religious Notions could be framed by them?” 
(81). Atkins uses the Africans as a kind of test case for how man in a state of nature reads 
what he later calls the “visible Universe.” Set down on the earth “without Guide, Letters, 
or any means of Cultivation to their better part but what immediately strike their Senses 
from beholding this Universe, and the Beings contained in it” (82), it was natural for the 
Africans to deduce that good and ill was caused by the “Materials used about them” (81) 
rather than by a “Deity devoid of Matter” (82) which required more sophisticated skills of 
induction to conceptualize, according to Atkins.  
The reason such beliefs about the power of matter to influence the energy of the 





it is continually affirmed through empirical experience: “The Hill, the Wood or the Lake 
may afford sustenance from time to time; perhaps in Extremity, either may have 
contributed to their Preservation or Defence from wild Beasts” (83). Additionally, 
Africans may have been protected from danger or been successful in a journey or hunt 
while carrying specific objects with them, and it thus makes sense that they would 
attribute such protection to the material influence of the object rather than to the 
providence of an immaterial god.    
Atkins of course commits the fallacy of animism here that still plagues how 
Westerners understand West African metaphysics—assuming the object itself is 
considered a god rather than a thing that enters into a complex spatial relationship with 
divine power. Yet, what he next proposes captures a more nuanced understanding of the 
worldview that he is trying to make sense of. After arguing for how such a worldview 
might have come about, he writes,  
Nor does this appear the unaccountable and ridiculous Folly some would have it. 
All material Beings are equally incomprehensible as to their Seed and real 
Essence; the Existence of a Straw as mysterious as the Existence of the Sun: 
Quodcunque vides, Deus est. No man can comprehend how matter came first into 
being, nor, which is nigher him, how the Atoms that compose a Stick, Stone, or 
Metal, are supported and hang together in that Bulk; or what diversifies them, that 
one should be fusible, another malleable, some both: I say, to consider these, and 
some other Attributes of Matter in the Essence, it will be impossible to explicate, 





The division Atkins initially makes between a material world and an immaterial God 
becomes troubled here as he suggests that such a separation between “material beings” 
and their “essence” may be an illusion of human perception rather than a metaphysical 
fact. Furthermore, his reminder to his reader that God infuses all things is a reminder to 
us that the nature of matter and its relationship to the divine in the early eighteenth 
century was still a hotly debated issue. The African notion that God was in everything 
and that material objects were connected to the divine on an essential, ontological level 
was not so far away from European theological doctrine, and the arguments circulated by 
some mechanical philosophers at the time, like Newton, that matter was fundamentally 
inert was not accepted as a universal truth. Many thinkers took issue with the fact that in 
such a worldview “the building blocks of the universe seemed to enjoy an existence 
independent of God” (Iliffe 275). They proposed instead arguments that “matter 
essentially contained within it some ‘force’ or ‘active principle’ that gave rise to 
impenetrability and other qualities” or that “the mere organization of matter gave rise to 
emergent properties such as consciousness and that there was thus no need to posit a 
dualism of spirit and matter.” Locke’s suggestion, for example, that matter might even be 
able to think generated debate throughout the eighteenth century about the relationship 
between the divine, the material, and human consciousness and understanding (Packham 
11). For the Protestant Atkins, the idolatrous African notion that one could commune 
with the divine through a material representation is more of a problem than the idea that 
the material and the divine could share the same metaphysical space, which in this 
passage he suggests is not only a reasonable assumption to make but also a 





Atkins qualifies this line of reasoning by suggesting that the Africans’ 
relationships with objects of power is the result of their “infant reason” that “cannot reach 
above a material God” (85). He argues that “the Wiser Idolaters (as called) set up the Sun 
to worship” (85), indicating that the sun’s more abstract nature indexes a potential for 
more abstract reasoning in some of the population. However, his observation in the above 
paragraph that something as common as a straw is as mysterious as the sun, and as 
equally connected to the divine, prohibits this attempt to subordinate the philosophical 
significance of African metaphysics from being fully successful. Atkins’s quotation of 
Lucan (“Quodcunque vides, Deus est” [all that you see is God]) reinforces the idea that 
all types of matter may be infused with the same vital energy or force. And he was not 
the first travel writer to use the classical notion that the divine existed in all things as a 
way to make sense of African beliefs. According to Purchas, African idol worship and 
belief in animal possession came from a belief in the metamorphosis of the gods, the 
inherited cultural symbolism of particular animals, their commonness, their use in 
divination practices, and African knowledge of “the Divine Nature diffused into all 
creatures” (472). Purchas adds his own explanation to this list as well—“that 
transanimation which Pythagoras (it seemeth) were honoured” (472)—in other words, a 
belief in the transmigration of the soul, a concept to which many Europeans were open. 
While Purchas rejects the logic of the Africans’ “Beasts and bestiall superstitions” 
wholesale (475), Atkins approaches the issue with more introspection, true to 
Aravamudan’s supposition that the Enlightenment was a time when confrontations with 





In fact, Atkins opens his narrative with what he refers to in his introduction as a 
“Pythagorean Soliloquy” (xx), where the high mortality rate of sea travel has made him 
speculate about what happens to the body and soul after death. He debates whether 
“when we have shut up this Life we shall remain resolved into our Elements; revive again 
in some Plant or Animal; or thirdly, be reinstated soul and body into Glory” (19), framing 
his analysis of African religion within a larger debate about the relationships among 
matter, divinity, and mortality. One might expect the clearly Christian Atkins to defend 
the third possibility. Indeed, he is “on the whole fond of Revelation” and would prefer to 
believe that after death God “may raise us into immortal Spirits” and “translate us to 
Bliss” (21), “what was Elementary, returned to its proper station, and what was Divine in 
us, to what is Divine in the Universe” (20). But he is skeptical that such dualism is an 
accurate metaphysical model, fearing instead that such philosophies stem from the human 
desire for immortality rather than from any reasonable understanding of the relationship 
between soul and matter.  
Rather, when he considers that there seems to be a tight relationship between the 
soul and the body (perhaps even no separation), as well as the possibility of “hebridous 
Productions, especially that of man with Beast,” he is “tempted to think this the most 
plausible of all Philosophical Opinions, in relation to our future Existence, that we are not 
Creatures of that consequence we imagine; our Natures neither deserving, nor should 
they expect in reason any other Immortality than what other Creatures enjoy in their Seed 
and Transmigration” (20). Indeed, in his introduction he sketches out a worldview in 
which the air condenses into rain, which falls to earth to grow plants, which are eaten by 





to Dust and Air” (xxi-xxii). Given the fact that in European representations Africa was 
the locus of such “hebridous Productions,” both in terms of the classical proverb and in 
terms of Bosman’s accounts of African idol worship, it makes sense that Atkins would 
turn to African metaphysics for insight into whether the self is just a product of a 
European imagination and whether the essential, animating properties of the universe—
that which comprises the soul and perhaps also all life—is transferable among all the 
matter of the universe.  
This issue first arises in a specifically African context in the narrative during 
Atkins’s conversations with John Conny, an Ashanti leader who took a fort from the 
Danish, successfully outmaneuvered the Dutch who tried to claim a right to the fort, and 
set up shop trading with the Europeans on his own (77). According to legend, he then 
paved the way to the entrance of the fort with his Dutch enemy’s skulls. Although Conny 
is in some ways a Europeanized figure in Atkins’s account, and there is a suggestion that 
his civility comes from the fact that he was a servant to Europeans for many years (78), 
he is unquestionably African in his worldviews. For example, when Conny gives the 
English leave to fish in his river and they catch no fish, he tells them that their “ill luck” 
was due to their “neglect of giving the water a Dashee [a gift], for it was a Grandee-
man’s Fetish, he said, and deserved more notice,” the word “fetish” in Atkins’s account 
meaning either something one wears or something one reveres more generally as a deity 
(79). At one point, Atkins gathers up the courage to ask him, “what was become of the 
Dutchmen’s Skulls that lately paved the entrance of his House” (80), and he learns that 
Conny had them buried with all the honors due to respected soldiers, including putting 





with the exception of their jawbones, which he strung from a tree in the courtyard (80). 
Jawbones often adorned Ashanti ntahera, and according to Kaminski, “the jawbone of an 
enemy transfers the enemy’s spirit into the power abiding in the tusk” (50). Presumably 
the same logic was behind Conny hanging the jawbones from a tree and, in a broad sense, 
the same logic underpins why Conny would have buried the bodies with amenities. Both 
practices suggest that matter, including the material of the human body, is not inert but 
has an intangible vitality that continues on even after death. Conny’s burying the Dutch 
soldiers with the things that they loved and stringing their jawbones from the tree also 
suggests a kind of compromise to Atkins’s question of whether we resolve into our 
elements after death or whether some enduring piece of the soul remains. 
 In the Ashanti conceptual scheme, the answer is both. As Gyekye articulates, 
traditional Akan thought does endorse a kind of dualism in which the “the soul is 
understood as the immaterial part of a person that survives after death” (12), but that 
surviving part continues to infuse the material world. Practices like burying bodies with 
objects and leaving offerings on graves (the food and drink that Purchas was so interested 
in) indicates the extent that the particles of the body still play a role in mediating this 
infusion. Keeping in mind Wiredu’s point that in Akan metaphysics being is necessarily 
spatial, it becomes clear how it is that ancestor sprits still have a very immediate presence 
in the world, and can interface with multiple people, objects, or animals at once. Such 
conceptual schema provides a way to imagine the continued existence of a soul without 
falling into the kind of Cartesian dualism that seems so implausible to Atkins—the 
question of whether the soul is material or immaterial is rendered irrelevant; more 





The relationship between vital energy and matter evoked by African burial 
practices and philosophies of death are the very issue that Atkins is wondering about in 
the beginning of his narrative, and it is Conny’s “dark Notions of a future state” that 
spark Atkins to go into his lengthy explanation of African religion and his justification 
for its fundamental rationality (80). He ultimately concludes that given the Africans’ 
understanding of the essential relationship between the material and the divine, and the 
fact that they would have “a natural affection or respect” for their dead, “the Custom was 
on neither account preposterous of John Conny, to bury Pipes, Tobacco, Brandy, or what 
else the deceased loved or wanted. It answers to the Pomp and Decency of our own 
Funerals, only more significant” (86). Rather than drawing clear boundaries between 
African and European beliefs, Atkins seeks to find shared truths between the two, from 
which he ultimately concludes, “The Foundation of all Men’s Religions is taken from this 
visible Universe,” and “The greater Lights that have from time to time appeared in the 
World, are only Refinements and Superstructures upon this Prop” (86). The African 
worldview is thus not set up in opposition to the European worldview, but rather they are 
compared as two philosophies that can be brought in dialog with each other, both 
attempting to make sense of the same object of study. The implication is that there is 
something about African worldviews that have fundamentally read this visible universe 
correctly even if they supposedly lack the experience to refine their beliefs. And given his 
accounts throughout the narrative of European follies, such refinement is not necessarily 
an improvement.  
Part of Atkins’s intense interest in finding common ground between African and 





from a hope that he can look to what he considers the African’s less sullied, more natural 
relationship with this “visible Universe” in order to find clues to the fundamental nature 
of creation and to the nature of death. If the African worldview is more naïve in Atkins’s 
conception, he also suggests that it has a kind of purity to it, not yet overly complicated 
by “Refinements” and “Superstructures.” For example, he suggests that the Africans 
lived in peaceful ignorance of evil before the European slave trade introduced the 
concepts of cruelty and greed into their societies (86)—a rhetorical move that would be 
repeated by abolitionists throughout the eighteenth century.17 The notion that they might 
have some brutishly intuitive understanding of the nature of creation would serve as a 
kind of naturalist argument for Atkins’s claims against understanding matter as 
fundamentally inert and for a worldview in which God is visible in all things. Such a 
schema also allows a conception of death that transcends the question of how an 
immaterial soul could be connected to a material body and suggests that even if we do 
resolve into our elements like any other creature, some vestige of the soul still remains as 
part of the vital energy of the universe.  
In this way, traditional African religion provides evidence for Atkins’s brand of 
non-dualistic Christianity in which even if revelation becomes a real possibility, it is one 
in which “our identity…will not consist in the same individual Particles being united, that 
makes our Bodies here” (xxii). Although there is much about African thought that Atkins 
misunderstands, including his implication that the Africans have a more primitive and 
thus more natural understanding of this visible universe, his conclusions are dependent on 
the fundamental plausibility of the African worldview not just on an explanatory but on a 





measure by which to judge the value of an African worldview, Atkins here suggests that 
at its heart African belief systems can reveal something fundamental about man’s 
relationship to the divine.  
So, although in some ways Atkins’s attempts to understand traditional West 
African metaphysics miss the point, we can see how such worldviews and their 
expression nevertheless become important to his narrative, taken as an opportunity to ask 
fundamental questions about the relationship between the material and the divine and to 
interrogate the logic behind European beliefs and cultural practices at the same time. In a 
sense, Atkins considers head-on the philosophical anxiety provoked by both 
confrontations with African animals outlined in the previous chapter and with African 
belief systems outlined above, particularly the way such encounters challenge European 
notions of the sovereignty of the self. His is a text shaped by the exchange of ideas 
among cultures rarely recognized in pre-colonial travel writing but almost always 
coexisting to some extent with such narratives’ other agendas. 
 
Conclusion 
The tendency to read travel writing as the product of deeply entrenched ideologies 
that tell us more about the world of the traveler than the world traveled through is an 
understandable and to some extent a justifiable one. Texts like Bosman’s and Atkin’s can 
tell us much about the hopes, desires, anxieties, and beliefs of early eighteenth-century 
European subjects. Yet such texts did not represent Africa in a single register, nor are 
they reducible to the brainchildren of Cartesian subjects who have been ideologically 





xenophobic lens. Atkins, for one, was clearly suspicious of the notion of the Cartesian 
subject altogether, and this skepticism motivated him to turn toward African worldviews 
for other ways of imagining how God, matter, and the soul could all be connected. 
Bosman, however unwittingly, became a conduit for a range of African ideas such that 
historians still rely heavily on his narrative to map the history of African thought.  
Bringing his narrative in dialog with African art objects and artifacts shows how 
intertextuality can at times transcend cultural divisions, to the extent that African 
representational philosophies are a traceable part of Bosman’s own aesthetic. Such art 
objects and artifacts are important texts in their own right because they not only remind 
us that self-conscious articulations of eighteenth-century African worldviews still exist 
today, they enable us to see how the self-conscious articulation of African worldviews 
became a part of Bosman’s own representational practices. The end result of either 
Bosman’s or Atkins’s texts is not a mirror of Africa and its people—it is a morass of 
assumptions, knowledge, and representational tropes from a range of cultural and 
regional origins. But then, such was Enlightenment. And both texts are evidence for the 
fact that African thought had a unique role to play in shaping the fundamental tenants of 









1 Art historian Peter Mark argues that African ivories should be understood as having 
their own semiotics, what he calls “an underlying unifying structure of meaning,” rather 
than simply “common theme[s]” that bring them together as a body of work (266).  
2 For an extended explanation of these categories, and the overlap between these belief 
systems and early modern Portuguese thought, see Brooks 23-27.  
3 The still most commonly seen terms to categorize this kind of worldview are “animism” 
or “animatism”; however, as P’Bitek Okot bluntly puts it, “There are no ‘animists’ in 
Africa” (27). Scholars of West African traditional conceptual schemes have objected to 
these terms because they misrepresent objects as having personal souls rather than the 
ability to be infused with a kind of vital energy (Parrinder 22-23), and because African 
belief systems are not reducible to the idea that objects have souls (Idowu 173). In this 
chapter, I have jettisoned the term “animism” for the broader notion of an African 
“worldview,” “metaphysics,” or “conceptual scheme.”   
4 Idowu’s study is perhaps the most conservative in his account of this—his swarming 
spirits are “distinct from material objects, although they reside in material objects or 
express themselves through material objects” (133). The objects themselves are “at best, 
technically a symbol” (125). Yet this way of defining the metaphysics of African thought 
may very well be the result of what Mudimbe refers to as the “silent dependence on a 
Western episteme” that reduces African beliefs to Western philosophical metrics (x). As 






theorizing traditional African religions in a way that was fundamentally copacetic with a 
Christian worldview.  
5 Wiredu argues that the Bantu and Yoruba metaphysics follow essentially the same logic 
even though each has their own unique interpretation of it.  
6 A similar ontological principle governs Yoruba notions of the self and world, which 
Segun Gbadegesin describes as comprised of various parts that bridge the visible and 
invisible. “How can a spirit occupy a space and still remain a spirit?” he asks: “It must be 
remarked that this is not an issue which engaged the attention of the traditional [Yoruba] 
thinker” (154). 
7 Some broad claims can also be made about the objects themselves. There is evidence, 
for example, that the Edo of Benin—one of two major producers of ivory carvings in the 
seventeenth century—not only obtained their ivory from their Yoruba neighbors but 
recruited Yoruba carvers as well (Ezra 21). Furthermore, their work has motifs too 
similar to the “Sape” carvings from what is now Sierra Leone (a broad Portuguese term 
encompassing the Bollum, the Temne, and, later, the Mende who invaded in the sixteenth 
century) to be entirely coincidental (Mark 238). Although art historians and 
archaeologists who study these ivory carvings mention the Akan less than other groups, 
as I discuss further below, Bosman gives evidence that carved ivory horns around Axim 
at the end of the seventeenth century were stylistically similar to those carved in Sierra 
Leone and Benin, perhaps as a result of the fact that, as Isichei reminds us, pre-colonial 
Guinea states flourished through vibrant trade with each other (243). Given the 






contact discussed in my first two chapters, it makes sense to assume that although each 
cultural group was distinct, the exchange of goods, ideas, and representational motifs was 
inevitable. Furthermore, many African ivory carvings from this time period in fact exist 
today because there was a market for them not only in Africa but also in Europe. Usually 
referred to as the “Afro-Portuguese” ivories since Portuguese travelers purchased and 
even commissioned such carvings from Sape and Benin artists, they are a kind of hybrid 
text in and of themselves, often including European and Christian iconography, although 
“they employ a visual vocabulary that developed in response to purely African beliefs 
and values” (Ezra 14). Ezio Bassani and William Fagg were the first art historians to 
document the presence of these ivories in Renaissance Europe extensively, and they 
analyze the objects largely in terms of the European art traditions that might have 
influenced their iconography. See Africa and the Renaissance: Art in Ivory. However, as 
Peter Mark argues, although these ivories featured “both Christian and local African 
imagery” (238), they are “far more African than they are Portuguese. West African artists 
created the sculptures within the context of their own cultures” (239). For additional work 
on the Portuguese history of these objects, see Rita Costa-Gomes, “In and Out of Africa: 
Iberian Courts and the Afro-Portuguese Olifants for the late 1400s.”   
8 Benin conquered the Owo kingdom in both the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries; so 
although the Edo and the Yoruba are separate ethnic groups, there is significant cultural 
overlap between the two, particularly in the time period considered here.  
9 I am working from the 1705 English edition of Bosman’s text, published two years after 






Bosman’s text, see Albert van Dantzig, “English Bosman and Dutch Bosman.” I have 
noted an instance where translation errors might slightly alter the tone if not the content 
of Bosman’s descriptions.   
10 This is one of the translations that concerns Dantzig. According to him, the last line in 
the original Dutch says nothing about stopping up one’s ears with cotton but rather 
translates as “… they produce an extraordinary sound, which is done to a certain Measure 
and Tone, and which they can vary in several ways, in accordance with their mood” 
(121).  
11 For a detailed account of how this specifically fits in with the wider universe of Akan 
metaphysics, see Kaminski 69-92.  
12 Not that Bosman needed an excuse to describe African religious practices in depth. As 
Pietz points out, Bosman’s detailed account of African fetish worship was the most cited 
and commented on part of his text in the eighteenth century (6). 
13 For more on Atkins’s abolitionism, particularly as a response to William Snelgrave’s 
1734 defense of the slave trade, see William A. Pettigrew, Freedom’s Debt 196-98.  
14 This instance, and several others, would seem to refute George Boulukos’s claim that 
Atkins “never rejects slavery itself” (60). Although Boulukos is right that Atkins’s 
narrative still fundamentally advocates for the rightness of Christianity—and that we 
should not mistake his humanitarianism for egalitarianism—I disagree that Atkins 
“acknowledges that ‘the worst of Christian slavery’ would be a benefit” (60). Atkins 
actually writes: “When the Nakedness, Poverty and Ignorance of these Species of Men 






them to the worst of Christian Slavery; but as we find them little mended in those 
respects at the West-Indies, their Patrons respecting them only as Beasts of Burthen; there 
is rather Inhumanity in removing them from their Countries and Families” (61-62; 
emphasis added). In the subsequent passages, Atkins advocates missionary work in 
Africa rather than Christianizing slavery, arguing that Africa’s naturally abundant 
landscape already provides the Africans everything they need while in slavery they get 
only “brown bread, without the Gospel” (62). In other places he is extremely critical of 
Christianity, including arguing that it is “ours” and not “their own Religion” that has 
generated evil in African societies (86).  
15 The Kingdom of Kongo became Catholic in 1491 at the behest of King Nzinga, and the 
kingdom maintained diplomatic relationships with both Portugal and Rome until the 
Kongo civil war in the late seventeenth century. See Fromont 136.  
16 For more on these illustrated missionary guides, see Fromont 134-154. As Fromont 
explains, these texts “presented knowledge about the natural, social, and religious 
environment of Central Africa visually in carefully constructed images using 
representation as a strategic tool to bridge the gap between the visible and the unseen, to 
shape viewers’ understanding of elusive forms of knowledge, and to translate ideas 
across cultural lines” (134). Not merely isolated religious tools, such manuscripts were 
present in the wider community that traveled around the Atlantic and  “contributed to the 
shaping of the intellectual and imaginary realm of the early modern Atlantic” (135).  
17 Ignatius Sancho, for example, deploys this argument in his Letters (1782). He writes to 






good friend, you should remember from whom they learnt those vices: —the first 
Christian visitors found them a simple, harmless people—but the cursed avidity for 
wealth urged these first visitors (and all the succeeding ones) to such acts of deception—
and even wanton cruelty—that the poor ignorant natives soon learnt to turn the knavish 
and diabolical arts which they too soon imbibed—upon their teachers” (149). He also 
proposes that “He who could penetrate the interior of Africa, might not improbably 
discover negro arts and polity, which could bear little analogy to the ignorance and 
grossness of slaves in the sugar-islands, expatriated in infancy, and brutalized under the 





CHAPTER 5: ABYSSINIAN MAIDS AND AFRICAN DISCOURSE IN SAMUEL 
JOHNSON’S RASSELAS AND JAMES BRUCE’S TRAVELS TO DISCOVER THE 
SOURCE OF THE NILE
African women are obscured figures and voices in eighteenth-century 
representations of Africa. African men such as Bucker Sano, John Conny, and Ayuba 
Suleiman Diallo are distinct though problematic characters in British travel writing, as 
my previous chapters have shown. But depictions of African women are often reduced to 
objectifying evaluations of their charms or to their status as one wife among many in 
polygamous households. This does not mean, though, that they are completely absent 
from or irrelevant to such texts. George Brooks observes that West African women were 
“invaluable companions as interpreters of language and cultures and … collaborators in 
commercial exchanges” between African societies and European traders (51).  
It does mean that their contributions to European knowledge about Africa are 
often filtered through hyper-sexualized and Orientalizing tropes.1 William Smith, for 
example, gives an account of the British factor Charles Wheeler’s relationship with his 
African mistress. It is a 20-page dialog so highly romanticized that it could have come 
straight out of Oroonoko. The woman is a concubine of an unnamed king. At one point, 
Wheeler rhapsodizes, “I could not forebear viewing my Fair with an amorous Eye, her 
Hair was done up in a Ringlet, set with precious Stones, from whence divers Locks of 





(252-53). She turns out to be not only beautiful but intelligent, well-spoken, and humble, 
admonishing him once that “Compliment, Lying, Flattery, Deceit, etc., are of no Service 
here” (259).2 The dialog functions to some extent, as Jonathan D. Sassi argues, as an 
Enlightenment exercise in European self interrogation (118), and it arrives at the proto-
abolitionist conclusions that “Christians have as many idle ridiculous Notions and 
Customs as the Natives of Guinea have, if not more” (Smith 267), and that “The 
discerning Natives account in their greatest Unhappiness, that they were ever visited by 
the Europeans,” who bring destruction with them wherever they go (266).3  The narrative 
distance that such romanticized tropes create might seem a paramount example of 
Mudimbe’s thesis that representations of the African other are really about the European 
self. However, although the African woman in the dialog is sexualized and romanticized, 
her half of the dialog is also a place where the importance of African women to the 
survival and education of European travelers materializes in Smith’s text.4  
Women enabled and translated exchanges between Europe and Africa, not just of 
goods and power, but of knowledge and ideas as well. Smith does not note the gender of 
the African healers that have proven so invaluable to European travelers that I discuss in 
Chapter 2, but as Brooks points out, “Europeans who were nursed by [their African] 
wives received sufficient medical treatment from skilled African practitioners” (17). 
Wheeler’s mistress tells him intimate details about African domestic practices, 
childrearing, and childbearing—all information that a white, male observer would not 
have otherwise had access to. The dialog suggests that women are the sources of cultural 
knowledge when it appears elsewhere in Smith’s text. For example, at one point, Smith 





have been told, has been deliver’d of a Child in less than a Quarter of an Hour…. Here 
are no Provision of any Necessaries for the new-born Infant, and yet all its Limbs grow 
vigorous and proportionate, and I must deliver it as my Opinion, that the contrary 
Practices in Europe makes so many crooked People” (211). Whom he gains this 
information from is abstract at this moment in the narrative—“I have been told”—but the 
introduction of the African mistress into the narrative makes the progenitors of such 
domestic knowledge concrete.  
The disembodied knowledge of the observer becomes both embodied and 
localized through the character of the African mistress, romanticized though she may be. 
The fact that in Smith the African woman’s power and intelligence is irrevocably tied to 
her promiscuity has on one level the rhetorical effect of subjugating her authority in 
service to the text’s European narrators. However, it should also change the terms under 
which we understand the production of global knowledge, reframing it from the creation 
of an objective, masculine, white gaze to ideas and discourses exchanged in intimate 
spaces, controlled and disclosed by sometimes unexpected sources. This chapter argues 
that African women are visible in eighteenth-century British literary and intellectual 
traditions by focusing on the prominence of Ethiopian women in European texts—
particularly those of Samuel Johnson and James Bruce. Despite Johnson and Bruce’s 
longstanding and public disputes about Ethiopia, their texts are in agreement in their 
admiration of Ethiopian women. Their representations are shaped in part by Ethiopia’s 
own tradition of depicting Habesha women as intelligent, well educated, and politically 
savvy. The wisdom that Nekayah and Pekuah display in Rasselas (1759) evoke accounts 





with. Bruce, traveling in the 1770s, built on such tropes in his account of Empress 
Məәntəәwwab and her daughter Aster. I argue that his relationships with the women of the 
court at Gondar had a significant effect not only on how he came to view the knowledge 
about Ethiopia that he brought back to Britain but also on how he describes the source of 
the Nile, the object of his explorations and a longstanding cultural symbol for both 
Africa’s potential and its impenetrability. 
Due to its Christianity, unique textual tradition, and trade connections across the 
Red Sea, in some ways Ethiopia was treated as exceptional within Africa even in the 
eighteenth century. At the same time, the often Orientalized country was being associated 
more and more with its geographical continent in literature, making it an important piece 
of how Africa was conceptualized in the Enlightenment. As I establish in my introduction, 
many parts of Africa were considered distinct in the eighteenth century, and this did not 
mean that they were not also seen as interconnected. Both Johnson and Bruce, for 
example, suggest that Portugal’s interest in Ethiopia was cemented by their explorations 
in West Africa. Johnson writes in his preface to Newbery’s World Displayed (1759) that 
when travelers sent out by Henry, King of Portugal were first exploring Africa in the 
sixteenth century, they were told both by a Wolof prince, Bemoy, and by the Oba of 
Benin that a Christian kingdom lay to the east. The Oba presented as evidence for this a 
“scepter, a helmet, and a latten cross” sent to him by the monarch of this land (xxv). 
Bruce repeats this story, commenting that although it is “difficult to account for the 
knowledge of Abyssinia in the kingdom of Benin” (2.105), “Yet the country alluded to 
could be no other than Abyssinia…indeed, the crooked staff, as well as the cross, 





Ethiopia and Senegal and Benin are responsible for the connection (2.104). Notably, 
Johnson writes that the Portuguese first tried to make it from West Africa to Ethiopia 
using overland routes themselves because Bemoy told them that “by passing up the river 
Senegal [the Christian king’s] dominions would be found” (xxvi). It is only after this fails 
that the Portuguese travel to Ethiopia by sailing around the cape.  
Such narratives connect Ethiopia to the rest of Africa geographically, 
economically, and culturally. Bruce, in fact, muses that the Wolof language may have 
originated as “a dialect of Abyssinian” (104) that spread across the continent, one of 
many statements about Ethiopia as the cradle of life and culture that would surface in the 
Western imagination throughout history. Rather than assuming Ethiopia is more Oriental 
than African, Bruce also argues that if certain architecture and goods found on the 
Arabian peninsula resemble those found in Ethiopia, it is because Ethiopia once 
controlled parts of the Arabian peninsula, not because Ethiopia is culturally Arabic (1.445, 
1.478).5 Furthermore, if Ethiopia is marked with such superiority in European texts, it is 
due at least in part to their history of representing themselves that way. Women are no 
exception to this; they are characterized in Ethiopian texts as well as European ones as 
intelligent, powerful, and politically involved.  
 
Exceptional Women in Habesha Texts 
Texts ranging from hagiographies to court chronicles to national histories display 
Ethiopia’s long history of women who debate openly, have authority over men, and 
occasionally run the country. At the root of this cultural and textual tradition, of course, is 





months learning from King Solomon and then brought back both his son and knowledge 
of the God of Israel to her homeland, ushering in the country’s Solomonic dynasty. The 
Kəәbrä Nägäśt, or “The Glory of the Kings”—a fourteenth-century Ethiopian text—
describes her as having wisdom that “Suprasseth the wisdom of men” (137), exceeding 
even Solomon himself. When she gives her kingdom to her son, she declares that a 
woman shall never again be queen, but that only the “male seed of David, the son of 
Solomon, shall ever reign over Ethiopia” (125). Rather than the concession to male 
power that this declaration first appears to be, however, Makəәdda’s story in the Kəәbrä 
Nägäśt establishes a tradition of Ethiopian women whose power does not disappear but 
rather transcends the state. When she hands the kingdom over, her son replies to her, 
“Thou art the Queen, O my Lady, and I will serve thee in every thing which thou 
commandest me…. For thou art the head and I am the foot, thou art the Lady and I am 
thy slave; everything shall be performed according to thy order, and none shall transgress 
thy commandment, and I will do everything that thou wishest” (127). Although Makəәdda 
relinquishes the explicit right to rule, she does not retreat into the private sphere. She 
retains an enormous amount of political and cultural influence.  
Similar women crop up throughout both Ethiopian history and Ethiopian texts—
such as the Tarikä Nägäśt or “Royal Chronicles”—and European scholars and writers 
throughout the early modern period made particular note of them. One such woman in the 
sixteenth century, Queen Ǝleni, ruled as regent for several of her male relatives and was 
the first Ethiopian monarch to foster diplomatic relationship with both Portugal and India. 
Hiob Ludoph—the premiere scholar on Ethiopia in early modern Europe—writes that 





fame behind her in Ethiopia, insomuch, that King Susneus would often praise her for her 
Virtue and Moderation” (173). European accounts of such women were not always so 
flattering. The Portuguese Jesuits who converted Susenyos to Catholicism write about 
how the mission to colonize Ethiopia culturally ultimately failed because the emperor’s 
wives, daughters, and nieces would not convert (Belcher, “Sisters Debating” 127). 
Susenyos’s eldest daughter Wängelawit led such forceful resistance against the Jesuits, 
for example, that the missionary Almeida refers to her as “the most hellish fury that 
Ethiopia spawned” (qtd. in Belcher, “Sisters Debating” 130). British readers encountered 
these women through translations and epitomes of Portuguese travel narratives, through 
the English translation of Ludolph’s History of Ethiopia, and through Joachim Le 
Grand’s dissertations on Ethiopia, which Johnson translated along with the Voyage 
Historique d’Abissinie.6  
Hence, both Johnson and Bruce were familiar with this tradition of intelligent and 
powerful African women. Belcher points out that Johnson not only knew about the Kəәbrä 
Nägäśt, both it and Rasselas are about “a quest for knowledge itself, a deliberate search 
for meaning, and one in which both men and women partake, all African” (Abyssinia’s 
210). Furthermore, she argues that Johnson was influenced by the narratives of Ethiopian 
women resisting Catholic conversion that he encountered while translating A Voyage to 
Abyssinia, an influence that surfaces in his other works, such as Rasselas and Irene. 
Bruce not only gives an extended summary of and commentary on Makəәdda’s story from 
the Kəәbrä Nägäśt in volume 1 of the Travels, he gives as detailed attention to the queen 
regents and female tutors of Ethiopia’s kings as he does the kings themselves in his 





both men’s representations of Africa, inviting us to examine more closely the ways that 
African women influenced eighteenth-century global knowledge. 
 
“Local Emotion” and the Quest for Knowledge in Rasselas 
Rasselas’s Northeast African setting has long been a point of vexation for readers. 
Although some critics have argued that Rasselas’s Abyssinia is “as much a concept as 
place” (van Wyk Smith 5), it is clear that Johnson was at least partly inspired to start his 
text in Ethiopia due to a personal interest in that country stemming from his translation of 
a Voyage to Abyssinia in 1735.7 The book in some ways takes the form of an Oriental tale, 
yet “Rasselas makes almost no concession to any readerly demand for Oriental exoticism” 
(Watt 25), not even in Pekuah’s tale of captivity by an Arab despot, who 
uncharacteristically of the genre never poses any threat to Pekuah’s virtue (Brooks 56). In 
fact, in his May 1759 review of Rasselas, Owen Ruffhead expressed puzzlement about 
why this tale was set in Northeast Africa at all. He complains that not only did Johnson 
do a poor job at “cloth[ing]” his narrative in an “agreeable garb” of Orientalism, any 
moral lesson the tale has to offer can be “acquire[d] without going to Ethiopia to learn it” 
(167). Nevertheless, as Belcher has argued, the text has traceable links to African worlds 
and worldviews (Abyssinia’s 192). In fact, these non-European influences might even be 
the reason why “Rasselas [is] so strange” (214), as voices other than Johnson’s animate 
the text. 
I suggest that such influences also expose the significance of both localized, 
experiential evidence and narrative evidence to Enlightenment geographical 





as an important reminder that such knowledge production included women as well as 
men. Proportionally, less critical attention has been paid to the female characters in 
Rasselas, even though they “participate equally as choice-of-life investigators,” as Jessica 
Richard argues (349-50). Through its female characters Rasselas dismantles the division 
between public and private life that was increasingly wielding influence over what was 
considered knowledge in the eighteenth century.8 Despite Ruffhead’s skepticism, the 
text’s Ethiopian setting is relevant to such an investigation since global inquiry was 
crucial for testing the viability of universalizing claims. It may also have very well been 
Ethiopia’s tradition of women who overtly transcended divisions between the domestic 
and the state that shaped Johnson’s critique in Rasselas of the practicality of the 
public/private divide.   
The relationship between particular experiences and encounters and the 
production of global knowledge is a central theme in Rasselas. It is, Carol Watts observes, 
a text “about a travelling spectatorship and a sense of metaphysical crisis” (42). As 
Rasselas, Imlac, Nekayah, and Pekuah travel from Ethiopia to Cairo, they seek profound 
understanding of the world around them.9 Yet, the experiential evidence of their travels 
does not lead to universalized truths but to a series of infinite regresses leading up to “the 
conclusion, in which nothing is concluded” (175).10 The fruitlessness of their venture is 
foreshadowed early on in the text through Rasselas’s ill-fated scheme to fly out of the 
Happy Valley. The scene establishes a dynamic in which empirical hubris dissolves into 
experiential uncertainty that recurs throughout. 
The engineer of a flying machine attempts to curry Rasselas’s favor by appealing 





furnished with wings, and hovering in the sky, would see the earth, and all its inhabitants, 
rolling beneath him, and presenting to him successively, by its diurnal motion, all the 
countries within the same parallel” (26). Equipped with wings, he promises, Rasselas will 
be able to 
survey with equal security the marts of trade and the fields of battle; mountains 
infested by barbarians, and fruitful regions gladdened by plenty, and lulled by 
peace! How easily shall we then trace the Nile through all his passage; pass over 
to distant regions, and examine the face of nature from one extremity of the earth 
to the other! (26) 
The engineer’s vision emulates epistemological fantasies of both early Enlightenment 
geographical projects and the early scientific revolution—what Srinivas Aravamudan 
calls “projections of an impossible hovering” (209) that would enable the viewer to see 
the whole world at once.11 If only one can gain a particular, universalizing vantage point 
over the earth, the engineer suggests, one’s “extensive curiosity” can be satisfied. The 
Nile serves as an important symbol within this fantasy. As examined in Chapter 2, the 
quest for complete knowledge of Africa’s waterways also suggested access to its inland 
riches and resources. One hundred years before John Hanning Speke’s infamous telegram 
from Khartoum to London—“The Nile is settled”—the aviator’s description suggests that 
visual mastery over the golden river would lead to mastery over the whole world. Yet, the 
aviator’s fantasy turns out to be just that. Like Icarus, his wings fail him, and he plunges 
into a lake, from which the prince pulls him “half dead” (28). The scene reveals the 
naiveté of the trust that Rasselas puts into the engineer’s otherwise convincing scientific 





of a probable truth, as early methods of the scientific revolution indicated it should, but to 
a corporeal and nonintellectual state of “terrour and vexation” (28). Additionally, the 
incident suggests the futility of attempting to “survey with equal security” all parts of the 
world. Rather, all the vulnerability, uncertainty, and contradiction that come with 
experiencing the world remain an inevitable part of the production of global knowledge.  
 The novel does not disregard the value of global inquiry. As Mayhew points out, 
“The intelligent characters in Rasselas…display a healthy interest in geography and 
natural knowledge” (546). Nor was Johnson dismissive of the value of empirical 
observation in travel writing. In his preface to A Voyage to Abyssinia, he praises Lobo 
because “He appears by his modest and unaffected narration to have described things as 
he saw them, to have copied nature from the life, and to have consulted his senses, not his 
imagination” (3). When he conducted his own journey through the Scottish Highlands, he 
carried with him the two folios of his Dictionary (Boswell, Tour 165) and a walking stick 
with “the properties of a measure; for one nail was driven into it at the length of a foot; 
another at that of a yard” (356) that he used to gauge the size of buildings and caves. Yet, 
Johnson was not persuaded by the value of empirical observation above all other ways of 
experiencing a place. When traveling through “the Caledonian regions, whence savage 
clans and roving barbarians derived the benefits of knowledge, and the blessings of 
religion,” Johnson observes,  
To abstract the mind from all local emotion would be impossible, if it were 
endeavoured, and would be foolish, if it were possible. Whatever withdraws us 
from the power of our senses; whatever makes the past, the distant, or the future 





from me and from my friends, be such frigid philosophy as may conduct us 
indifferent or unmoved over any ground which has been dignified by wisdom, 
bravery, or virtue. (Johnson, Journey 140-41) 
His emphasis here on the way that a place can make a unique imprint on the mind, as a 
kind of knowledge that “advances us in the dignity of thinking beings,” speaks to the 
importance of not privileging the universal over the particular, the global over the local. 
By contrast, “Frigid philosophy” that tries to float above “local emotion” results not only 
in indifference but also in a missed opportunity for edification.  
In Rasselas, the philosopher Imlac expresses a similar view as he is explaining the 
notion of pilgrimage to Rasselas. Imlac harnesses the potential for place to act on the 
human consciousness implicit in the notion of pilgrimage but detaches it from the notion 
of religious aura. He states, “Change of place is no natural cause of the increase of 
piety…. That the Supreme Being may be more easily propitiated in one place than in 
another is a dream of idle superstition” (48). Yet, when men “view the fields where great 
actions have been performed [they] return with stronger impressions of the event.” He 
goes on to promise Rasselas that the fact that “some places may operate upon our own 
minds in an uncommon manner, is an opinion which hourly experience will justify” (48). 
The notion that such “local emotion” makes us wiser but also may continually be at odds 
with methodologies for producing abstract truisms resurfaces throughout the text as 
Rasselas and the others struggle throughout their travels to translate inquiry and 
experience into knowledge.  
Rasselas addresses this difficulty explicitly through a conversation between 





what can be learned about living a happy life in the city of Cairo, “The prince and his 
sister divide between them the work of observation” (89), with Rasselas making inquiries 
into state life and Nekayah making inquiries into domestic affairs. When Nekayah shares 
her observations that both marriage and celibacy results in unhappiness, Rasselas is 
frustrated by the fact that her inquiry seems to have lead to a contradiction, telling her, 
“You seem to forget…that you have, even now, represented celibacy as less happy than 
marriage. Both conditions may be bad, but they cannot both be worst. Thus it happens 
when wrong opinions are entertained, that they mutually destroy each other, and leave the 
mind open to truth” (104). In response, Nekayah protests against the notion that abstract, 
logical regularity discloses universal truth: 
To the mind, as to the eye, it is difficult to compare with exactness objects vast in 
their extent and various in their parts. Where we see or conceive the whole at once 
we readily note the discriminations and decide the preference: but of two systems 
of which neither can be surveyed by any human being in its full compass of 
magnitude and multiplicity of complication, where is the wonder, that judging of 
the whole by parts, I am alternately affected by one and the other as either presses 
on my memory or fancy? (105) 
Nekayah concurs that it is possible to “agree in one judgment,” on issues where one can 
“see the whole at once, as in numerical computations” (105), but she exposes the futility 
of this method when confronting issues too vast to fully “compass”—a word choice that 
parallels the aviator’s geographical imagery as a metaphor for philosophical inquiry. 
Memory and fancy, she suggests, play just as much of a role in how we experience the 





which reason never can decide; questions that elude investigation, and make logick 
ridiculous; cases where something must be done, and where little can be said” (109). To 
assume that such experiences can be ameliorated by the application of a little reason is, 
Nekayah argues, the premise by which “Philosophers… are deceived.” Rasselas’s 
response is not so much a rebuttal as an acknowledgement of defeat designed to save 
face—“let us not…vie with each other in subtleties of argument”—indicating that 
Nekayah has emerged the wiser of the two, at least in this debate.12   
 Michael McKeon argues that it was through “the division of knowledge” into an 
explicit category separate from the experiences of everyday life that “the modern 
abstraction of the public and the private came into their characteristic relationship” (xxiv). 
Yet, Rasselas indicates that eighteenth-century writers were aware of and potentially 
suspicious of both this division and its implications for how knowledge and truth were 
becoming characterized in the cultural consciousness. The heading of this chapter, “The 
prince and his sister divide between them the work of observation” (89), both evokes and 
collapses such distinctions. The spheres of their investigations initially seem to logically 
fall into gendered categories, each one going where the other cannot. But Nekayah and 
Rasselas both perform the same task, and Nekayah subjects the domestic to the same 
rigorous examination as Rasselas does the state. Not only does a woman function here as 
a knowledge-producing subject, the object of her investigation does not turn out to be 
fundamentally different from the object of Rasselas’s investigations. In fact, if there is a 
universal truth to be found here, it is that the private sphere is not exempt from the 
contradictions and foibles that plague the global search for knowledge and truth. Despite 





suggestion that such global knowledge will quell Rasselas’s existential angst, Nekayah 
reminds him that “no man can, at the same time, fill his cup from the source and the 
mouth of the Nile” (110) and recommends that he be content with what he has.  
 Even if Rasselas acknowledges the valuable contributions that women make to 
global knowledge, the question remains to what extent this commentary has anything to 
do with African women specifically. In his review, Ruffhead remarks on what he saw as 
Johnson’s implausible representation of African women, commenting that Johnson “has 
so little conception of the propriety of character, that he makes the princess speak in the 
same lofty strain with the philosopher; and the waiting woman harangue with as much 
sublimity as her royal mistress” (166). Yet, the Ethiopian historical and narrative tradition 
of intellectual women who transgress divisions between the domestic and the state on a 
regular basis is a plausible foundation for such characters. Belcher points out “the mere 
plot of the Kəәbrä Nägäśt—in which a young African prince travels to Egypt (and beyond) 
in search of wisdom rather than adventure or dragons or wives—may have participated in 
shaping the plot of Rasselas” (Abyssinia’s 209), and before it is a story about a young 
African prince on a journey for knowledge, it is a story about how his mother goes on the 
quest before him, emerging with wisdom that “surpasseth the wisdom of men” and even 
“exceedeth that of Solmon” (Kəәbrä Nägäśt 137). Makəәdda does not so much retreat from 
the public sphere as transcend it, maintaining her position of privilege as queen and as the 
originator of the Solomonic dynasty. Even though Solomon’s lineage is obviously 
significant to the monarchy, Makəәdda is characterized in the text as both “father” and 
“mother” of Menelik I.13 Historical Ethiopian women that Johnson would have 





boundaries between private life and the state in similar ways, including queen regents like 
Ǝleni, who was likewise referred to as “both mother and father” of the nation (Alvarez 
434), and the women who publicly resisted the cultural imperialism of the Portuguese.14 
Nekayah’s ability to hold her own or even best Rasselas in argument, and they ways her 
wisdom and methods transgress the domestic sphere, is not without precedent.    
Another way that the text showcases the contribution of African women to global 
knowledge is by making Pekuah the narrative authority on places that Rasselas does not 
travel to himself. I argue in chapter 1 that Aphra Behn’s use of the conventions of 
romance in Oroonoko illustrates the extent that the production of global knowledge was 
dependent on secondhand narratives. Nekayah confirms the reality of this when she, too, 
observes, “What reason cannot collect…and what experiment has not yet taught, can be 
known only from the report of others” (108).15 Rasselas aligns itself with the genre of 
romance by including an interpolated captivity tale in which Nekayah’s great favorite 
recounts her experiences being held for ransom by an Arab despot on an island in the 
Nile. Though appearing just a silly servant before her capture, Pekuah is revealed through 
her adventures to have the privileged intellect and resilience of Makəәdda’s legacy, just as 
her mistress does.  
In contrast to the Arabic women of the harem, who are uninterested in the world 
around them but merely run “from room to room as a bird hops from wire to wire in his 
cage” (138), Pekuah has an alluring intellect, is a witty conversationalist, and is often left 
to rule in the Arab’s stead. He tutors her in “celestial observations” and “the names and 
courses of the stars,” and it is implied that he is taking more time than necessary in order 





Imlac says that she was lucky that he let her go as easily as he did, for, “How could a 
mind, hungry for Knowledge, be willing, in an intellectual famine, to lose such a banquet 
as Pekuah’s conversation?” (140). When the Arab does go abroad, he leaves Pekuah to 
“govern in his absence” (141). Furthermore, it is clear that she, like Rasselas and 
Nekayah, is driven to investigate her surroundings. On the island, she is “diverted from 
impatience by the novelty of the place,” and she describes it to the others in detail: 
In the day I wandered from one place to another as the course of the sun varied 
the splendor of the prospect, and saw many things which I had never seen before. 
The crocodiles and river-horses are common in this unpeopled region, and I often 
looked upon them with terrour, though I knew that they could not hurt me. For 
some time, I expected to see mermaids and tritons, which, as Imlac has told me, 
European travellers have stationed in the Nile, but no souch beings ever 
appeared… (137) 
Here we get a third way of looking at the Nile. If the aviator’s way is an impossible 
fantasy, and Nekayah’s way is depressingly limited, Pekuah’s way simply reflects the 
realities of how geographical knowledge was produced. She spends much of her time 
observing the small portion of the river she has access to and matching what she sees up 
with what stories she has heard about it. In retelling her impression of the Nile to the 
others, it becomes itself another narrative waiting to be confirmed or denied by new 
observations. Pekuah’s experience attests that much of global knowledge production 
comes not from gaining a birds-eye view of geography, but from matching new narratives 
against old ones, until little by little a picture is formed. Women, Pekuah’s observations 





extraordinary Habesha woman, Empress Məәntəәwwab, would leave a lasting impression 
on how James Bruce thought about the Nile, the great symbol of Africa’s bounty and 
impenetrability.   
 
Sheba’s Legacy in James Bruce’s Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile  
In 1769, James Bruce arrived in Northeast Africa with the intent of discovering 
the source of the Nile. Though it took him until 1790 to publish his 5-volume account of 
the journey, stories of his exploits circulated almost immediately upon his return.16 Bruce 
was at first hailed for having performed invaluable services on behalf of science and 
navigation, particularly in Europe, where figures like the Comte de Buffon praised his 
attention to detail and the wealth of drawings, specimens, and geographical data he 
brought back with him. However, public opinion quickly degenerated.17 A review 
published in The British Critic in 1816 comparing Bruce’s Travels to Henry Salt’s early 
nineteenth-century account describes Bruce’s reception this way: 
It is well known that the celebrated and intrepid character whom we have just 
named was of a haughty and overbearing disposition, impatient of interrogation, 
and too proud to remove even the reasonable doubts of the most candid and 
intelligent. It is equally well known that, upon his return to Europe, he was beset 
with skeptics on all hands, who seemed unwilling to believe his statements, or to 
give credit to his testimony, and that he, scorning alike to explain or dispute, 
persisted in telling what he saw and in despising their strictures. Hence, as might 





themselves for his obstinacy and contempt, spared no pains to convince the public 
that Bruce was an imposter and his book a romance. (483)  
Bruce continued to have his defenders, most notably Buffon and Charles Burney, the 
ethnomusicologist, father of Frances Burney, and longtime friend of Samuel Johnson. But 
he was lampooned by the likes of Horace Walpole and John Wolcot (Peter Pindar).18 The 
British sequel to Rudolph Erich Raspe’s Baron Munchausen stories (1792) is “humbly 
dedicated to Mr. Bruce the Abyssinian traveller,” and pokes fun at Bruce’s notoriously 
bad temper on the title page by adding that if this “does not delight Mr. Bruce, the Baron 
is willing to fight him on any terms he pleases.”  
 One of Bruce’s highest profile critics was Samuel Johnson, who complained to 
Boswell that Bruce was not a “distinct relator.” When Boswell asks, “But will you not 
allow him a nobleness of resolution, in penetrating into distant regions?” Johnson replies, 
“That, Sir, is not the present purpose. We are talking of his sense. A fighting cock has a 
nobleness of resolution” (Boswell, Life 606). In turn, Bruce criticized Johnson for being 
taken in by Lobo’s account of the source of the Nile, which Bruce maintained until his 
death was completely fabricated.19 Furthermore, Bruce was irritated that Johnson did not 
believe his anecdote about how Abyssinian soldiers cut steaks from the rumps of live 
cows and then stitched the cows back up again. Bruce writes, “I asked the reason of this 
disbelief and was answered, that people who had never been out of their own country, 
and others well acquainted with the manners of the world, for they had travelled as far as 
France, had agreed the thing was impossible, and therefore it was so” (3.144). Though 





because Johnson was still considered by many to be the expert on Abyssinia despite the 
fact that he had never personally traveled there.  
 When Johnson and Bruce are put side-by-side, such disagreements about 
Abyssinian ways of life have taken center stage. However, in spite of their public dislike 
of each other, the two men agreed on some key points about the country. For example, 
although they had conflicting opinions about the Jesuit Lobo himself, both Johnson and 
Bruce defended the Ethiopian Orthodox Täwaḥəәdo Church against Catholic criticism as a 
legitimate form of Christianity.20 Even more so, though, both Johnson and Bruce shared 
an admiration for Ethiopian women. The Travels, like Rasselas, incorporates Ethiopia’s 
history of intelligent and politically savvy queens as a mainstay of its own representations 
of the country. In fact, just as Ruffhead took umbrage with the fact that Johnson’s 
Abyssinian women “speak in the same lofty strain with the philosopher,” an anonymous 
reviewer of the Travels protested that Bruce’s “women display such delicacy of sentiment 
and elegance of behaviour, as would do honour to the most civilised nations” (Monthly 
Review 188). What was perhaps lost on the reviewer is the way Bruce uses the legacy of 
the Queen of Sheba in order to authorize the legitimacy of his insider information about 
Abyssinia—information that he largely gathered from the Dowager Empress and 
noblewomen of the Gondar court.  
  Bruce deliberately gives Makəәdda’s story a place of privilege the first volume of 
his narrative.21 He introduces her and her journey to Jerusalem in an overview of the 
history of the Arabian Gulf, remarking, “It will very possibly be thought, that this is the 
place in which I should mention the journey that the Queen of Saba made into Palestine” 





expedition itself…merits that it should be treated in a place by itself” (446), specifically 
as “the foundation of the monarchy of Abyssinia.” In making this move, Bruce is 
privileging the Habesha story of the Queen of Sheba over Arabic or European versions. 
Once he “fulfill[s] his promise to the reader” and returns to her story (1.472), not only 
does he emphatically argue that the Biblical queen and Makəәdda were in fact one in the 
same—that the Queen of Sheba was definitely African and not Arabic (1.473)—he 
stresses her importance to establishing the Solomonic dynasty in Ethiopia, the very origin 
story that the Kəәbrä Nägäśt details. He furthermore writes that she was “a person of 
learning, and that sort of learning which was then almost peculiar to Palestine, not to 
Ethiopia” (1.474). According to Bruce, she traveled to Solomon in order to test him: “We 
see that one of the reasons of her coming, was to examine whether Solomon was really 
the learned man he was said to be. She came to try him in allegories, or parables.” 
Despite the fact that Makəәdda was clearly any king’s match, Bruce ends his account of 
her with her declaration that “no woman should be capable of wearing the crown or being 
queen, but that it should descend to the heir” (1.476). Yet, Bruce understands that this 
prohibition of female monarchs does not equate with a gendered divide between public 
and private spheres. As the Kəәbrä Nägäśt does, Bruce represents Makəәdda cultural, 
intellectual, and political influence as far outlasting her formal reign.  
Makəәdda’s story sets the stage for Bruce’s “list of kings of the race of Solomon, 
descended from the queen of Saba” (1.478), which takes up the end of volume 1 and all 
of volume 2. In fact, Bruce advertises volume 2 as the “Annals of Abyssinia, translated 
from the original” (1), although it is only a loose adaptation of and commentary on the 





this history, Bruce brings up Makəәdda’s dictate that women should never rule several 
times, but mostly in order to stress how frequently women ended up in charge of the 
country anyway. He discusses women who tutor young princes at court (2.174) and 
women who resisted the Portuguese—one by blowing up a tent full of soldiers who had 
taken her captive and herself with it (2.188). Even more notably, though, he consistently 
remarks on the fact that “though it be true that all women are excluded from the 
Abyssinian throne, yet it is as true that there is a law, or custom, as strictly observed as 
the other, that the queen upon whose head the king shall have put the crown in his life-
time…that woman is regent of the kingdom, and guardian of every minor king, as long as 
she shall live” (1.507). She has absolute power as regent, and Bruce points out that this is 
not a rare occurrence, that throughout the “Abyssinian annals…very frequent minorities 
happen” (2.114). One such regency Bruce describes in detail, for instance, is Ǝleni’s, the 
early modern queen who so impressed historians like Ludolph with her intelligence and 
diplomacy.  
Bruce’s investment in the significance of Abyssinian women is not an abstract 
interest. As the narrative progresses, it becomes clear that this lineage builds directly to 
the eighteenth-century noblewomen who befriended Bruce, most evidently Empress 
Məәntəәwwab and her politically influential daughter Aster Iyasu. Not only are they of the 
line of Solomon, their behavior throughout the texts and even both women’s desire to 
travel Jerusalem echo the Sheba myth.22 Məәntəәwwab, like Ǝleni several centuries earlier, 
served as regent through two different minorities building up to the eighteenth century’s 
tumultuous Era of Princes. The first was her son Iyasu II’s minority, a decision that was 





royal chronicles, “The King of Kings Iyasu said to them: ‘Make my mother reign, crown 
her with my crown because without her my reign cannot go on!’ When the dignitaries 
and learned men heard these words, they all rejoiced and said with a single voice: ‘She is 
worthy of it! She is worthy of it!’” (123).23 The second was her step-grandson’s minority, 
Iyoas I; however, in 1769, Ethiopia’s central government was fractured after Ras Mika’el 
Seḥul, the governor of Tigre, deposed and murdered Iyoas.24 Shortly after this incident, 
Bruce arrived in Gondar, and his time at the court and journeys through the country are 
set against the backdrop of its aftermath. He befriended Ethiopians on both sides of the 
conflict.   
When Bruce first meets Məәntəәwwab she has retired from court life after the 
assassination of her grandson. But her glory still shines through his descriptions of his 
interactions with her, and he depicts her as generous, intelligent, and able to hold her own 
in their many philosophical debates, even though there are several things over which she 
and Bruce disagree: “Our first discourse was about Jerusalem, the Holy Sepulchre, 
Calvary, the City of David, and the Mountain of Olives, with the situations of which [the 
Empress] was perfectly well acquainted” (3.207). They get into a debate over whether 
Bruce’s Protestantism or Məәntəәwwab’s Orthodox Christianity is closer to Catholicism, 
and whether or not miracles are possible, with Bruce expressing skepticism that the 
hagiography of Ethiopian saints is true and Məәntəәwwab protesting that all things are 
possible through God. Bruce is initially made uncomfortable by this intense exchange, 
“wishing heartily the conversation might end there” (3.208). But it turns out that he has 
won her trust. She asks him to come stay in her palace and look after her sick 





coopts the power not only of her authority but that of an entire narrative history dating 
back to the Queen of Sheba as a means of authorizing what he characterizes as his 
privileged and reliable information about the Abyssinian court.  
After all, Bruce is upfront about the fact that the only reason he was able to gain 
as much traction in Gondar as he did was due to the women of the court. He says once of 
Məәntəәwwab that he “could not possibly have any merit but what arose from her own 
gracious and generous sentiments, and universal charity, that extend to every object in 
proportion as they were helpless” (3.377). Of course, he attributes many of the women’s 
interest in him—presumably particularly Aster’s—to his manly charms: “Being in the 
prime of life [and] of no ungracious figure… I cultivated with the utmost assiduity the 
friendship of the fair sex, by the most modest, respectful distant attendance, and 
obsequiousness in public, abating just as much of that in private as suited their humour 
and inclinations” (1.lxxvii). Significantly, he suggests that is specifically his ability to 
cross between the public and the private that has enabled him to gather not just domestic 
knowledge but political, historical, and geographical knowledge about Abyssinia. What is 
implied in the dialog with Charles Wheeler’s mistress is made explicit in Bruce: African 
women were often European travelers’ most important cultural brokers. Like the dialog 
in Smith, when Bruce describes his relationship with the women as distant and respectful 
in public and intimate in private he perpetuates the stereotype of sexually open African 
women. Yet, reducing the women in Bruce’s text to this stereotype not only glosses over 
the role they played as cultural brokers, it disregards the great respect he had for the them, 
the care that he took to describe his interactions with them, and the likelihood that they 





by the fact that he makes it clear that the level of intimacy reached in private was 
contingent on their “humour and inclinations,” not on his ability to charm or seduce them.  
Aster, or “Ozoro Esther” as Bruce calls her, is in particular treated as a woman 
with an enormous amount of political and narrative control, described as having “the 
courage and decision of a Roman matron” (2.698). Although she was Məәntəәwwab’s 
daughter and Iyoas’s step-aunt, after her first husband was killed by the Oromo faction in 
a conflict between Ras Mika’el and the Oromo warlord Fasil (who was loyal to Iyoas) 
she married Ras Mika’el because it put her in a position to avenge her first husband’s 
death (2.700). The first Bruce ever hears of Aster is a rumor that he encounters on his 
way into Abyssinia that she has recently captured the man who assassinated her first 
husband and ordered him flayed alive. After meeting her personally, Bruce assures the 
reader that in spite of this vengeful streak Aster is “kind and humane” in all “other 
respects” (3.286); however, there is no question of her influence. She was intimately 
connected to the two most powerful men in the country, Ras Mika’el and Täklä 
Haymanot II, the young king that Ras Mika’el put on the throne to replace Iyoas, who 
“had contracted a decided tenderness for her” (3.545).25 Nor is there any question of the 
fact that Bruce takes advantage of that leverage to ensure both his safety and his access to 
the political secrets of an otherwise insular community.  
In one illustrative incident, Bruce gets into a fistfight with a courtier that Ras 
Mika’el had an outstanding quarrel with, which Ras Mika’el uses as an excuse to secretly 
imprison the man. When Bruce goes to Ras Mika’el to intercede on the man’s behalf, 
asking him to set the man at liberty, the governor feigns ignorance of the man’s 





replies. “Somewhere in irons.” At this, Ras Mika’el owns up to his feint, grumbling, 
“This is Esther’s intelligence… these women tell you all their secrets” (3.240). Notably, 
by identifying the secrets as belonging to the women in this line, Ras Mika’el illuminates 
the extent that the private intelligences of domestic spaces and the machinations of public 
politics are two sides of the same coin in the Gondar court. Furthermore, the passing of 
such secrets recurs throughout the narrative; they are the currency that Bruce uses to 
make his way across different regions in search of the source of the Nile. For instance, at 
one point Bruce enters Fasil’s domains and unwittingly informs him that Ras Mika’el’s 
troops have taken a strategically important mountain. “Take care what you say, Yagoube,” 
Fasil says. “Take care this be not a lie; tell it to me again.” And so, as Bruce goes on, “I 
told him the whole circumstances from beginning to end; how the news had come from 
Michael to Esther—how it had come to the Empress—who had brought the intelligence 
[to me]…” (3.523). True to the tradition of their predecessors, Məәntəәwwab and Aster’s 
roles as wives and mothers give them direct access to and agency in state politics—
agency that often ran counter to the desires of the men. Bruce tells another story about 
“an inveterate enemy to Ras Michael and the new succession,” who is not initially 
welcome back in Gondar. However, Bruce says “we did him a great service by the means 
of Ozoro Esther” by protecting him from “Ras Michael’s rapacity and avarice” (3.404). 
Aster is never portrayed as cowed by Mika’el, the man who assassinated two kings. In 
fact, Bruce suggests that every day Aster gains more and more influence over Mika’el 
(3.545).   
The women do not only play a crucial role in shaping Bruce’s understanding of 





conversation he has with Məәntəәwwab also had a lasting impact on how Bruce 
experienced and represented the very object of his explorations, the Nile itself. In his 
introduction, Bruce calls the legendary river “a defiance to all travellers, and an 
opprobrium to geography” (1.vi). When it came to finding the source, “Even conquerors 
at the head of immense armies, who first discovered and then subdued great parts of the 
world, were forced to lower their tone here” (1.i). The patrons who encouraged him to 
undertake the journey believe, much like Rasselas’s aviator, that to gain a better 
understanding of the river would be to unlock Africa’s greatest secrets. However, Bruce 
writes that Məәntəәwwab “treated the intention of going to the source of the Nile as a 
fantastical folly, unworthy of any man of sense or understanding” (3.337). She says to 
him, “See…how every day our life punishes us with proofs of the perverseness and 
contradiction of human nature; you are come from Jerusalem, through vile Turkish 
governments, and hot, unwholesome climates, to see a river and a bog, no part of which 
you can carry away were it ever so valuable, and of which you have in your own country 
a thousand larger, better, and cleaner” (3.378). Like Rasselas and his companions, Bruce 
is faced with the sobering realization that such epistemological pursuits might be nothing 
but vainglory. 
Historically, Abyssinians have projected their own mythological discourses onto 
the Nile, most notably circulating the rumor that the Emperor could control its flow into 
Egypt. But they are clearly not persuaded by the symbolic and epistemological value of 
Bruce’s mission, nor are they threatened in any way by what his claiming discovery of 
the source of the Nile could mean ideologically because, as Məәntəәwwab points out, he 





official decree giving “those fountains he is so fond of, to Yagoube [his name for Bruce] 
and his posterity for ever, never to appear under another’s name in the deftar and never to 
be taken from him or exchanged, either in peace or war” (3.472). Given Bruce’s efforts to 
validate his discovery in the narrative, including making every effort to defame Lobo as a 
lying Catholic who absolutely did not make it there first, one expects him to recount his 
arrival at the source with the same self-aggrandizement he has no compunctions about 
employing elsewhere in the texts. 26  
But when Bruce finally does arrive at the source of the Nile, he calls his journey 
“a violent effort of a distempered fancy” (3.641). He writes,  
I was, at that very moment, in possession of what had, for many years, been the 
principal object of my ambition and wishes: indifference, which, from the usual 
infirmity of human nature, follows, at least for a time, complete enjoyment, had 
taken place of it. The marsh, and the fountains, upon comparison with the rise of 
many of our rivers, became now a trifling object in my sight. I remember that 
magnificent scene in my own native country, where the Tweed, Clyde and Annan, 
rise, one hill; three rivers, as I now thought, not inferior to the Nile in beauty. 
(3.641-42) 
This is by far the most written about passage in the Travels and has been read as evidence 
of Bruce’s homesickness, of his frustration at not receiving the accolades he thought his 
due, and of his Scottish pride.27 At the end of Rasselas, the Nile floods, and the prince 
and his companions “resolv[e], when the inundation should cease, to return to Abissinia” 
(176). Likewise, with his end goal in sight, Bruce’s thoughts turn back to his beginnings. 





introspection in both cases, symbolizing, in the end, the vanity of such earthly ambitions. 
However, the extent that Bruce’s reaction mirrors Məәntəәwwab’s sentiments about his 
journey earlier in the narrative bears investigating. What she called a “fantastical folly” 
Bruce ends up calling a “distempered fancy.” She insists that the rivers in his own 
country must be “larger, better, and cleaner,” and indeed Bruce reflects in this moment on 
the rivers of his homeland, and not on the Thames which was the usual point of 
comparison in British travel writing for global rivers, but three insignificant Scottish 
rivers.28 Rather than joy, he feels indifference, confronting the “the perverseness and 
contradiction of human nature” that Məәntəәwwab predicted he would experience.  
 Perhaps Məәntəәwwab’s words are simply one of Bruce’s inventions, built into the 
text to foreshadow his arrival at the source. They were at the very least translated through 
language, space, and time before appearing on the pages of a book published seventeen 
years after the Empress’s death. But there is no logical explanation for Bruce to have 
done this. He is not interested in coming across as humble or self-reflective at any other 
time, and the scene troubles the ideologies of both individual and national superiority and 
pride that appear elsewhere in the narrative.29 It is, in fact, just as plausible that Bruce had 
little narrative control over this scene, that his experience of, reaction to, and even 
memory of the event was continually haunted by Məәntəәwwab’s skepticism. It is perhaps 
another example of the discursive and historical influence of Abyssinian women, an 
instance where Bruce’s impressions of both political and geographical Abyssinia may be 
more a product of their worldviews than they are of his. 
 Bruce’s accounts of the women of Abyssinia, from Makəәdda to Məәntəәwwab, 





who refused to believe that they could be simultaneously so barbarous and so cultured. 
But Samuel Coleridge was inspired by Bruce’s portrait of Aster to pen his description of 
the “Abyssinian Maid” in Kubla Khan playing on her dulcimer and “Singing of Mount 
Abora” (37-41).30 Hugh Blair wrote to Bruce, “You make one absolutely in love with 
your great favorite, Ozoro Esther” (qtd. in Bredin 259). In James Boswell’s piece on 
Bruce that he wrote for the London Magazine, he writes about the queen of Sheba 
traveling to the East specifically to find and test Solomon, after which “according to the 
Abyssinian history, that princess did more than see his wisdom” (390). Since Bruce’s 
travel narrative was the recipient of such ridicule, it is often easy to forget that in spite of 
Bruce’s reputation as the Abyssinian Liar, his text has been one of the most influential 
European authorities on East Africa both in the eighteenth century and now.31 His 
accounts are still treated by historians as one of the most detailed and authoritative 
sources of the events leading up to the Era of the Princes. Given Bruce’s acknowledged 
debt to Aster, Məәntəәwwab, and the Kəәbrä Nägäśt the authorities we should be looking at 
here are not Bruce but the women who so clearly influenced both him and the way he 
reproduced Abyssinia for his readers. 
 
Conclusion 
The importance of African women to how eighteenth-century travelers and 
writers thought about the continent and even the world more generally is visible in both 
Johnson and Bruce. They both rely on Ethiopia’s narrative history of intelligent and 
politically active women as a backdrop for their own philosophical and epistemological 





Africa came through African women, whose stories and social position influenced 
travelers’ access to the continent’s cultures, trade, and geography. Such texts may enable 
us to look at other European representations of African women with more complexity, 
such as Wheeler’s mistress in Smith’s narrative, or various mentions of African queens in 
West African travel narratives. Underneath the highly stylized and often objectifying 
accounts of contact with these women, we can begin to discern the extent that the stories 
they told contributed to the ways European travelers thought about their worlds. Indeed, 
it reminds us that Enlightenment itself was as much a product of the domestic and the 
intimate as the public and objective, as much a part of local emotion as global principles, 
and that the divisions between such things regularly collapse in eighteenth-century texts 
















1 Descriptions of these women ranging from Willem Bosman’s narrative to the depiction 
of African women in Henry Fielding’s Jonathan Wild reinforce problematic stereotypes 
of the hyper-sexualized black woman. But their sheer prevalence in such texts also stands 
as a testament to these women’s significance to early Enlightenment geopolitical 
relations. According to William Dampier, for example, on the coast of Guinea, the taking 
of a black mistress meant greater protection and “Friendship” in the region (396). 
2 In fact, John Green, the editor of the Astley compendium, left this section out of the 
epitome of Smith’s narrative, saying only that it “seems to have been composed at Fancy, 
than to have any real Foundation in Nature” (464). 
3 This sentiment was striking enough for the early abolitionist Anthony Benezet to quote 
it in his 1767 Some Historical Account of Guinea.  
4 Roxann Wheeler suggests, for instance, that in this passage “the function of the African 
woman is to smooth relations between himself and the local leader—to facilitate an 
interracial male bond,” rather than a representation of herself (Complexion 130). Aside 
from the fact that Wheeler misidentifies the “I” in this section as Smith himself rather 
than Charles Wheeler, her reading is valid. However, I suggest that recognizing the 
African woman as a symbol of homosociality in this scene does not erase the ways that 
African women may speak through European texts in spite of authorial attempts to 






5 Similarly, Hiob Ludolph defends the Queen of Sheba’s Ethiopian origins by pointing 
out that “as many of the Old Writers held, the ancient Ethiopia extended itself into 
Arabia” (160). 
6 Voyage Historique d’Abissinie was Le Grand’s French translation of Jeronimo Lobo’s 
Itinerário, his account of living as a missionary for ten years in in the Ethiopian 
Highlands. Johnson translated the French version as A Voyage to Abyssinia in 1735. 
7 For work that explores Johnson’s knowledge of and interest in Abyssinia, particularly in 
relation to this translation, see Gwin Kolb, Ellen Douglass Leyburn, Donald Lockhart, 
and Wendy Belcher, Abyssinia’s Samuel Johnson 42-96, 192. In a 1774 essay in the 
London Magazine about James Bruce, Boswell describes the generic balance of Rasselas 
as “a work in which that eminent writer has displayed a rich fund of moral instruction, 
embellished with original imagery, and rendered interesting by a well conducted story, in 
the tissue of which several real facts concerning that country are interwoven. It has been 
translated into many languages, and read with universal admiration” (47).  
8 Michael McKeon defines “‘Modern’ knowledge” as “an explicit and self-conscious 
awareness, characterized not by the way it saturates social practice but by the way it 
satisfies the canons of epistemology, which impose on knowledge the test of self-
justifying self-sufficiency” (xix). Furthermore, he argues that this evolution was tied 
specifically to how modernity “reconstitutes the public and the private as categories that 
are susceptible to separation” (xix). 
9 For other scholarship that examines Rasselas as a commentary on place-making and 






in exemplifying Johnson’s moral arguments (539-540), and James Watt, who reads the 
novel in the context of the Seven Years War and suggests the text replicates “specific 
forms of enquiry regarding the interconnectedness of an increasingly globalized world” 
(21). Stephen Gray points out that Imlac’s detailed geographical descriptions are 
grounded in the “highly developed commercial network extending as far east as to Persia 
and India, and up the Red Sea from Aden to Cairo” (19).   
10 According to Watts, “Johnson’s very language for the acquisition of knowledge and 
experience is shaped by the circulating desires and energies of worldly life, as if, despite 
its protest, it cannot be imagined distinctly from them” (42). Ros Ballaster argues that 
Johnson showcases “characters whose curiosity and identification with the world beyond 
them repeatedly turns into a kind of introspective madness” (120).  
11 Aravamudan argues that Johnson’s novel satirizes the “fantasies of domination” (205) 
implicit in “omnivoyant spectatorial position[s]” (209), including in this even Imlac’s 
famous dictate that the task of the poet is “to examine, not the individual, but the species” 
(Johnson 43). 
12 As Christopher Brooks argues, the novel does not shy away from showcasing “a 
woman’s capacity to instruct men” (70). 
13 At one point, Menelik pesters Makəәdda about his father, to which Makəәdda replies, 
“Why dost thou ask me about thy father? I am thy father and thy mother” (34).  
14 Although there is no evidence that Johnson knew her by name, Walatta Petros is 
perhaps the paramount example of an Ethiopian woman who left her domestic situation 






a monastery, ultimately becoming a religious leader even over the male priests in her 
region. Her contemporaries referred to her, like Makəәdda and Ǝleni, through a 
combination of masculine and feminine terminology (Belcher, Introduction 15). The 
Ethiopian Orthodox Täwaḥəәdo Church canonized her, and her gädl, the story of her life 
and struggles, was written in the late seventeenth century. See The Life and Struggles of 
Our Mother Walatta Petros translated by Wendy Belcher and Michael Kleiner. 
15 This is consistent with Johnson’s later observation in his Journey to the Western 
Islands of Scotland that “narrations…however uncertain, deserve the notice of a traveller, 
because they are the only records of a nation that has no historians” (68).  
16 According to Richard Sher, once Bruce finally did publish his narrative, there were 
2,000 copies of the first edition, and the text quickly became a bestseller. Sher speculates 
that “if Bruce had lived longer, he might well have earned more money from his Travels 
than any other eighteenth-century author received for a single book” (242–43).  
17 For the most useful sources on why Bruce’s narrative was so controversial, see Withers, 
“Travel and Trust”; and Nigel Leask, Curiosity chapter 2.  
18 See Wolcot’s A Complimentary Epistle to James Bruce. Walpole circulated a 
commonly cited anecdote in which, during a dinner party, one of the guests asked Bruce 
if he saw any musical instruments in Abyssinia.  “Musical instruments,” said Bruce, and 
paused—“Yes I think I remember one lyre.”  The dinner guest then leaned to his 
neighbor and whispered, “I am sure there is one less since he came out of the country” 






19 In response to Johnson’s comment about Lobo having “consulted his senses, not his 
imagination,” Bruce writes, “At first reading this passage, I confess I thought it irony” 
(3.138). 
20 The Catholic Joachim Le Grand and the Protestant Hiob Ludolph were still the two 
reigning scholars on Ethiopia in the eighteenth century. More overtly than Johnson, 
Bruce praises Ludolph and criticizes Le Grand throughout the Travels. Bruce’s first 
conversation with Empress Məәntəәwwab is about their mutual dislike of Catholics (3.208). 
Johnson was less interested in overtly criticizing Catholicism, but he was curious about 
and defended Ethiopian Christianity, downplaying Le Grand’s anti-orthodox sentiment in 
his translation of Voyage historique d’Abissinie. See Belcher, Abyssinia’s Samuel 
Johnson chapter 3.  
21 Bruce was not the first European writer to recount Makəәdda’s portion of the Kəәbrä 
Nägäśt.  Ludolph paraphrases the story from Tellez (158-161), and states that the 
Gorgoryos, the Abyssinian monk who travelled to Germany to study with Ludolph 
confirms that his version matches up with “the Book…called the Glory of the Kings” 
(161). The semi-fictional Late Travels of S. Giacomo Baratti, an Italian Gentleman 
(1670) mentions her journey and her connection to the line of Solomon in Ethiopia (103, 
220). She is part of the first paragraphs of Lobo’s “Description of Abyssinia” (41). 
However, the way Bruce’s version of the story resonates throughout all the volumes of 
his narrative, as I detail further.    
22 Məәntəәwwab tells Bruce that her “only wish” is to “be conveyed to the church of the 






find Aster has made plans to travel part of the way with him after he leaves Gondar, 
telling him “You would not stay with us, so we are going with you” (4.294). She explains 
that Ras Mika’el’s enemies have finally captured him, “and therefore, being now a single 
woman, I am resolved to go to Jerusalem” (4.294).  
23 Məәntəәwwab’s honorific was “Berhan Mogasa,” meant to complement Iyasu II’s 
honorific, “Berhan Seged,” which means “He To Whom the Light Bows” (Crummy 95). 
24 Iyoas was allegedly persuaded by his Oromo relatives to dismiss Mika’el from court 
and condemn him to his own province where he was then attacked. After Iyoas denied 
Mika’el’s request to order his relatives out of Tigre, Mika’el retaliated. See Pankhurst 
134-138 and Bruce.  
25 Strictly speaking, Ras Mika’el first put Yohannes II on the throne, but he only lived a 
few months, very likely poisoned by Ras Mika’el himself, who then replaced him with 
Täklä Haymanot II.    
26 Despite the fact that Bruce was not, as he claimed, the first European to set his sights 
on the source of the Blue Nile, he was the first to approach it with what we might now 
call a scientific method, and Edward Ullendorf reminds us that “the stimulus [Bruce] 
gave to Ethiopian scholarship became the decisive basis on which all else is built” (143). 
27 Critics who have analyzed or remarked on this passage include Leask 16; Liu 505; 
Bode 69; Carnochan 26; Crawford 378; and Mitsein 12.  
28 I examine the significance of Bruce prioritizing Scottish rivers over English ones 
elsewhere. See Mitsein, “Come and triumph with your Don Quixote.”   






30 See Nigel Leask, “Kubla Khan and Orientalism: The Road to Xanadu Revisited.”  
31 For more on Bruce’s influence on the literary world, see Leask, “Kubla Khan”; Bode; 
Liu; and Reid. For more on Bruce’s influence on the scientific and anthropological world, 







By the end of the eighteenth century, the cultural tools that British subjects used 
to make sense of the world were changing. The Seven Years War, which set Britain on 
the path to becoming a global power, altered Britain’s geopolitical relationships and 
colonial practices (Watts 2). In 1758, Britain captured Senegal from France, intending to 
use it as a starting point for expansion into Africa, setting in motion the institutionalized 
colonial initiatives that would become prominent in the nineteenth century.1 As part of 
this trajectory, Wahrman suggests that by the 1780s Britain became obsessed with 
nationalism and began defining the British self in opposition to foreign others (217). 
During this same time, more sentimentalized portraits of Africa and Africans also began 
to dominate the British imagination as part of the growing abolition movement. Texts 
such as Ignatius Sancho’s Letters (1782) and Thomas Clarkson’s Essay on the Slavery 
and Commerce of the Human Species (1786) represented Africans as harmless and peace 
loving to combat arguments that slavery was defensible because Europeans bought 
Africans captured in just wars.2 The role that African potentates played in brokering the 
slave trade was downplayed to prevent Europeans from passing the moral buck onto them, 
but such narrative strategies also deemphasized their political and territorial power. 
However understandable the intent of these tactics, the effect was an increase in accounts 





conventions of travel writing transformed along with these other shifts. As Duncan and 
Gregory observe, Romanticism “dethroned the sovereignty of Reason and glorified 
unconstrained impulse, individual expression, and the creative spirit.” Travelogues began 
to focus on the experience of the individual traveler “over objective observation” (6). In 
other words, many of the historical, generic, and epistemological factors that encouraged 
British travelers and writers to turn to Africa and Africans to fill gaps in their own 
knowledge began to fade.  
  But this does not mean that African worlds and worldviews stopped inflecting 
British texts. Rather, more work is needed to identify the unique mechanisms through 
which this happened at the end of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth. James 
Bruce’s travel narrative is one case that bridges these shifts. Though the majority of 
Bruce’s models would have been from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, he 
was attuned to popular narrative conventions at the end of the century and clearly makes 
an effort to interweave picturesque description with empirical observation. In fact, this 
generic heterogeneity could be another reason why readers found him entertaining but 
untrustworthy. He claims to be producing scientifically objective knowledge, but the way 
he inserts himself into every scene as the heroic traveler created a narrative conflict.3 Still, 
as I argue in Chapter 5, Bruce’s vexed public reception neither erases the African 
influences from his text nor precludes us from thinking about how they might have 
permeated culture more broadly through his wide readership.   
 Another useful test case for thinking about how African discourses seeped into the 
Anglo-Atlantic world in the later eighteenth century is Olaudah Equiano’s Interesting 





into slavery, who eventually purchases manumission. Equiano’s account of his African 
homeland deploys several of the representational changes sketched above. He describes 
his birthplace as picturesque, “situated in a charming fruitful vale” (4), and its inhabitants 
as innocents: “As our manners are simple, our luxuries are few…. Our manner of living 
is entirely plain” (8). The women are graceful, the men cheerful and affable (12). 
Although he admits that his village kept slaves, he emphasizes the differences between 
African and West Indian slavery: “With us they do no more work than other members of 
the community, even their master” (14). His experience as a slave in Africa, though 
represented as a tragedy, is comparatively humane. This is no doubt partially because 
slavery in Africa was often more humane than in Europe or America.4 But the discourse 
of slavery is deployed in the narrative to significant rhetorical effect when contrasted 
with the first white slavers he encounters, who immediately flog him when he refuses to 
eat (35).   
When Equiano’s autobiography was republished in the 1960s, it was treated as a 
rare glimpse into an authentic eighteenth-century African worldview.5  Scholars from 
literature, history, and African studies turned to it as an authoritative source on both 
eighteenth-century Africa and the Middle Passage. Indeed, it was the first detailed 
description of the Middle Passage published in English (Carretta 3), and its vivid portrait 
of the Passages horrors is no doubt real.  However, in his 2005 biography of Equiano, 
Vincent Carretta provides compelling evidence that Equiano was in fact born in South 
Carolina, and that his Igbo origin story is a literary performance, a discursive construct in 
service to the early abolitionist movement (2-4). This argument has been controversial. 





connection between the old world and the new; for those for whom Equiano’s narrative 
was a powerful testimony to the horrors of slavery, and for those for whom Equiano’s life 
provided an example of triumph in the face of adversity, this was both a startling and 
unsettling possibility” (232-33).6 Scholars expressed anxiety that changing how we 
thought about Equiano’s identity “discredited” him and the powerful points his narrative 
makes about slavery and the Middle Passage.7 The specific details the autobiography 
offers about Igbo language and culture, they furthermore argue, flags the narrative’s 
authenticity.  
The flaw in this reasoning is the assumption that unless a text is authored by an 
African subject with firsthand, empirical experience of the continent, it cannot be an 
“authentic” African text. Perhaps it is more useful to consider how Equiano’s narrative is 
a corporately authored text, comprised of discursive details from the hundreds of 
Africans living in Britain and thousands of Africans living in the New World in the 
eighteenth century, and even from African discourses filtered first through the European 
travelogues that Equiano’s narrative also evokes. After all, Carey points out, “Equiano 
knew many other Africans, and thus did not need to rely on his memory alone for details 
of Igbo language, geography, and culture. Indeed, had he decided to construct an Igbo 
identity, it is inconceivable that Equiano would not have researched the language and 
culture” (237). This does not make the text any less African. Indeed, it serves as an 
important reminder that Africa in the eighteenth century was comprised just as much 
through global commerce and cross-cultural exchange as Europe and America were. The 
destabilization of authorial identity in Equiano’s narrative does not discredit the early 





tangible avenues through which African discourse shaped literary history across the 
eighteenth century and beyond.  
The examples of Africa writing back into Enlightenment texts that I have included 
throughout this project are no doubt an imperfect beginning toward this goal. Still, much 
of what is good comes slowly. My mother used to tell me an Ethiopian folktale about an 
impatient girl who longed to please her shy new stepmother. She goes to her grandfather 
to ask him the secret of winning her stepmother’s love. Her grandfather says he will only 
tell her if she brings him some hair from the tail of a lion. So, the girl brings meat to a 
lion’s cave every day, getting a little closer to the beast each time, until finally she gets 
close enough to pull its tail. Running as fast as she can back to her grandfather’s house, 
he tells her, “Go to your stepmother as you did to the lion, slowly by slowly.” I have tried 
to approach my research with this same wisdom, knowing that I have so far touched on 
only a fraction of the history and narratives that passed between Africa and Britain in the 
eighteenth century. Yet, as another Ethiopian adage goes, the egg only grows legs little 












1 Britain ended up giving Senegal back to France as part of ongoing negotiations in 1783, 
but in the meantime launched the Africa Corps in hopes of expanding their territorial 
control. See Searing, “The Seven Years’ War in West Africa.”  
2 The idea that slavery was justified if slaves were taken in a just war was a common 
argument reconciling slavery with Christianity from the medieval period to the eighteenth 
century. Snelgrave makes this argument, among others, in the justification for the slave 
trade included as part of his travel narrative. See 158-161. In his rebuttal, Clarkson 
protests, “But if the African convicts are innocent with respect to you…you have not 
even the shadow of a claim upon their persons” (77).    
3 For example, he makes much of the fact that his camera obscura allowed him to render 
drawings with the “utmost truth and justest proportion,” and as he goes on to explain “all 
the landscapes, and views of the country, which constitute the background of the picture, 
are real, and in their reality shew, very strikingly indeed, in such a country in Africa, 
abounding in picturesque scenes, how much nature is superior to the creation of the 
warmest genius or imagination” (x). But the objective or universalized quality of his 
descriptions and images are undercut by the fact that throughout the narrative there is 
only room for him inside its tent. Bruce’s obsessive need to be the body behind the 
image—the “I” behind the eye—frames the images from his travels, with all their claims 
to Cartesian perspectivalism, in highly subjective terms. Thus, the allegedly disembodied 






4 Thornton suggests that while in Europe and America, slaves were imported to do the 
kind of work that Europeans either would not or could not do, “African slaves were often 
treated no differently from peasant cultivators, and indeed they were the functional 
equivalent of free tenants and hired workers in Europe” (87).  
5 Paul Edwards’s 1967 abridgement was the first time the narrative appeared in print 
since 1837.  
6 The most outspoken critic of Carretta’s findings has been Paul Lovejoy. Lovejoy and 
Carretta debated the issue of Equiano’s birthplace in several articles published in Slavery 
and Abolition from 2006-07.  
7 For a detailed account of the evidence for and against Equiano’s African or American 
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